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The commentary attempts to ?ain a more accurate and 
comprehensive picture of the events and personalities 
included in the Life of B-utus or forming part of the 
historical background of the biography. Since Plutarch 
is biographer and moralist first and only then an 
historian, his narrative is checked and complemented from 
a comparison of other sources, in order to out].ine Brutus' 
part in the final struggle of the Roman Republic.
Rome modern questions and discussions on points 
raised by this survey are included also. Plutarch's 
portrayal of Brutus - since, again, be is prepared to 
sacrifice strict accuracy to his general moral purpose - 
is briefly considered in relation to other evidence, 
especially the contemporary evidence of Cicero, which 
affords a comparison and modifies the idealistic 
presentation of Plutarch's Life.
1.
c. 1- The ancestors of Brutus.
Cicero: ^rutus 97, 521. Tusc. IV 1, 2. ^hii, %
6, 15. II 11, 26. IV 5, 7, X r. 14.
Orat. II 55, 224 - 56, 22^. Att.'xiII 40, 1. 
XVI 5.
Appian; II 112, 469. Dio 44, 12, 1-5. 45, 45, 4.
Nicolaus: (Vita Caes.) 19. 26.
Livy: I 56-60. II 1-6. IV 14 f. Dioysirs of
Halicarnassus IV 6" ff. V 18. VI 70, 1.
Valerius Maximus: IT a. o, %v 1. v 5, T. 8, 1.
VI 4. Ext. ll VII 5, 2. VIII 14, 6. 2. IX 1, 5
Rilius Italiens: Punica VII 642-660. VIII 607 f. IX 415.
Pauly - Wissawa X 961 ff. Suppl. V 255 ff.
Grueber - CRRBM I pp. 477-480,
Sydenham: Roman Republican Coinage p. 150.
The Life begins conventionally rith some account of 
Brutus' family. This chapter deals with the two most famous 
of the reputed ancestors of Brutus: Lucius Junius Brutus, in
popular belief the expeller of the kings and first consul, and
Rervilius Ahala who assassinated Spurius Maelius in 429 B.C.,
on suspicion of aiming at monarch (see Dion. Hal. IV 67 f.,
Livy I 56 - II 6. IV 14 f.).
The association of the Servilian and Junian families with 
these early Liberators was general in antiquity. According to 
Plutarch (l, 6); no-nne doubted Brutus' descent from Ahala
through his mother Servilia, but objections ^^ ere raised
especially by enemies to his claim to be a descendant of the 
first consul; and v.ûth reason. Even if f. B?mtus is an 
historical figure, there is no possibility that the later 
Junii Bruti were connected with him. His line was believed 
to have died out with the two sons whom he executed (Dion.
Hal. V 18. Val. Max. V 7, 1), Posidonius, who defended the 
claim (1, 7); seems to have originated the theory that L.
Brutus had a third son. There is no trace of his existence 
in traditional accounts of the early Republic.
The family apparently disregarded the chief objection 
to their claim - that the first consul must have been a 
patrician, while the historical Junii are plebeians (Dion,
Hal, V 18). Accounts of them before the fourth century are 
unreliable. They did not attain nobility until the consul­
ship was throv.n open to the Plebeians. Thereafter they are 
found holding the chief offices of the Republic (see Livy 
VIII 12, 12. 29, 2. IX 21, 1. 28, 2. - cf. Val. ItAx. II 9, 2. 
VÏIT 14, 6. IX 1, 2. Livpr Per. 16. 8il. It. VII 607 f. IX 
415); for their plebeian origin see TJ.vy 24, 45, 2 - the 
tribune of 195 B.C.
The origin of the connection with the first consul is 
imknown., but was well-established by the mid-second century 
when the poet Accius produced his nraetexta "Brutus" in honour 
of his patron, Dec. Junius Brutus Callaicus, cos. 128 B.C. (see
Gic. Brnt, 28, 107. de leg. Il 54. nro Arch. 27. l'^ arro de 
C.L. 5, 80). Dionysius (VI 70, 1) invents an '::'arly plebeian 
L. Junius Wiio tried to assume to cognomen Brut"''s and ■'uno is 
later numbered among the first tribunes (cf. Plut. Coriol.
7, 1^. He is almost certainly a fictitious counte:rart of 
the first consul (see X 968).
Schur (T^'^ Suppl. V 266 -8) reaches the conclusion that L. 
Brutus himself is a figure of legend. He is not the sole 
example of a patrician, famous in the traditions of the early 
Republic, who is represented in later times only by a plebeian 
family bearing the same name (note the Cassii, Bemnronii, 
Volumnii, etc.). Possibly, ennobled plebeians fabricated 
patrician ancestors for themselves "vithout troubling to 
reconcile the discrepancy.
However it developed, the connection was commonly accented 
in the time of Marcus Brutus, Cicero frequently referred to 
it (e.g. Brut. 97, 221. Tusc. IV 12. Att. XIII 40, 1. Phil.
I 6, 13. IV 3, 7. X 6, 14), stressing the association of 
Brutus' name and family with liberation from tyranny.
In 44 B.C. it was fully exploited by Republicans in order 
to prepare the ground for,and after^ popularize^the assassi- 
nation of Caesar (see below 9, 6 f.). To accomplish it under 
the name of Brutus was all but a guarantee of good faith.
In the struggle following Caesar's death, Cicero helped to
propagate this view (see Phil. IV 3, 7. I 6, 13). In the
Tenth Philinnic he urged it, to overcome the apprehension of 
certain senators concerning Brutus' intentions in occuuyln? 
Macedonia (X 6, 14).
In the same way, Brutus, hoping to win the people with 
his Games in July 44, intended to revive the "Brutus" of 
Accius (Att. XVI 5).
Brutus himself clearly believed (or -ished to believe) in 
his descent and took pride in it. 'Imagines' of L. Brutus 
and Ahala were to be seen in his house among his ancestors 
(Phil, II 11, 26), and he induced Atticus to draw up his 
genealogy, tracing his line back to the two heroes (wepos Att. 
IB, 2. Cic. Att. XIII 40, 1). His natural interest was 
increased by his sympathy with the strong Republican views of 
his supposed ancestors. At the beginning of his career he 
turned to this tradition and as triumvir monetalis GO/59 B.C. 
issued coins bearing portraits of his ancestors and "Libertas" 
(see Grueber I pp. 478-80. Sydenham p. 150). in addition to 
the family pride displayed here, there ma^ have been some 
intention of advertising his political stand on entering public 
life. At that time, too, when the first triumvirate was 
forming, the reminder of former champions of liberty was 
significant. Brutus v/as not alone in recalling them.
Vettius tried to implicate Cicero in his "plot" (see below"' 
oy quoting a remark of his; "Ahalam Rervilium aliquem aut 
Brutum opus esse reperiri" (Att. II 24, 2),
5.
Later writers, aware of Brutus' keen interest in his 
family history, believed it was one of the chief motives for 
his part in the conspiracy against Caesar (Dio 44, 12-12.
App. II 112, 469). In this connection, L. Brutus was more 
important to him than the Bervilian line. Ahala is never 
mentioned escept in conjunction with Brutus.
It is significant, too, that Brutus continued to be 
known by his father's name after his adoption and even in 
his official title the name of Brutus was retained (see Phil.
X 11, 25-26. Dio 41, 63, 6). And this, although in the 
first century B.C. the Servilii were more prominent than the 
Junii Bruti, who in the preceding generation had produced 
several lawyers and minor Populares, no important figures 
(see Cic. Brut. 47, 175. 34, 130. de Orat. II 55-56. Livy 
Per. 88. App. I 60, 271). Apart from distant Junian ancestors, 
the Servilii played a greater part in Brutus' life. After 
his father's early death in 77 B.C., he was drawn closer to 
his mother's family and eventually adopted by his maternal
p-3/-
uncle (see belowÿ. The personal influence of his Mother, 
Servilia, may be seen in this. From Cicero's letters it is 
clear that she was always active in his affairs, both public 
and private (see Att, XIII 16, 17, 22. XV 11. ad Brut. I 18).
2, 1. More important was the influence of her half-brother, 
Cato (cf. Cato Min. 1, 1). His attachment to her (see 
Asconius in Rcaur. 17 "apud Catonem maternam obtinebat
auctoritatem".; and the death of the elder Brutus porhans 
first led him to take particular interest in his nephew.
Plutarch introduces Cato here, "here some account of 
Brutus' father might have been expected. (Tihe latter is 
not mentioned until c. land then very briefly). He 
notes Brutus' admiration for his uncle and his imitation 
of him. Certainly his political and philosophic views 
display the effect of his association from youth with the 
uncompromising Republican and Stoic - though he was never, 
like Favonius, a blind imitator. Cato's opinions were modi- 
fled in him, at once less extreme and less steadfast.
A slight indication of his opinion of his uncle is found 
in Cicero. In his "laudatio" of Cato he gave credit to his 
part in the Catilinarian debate in 62 B.C., at Cicero's 
expense (Att. XII 21, 1. cf. PW X 984): in the "Brutus",
Cicero allows him one comment on Cato - "in quo perfectissimo 
Stoico summam eloquentiam non desiderem" (31, 118).
It was his relation to Cato more tnan the legendary 
connection with the first consul that influenced surviving 
Republicans in 44 B.C. and led them to look to him as a 
possible leaner.
7.
c»2, 2f. Brutus as philosopher and man of letters,
Cicero; Brutus, Orator, Academica, de finihus,
Tusc. V 10.13. ad Atticum XII 5B. XIII 8.
Tacitus: dial, de orat. 18, 21, 25.
Quintilian: Instit. Orat. Ill 6, 93. IX 3, 95. X 1, 183.
7, 27. XII 10, 11. 1, 22.
Seneca; Dial. XII - Cons, ad Helv. 9. Bp. Mor. 95, 45.
Pliny: Bp. V 3, 5. Aurelius Victor; de vir. ill. 82, 2.
Statius: Silvae IV 9, 20-23.
Hercher: Epistolographi Graeci pp. 177-191.
Keil: Grammaticl Latini I pp. 130. 367. 383. 388.
Teuffel: History of Roman Literature (Eng. trans.) I 209.
E. Filbey: Concerning the Oratory of Brutus (O.P. VI 1911
pp. 325 ff.)
R.E. Smith: The Greek Letters of M. Junius Brutus (C.Q.
XXX 1936 pp. 134 ff.)
G. Boissier: Cicôron et ses amis pp. 343-345.
This aspect of Brutus attracted Plutarch above all and 
is the dominant feature of the character he portrays. It 
appears in the preliminary sketch in c.l, 3-5 -
(c o ( f ^ ^ * 6 g  - t o  j  &0 S
There is no doubt of its importance. Brutus was 
always more of a philosopher and student than a man of action 
and in this lay one of the chief causes of his failure in
8.
politics. His birth and training led him to embark on a 
career that, in other circumstances, he might not have 
chosen. Throughout his public life he betrayed his 
preference for study. He never failed to find time to 
devote to it, no matter what other affairs were on hand.
Cicero bears witness to this; "in maxirais occupationibus 
nunquam intermittis studia doctrinae, semper aut ipse scribis 
aut me vocas ad scribendum" (Orator 10, 34). Quintilian, too, 
probably with this passage in mind, holds him up as a model of 
industry for the student: *neque enim fere tarn est ullus dies
occupatus ut nihil lucrativae, ut Cicero Brutum facere tradit, 
opera© ad scribendum aut legendum aut dicendem rapi aliquo 
momento temporis possit" (X 7, 2 7). Cicero again, in the 
^Brutus", comments on his "singularis industrie" (6, 2 8 ); c.f. 
"contine te in tuis perennibus studiis" (97, 332).
Plutarch (below 4, 8) tells how he occupied his leisure 
time in Pompey's camp " 'hoyoos ", and was
engaged on an epitome of Polybius just before Pharsalia.
During his stay at Athens in the autumn of 44 B.C. (c. 24, 1-2) 
he attended the lectures of Theomnestus and Gratippus while 
negotiating with the governors of the neighbouring provinces. 
Appian gives a similar picture of him during the campaigns of 
43-42 B.C.: o If SVy y iy j i /
 ^ ooK (iV 133, 561).
Cicero ascribes to him a love of study for its own sake.
9.
In the "Brutus", he replies to Cicero, who has been de$t)rlng 
the loss of free speech in the Forum: "Ceterarum rerum causa
istuc et doleo et dolendurn puto; dicendi autem me non tarn 
fructus et gloria quam studium ipsum exercitatioque delectat"
(6, 85). This unpractical attitude is exemplified in the 
style of speaking that he cultivated.
In philosophy, Brutus, though influenced by Cato, did 
not follow him strictly. Plutarch's statements on his attach­
ment to Plato and the Old Academy, his admiration for Antiochus 
of Ascalon, and his acquaintance with Aristus are well supported 
by Cicero - see Acad. I 5, 18; "Brutus quidem nos ter ...
Arlstum Athenis audivit aliquam diu cuius tu (Varro) fratrem 
Antiochum" (cf. Brut. 97, 338)
de fin, V 3, 8: "... cuius oratio attende, quaeso. Brute,
satlsne videatur Antioch! complexe esse sententiam, quam tibi 
qui fratrem eius Aristurn frequenter audieris maxime probatam 
existimo"
Brut. 40, 149 "vestra. Brute, vetus Academia ...".
Brutus, that is, followed Antiochus in rejecting the scepticism 
of the Middle and New Academy, which Cicero defended.
Antiochus had insisted on the essential agreement, at 
least in ethics, between Academics, Peripatetics and Stoics, 
who all derived ultimately from Plato. In Cicero's "Academica" 
his doctrines are expounded by his friend Lucullus: "(Plato)
reliquit perfectissimam disciplinam, Per^ateticos et Academicos
10.
norainibus différentes, re congruentes, a quibus Stoici ipsé 
verbis magis quam sent-entiis dissenserunt" (II 5,15).
Elsewhere, Cicero confirms Antiochus' (and Brutus') approval, 
in particular, of Aristotle, Xenocrates, Speusippus and Polemo 
(Tusc. V 10, 30. 13, 39. de leg. I 38. Acad. II 42, 131. 45, 137). 
The close connection between Academic and Stoic ideas is 
emphasized see de leg. I 53 "de re una solum dissident, de 
ceteris mirifice congruunt". Again, Antiochus, "qui 
appellabatur Academicus", is said to have been si perpauca 
mutayisset, germanissimus Stoicus" (Acad. II 43, 132).
Through this affinity of ideas and his association with 
Cato, Brutus had much of the Stoic in him. Antiochus, 
however, differed from the Stoics in his conception of the 
wise man; he taught that physical excellence and external 
goods could contribute to happiness - c.f. Acad. II 43, 134:
*<Zeno in una virtute positam beatam vitam put at; quid 
Antiochus? Stiam, inquit, beatam sed non beatissimam". Yet 
he seems to have favoured the Stoic view on the question of 
the emotions, though the Academics in general maintained a 
different opinion, see Acad. II 44, 135: "Sed quaero quando
ista fuerint ab Academia vetere décréta, ut animum sapientis 
oommoveri et conturbari negarent? .., ill! quidem etiam 
utiliter a natura dicebant permotiones istas animis nostris 
datas ...".
The distinguishing characteristic of the Old Academy was
11.
its insistence on moderation: "Omnis virtus sit, ut vestra.
Brute, vetus Academia dixit, médiocrités" (Brut. 40, 149).
And again, "Mediocritates illi probabant et in omni permotlone 
naturalem volebant esse quendam modum" (Acad. II 44, 135).
This doctrine, above all, appealed to Brutus and he practised 
it not only in philosophy but in his political life also.
Of his own philosophic works only a few quotations and 
brief references survive. Cicero extravagantly praises his 
work; "Brutus quidem noster ... sic philosophiam Latinis 
litteris persequitur nihil ut isdem de rebus Graeca desideres" 
(Acad. 13, 12). The flattering comparison with the Greeks 
is repeated in "de finibus" (13,8): "te ne Graecis quidem
cedentem in philosophie
Brutus' chief contribution seems to have been his treatise 
«de virtute", written in the form of a letter to Cicero in the 
summer of 47 B.C., see de fin. i 3,8 "gratissimo mihi libro 
quern ad me de virtute misisti". It is identified with the 
letter mentioned in the "Brutus" ("epistulam quam ad te Brutus 
misit ex Asia" (3, 11)) which, Cicero says, first roused him 
from his despondency (3, 12) and which prompted him to repay 
the debt with his "Brutus".
The treatise was written after Brutus' visit to M. Claudius 
Marcellus in his exile at Mytilene (Brut. 71, 250). Seneca 
quotes his account of the visit and its effect on him: "Brutus,
in eo libro quern de virtute composuit, ait se Marcellum vidisse
12,
Mytilenis exulantem ... Itaque adicit, visum slbi se magis in 
exillum ire qui sine lllo rediturus esset quam ilium in 
exilio relinqui ... Idem ait Brutus C. Caesarem Mytilenas 
praetervectum quia non sustineret videre deformatum virum" 
(Cons, ad Helv. 9, 4-3),
Cicero, towards the end of the "Brutus" returns to this 
"letter” and quotes a passage which, like Seneca's fragment, 
hears closely on the political situation: "tuis suavissimis
litteris, quibus me forti animo esse oportere censebas, quod
me.
ea gessissem quae de me etiamy^tacente ipsa loquerentur mortuo 
viverentque; quae si recte esset, salute rei publicae, sin 
secus, inter itu ipso testimonium me or urn de re publica 
consiliorum darent" (Brut. 96, 330).
The book was evidently intended to reconcile Cicero to 
the victory of Caesar and the loss of freedom in public life. 
Boissier ( op. cit. p. 344) summarizes: "la morale du livre
4tait que pour vivre heureux on n'a besoin que de soi".
This recalls Brutus' letter to Cicero in 43 B.C.; "... longe
a servientibus abero mihique esse iudicabo Romam ubicumque 
liberum esse licebit ... Quid enim est melius quam memoria 
recte factorum et libertate contentura neglegere humana?" (ad 
Brut. I 16, 8-9).
Here, too, Brutus shows that he could consider the possi­
bility of a life spent apart from Rome and public affairs, that 
he was not as strongly attached to the city itself as Cicero
13.
wsis. Boissier (p. 344) points out that this aloofness and. 
detaciiEient, which Brutus cultivated, may command respect in a 
philosoper but is not the best attitude for a statesman and 
party leader to adopt. Brutus, indeed, was not fitted to be 
such a leader, especially in the age in which he lived. The 
character of the idealist and doctrinaire is revealed in his 
actions repeatedly, often in conflict with the needs of a 
particular situation. Of such men Boissier observed "Ils 
peuvent être des sages; ils font de mauvais chefs de partis”
(p. 345).
The titles of two other treatises have been preserved. 
Seneca briefly describes one: "M. Brutus, in eo libro quam
-yryl inscripsit, dat multa praecepta et
parentibus et liberis et fratribus" (Bp. Mor. 95, 45),
The third title is found in the grammarian Diomedes 
(G,L. I p. 383, 8 K) "apud veteres ridunt reperimus dictum, ut 
M. Brutus de patientia 'inridunt horum lacrimas'
Later critics rated Brutus higher as a philosopher than as 
an orator, see Tac. Dial. 31 "Brutus philosophiae suae relinqua- 
mus; nam in orationibus minorem esse fama sua etiam admiratores 
eius fatentur", Quintilian, too, (X 1, 133) places him among 
the philosophers and considers his philosophic works more 
successful than his speeches,
Plutarch, with his greater interest in this aspect of 
Brutus, briefly dismisses his ability as writer and speaker in
14.
Latin (g, 5: ytr/c^  r^ r/f^ s T<s
K«( I r'c cfs. ^  y  W | /  c  K < / / tZ)^ c  Ù  ; g j  I  C 5  J
Cicero provides evidence of his training and early career as an 
orator. He studied at Athens under the rhetorician.Pammenes 
(Brut. 97, 332) and was beginning to speak in the courte at Rome 
when his career was cut short by the Civil War and subsequent 
loss of free speech in the forum (lb. 6, 2 2 ): "Cum enim in
maximis causis versatus esses ... subito in civitate cum alia 
ceciderunt turn etiam ... eloquentia obmutuit".
He is said to have taken part in several cases with both 
Cicero and Hortensias (ib. 51, 190. 94, 324), but only one in 
which he spoke at Rome is known. At the trial of his father- 
in-law, Appius Claudius, on a charge of 'maiestas' in 50 B.C., 
Brutus appeared for the defence with Pompey and Hortensius (ib, 
94, 324 and F, III 11, 3), His 'laudatio' of Appius is also 
mentioned by Diomedes (G.L. I 367, 26 K) "ut Brutus laudatione 
Appii Claudii 'qui te toga praetexta amicuit'",
Brutus composed and published a defence of Milo, 
'exercitationis gratia' (Quint. X 1, 23, 5, 20. Ill 6, 93. 
Ascon. in Milon. 36), Both Asconius and Quintilian note 
Brutus' line of argument in thfe, since it differed from 
Cicero's. He did not attempt to exonerate Milo, but claimed 
that the death of Clodius was a benefit to the state: see
Ascon. 36, 11 "interfici Clodium pro re p, fuisse - quam 
formam M, Brutus secutus est", c.f. Quint. Ill 6, 93
15.
"ideoque pro Milone aliud Ciceroni agent! plaçait, aliud 
Bruto ... ille etiam gloriatus sit occiso male cive".
The speech Brutus delivered before Ceasar in 47 B.C. on 
behalf of Deiotarus (below 6, 6. Cic. Brut. 5, 21. Att. XIV 
1, 2) also survived and was known to Tacitus (Diql. 21).
In his style of speaking Brutus joined the reaction 
against Cicero and became one of the self-styled Atticists, 
who professed to model themselves on the Attic orators 
("Atticorum similes esse volumus" Brut. 83, 286-7). They 
cultivated greater simplicity and severity in thought and 
diction, avoiding rhetorical ornament and emotional appeal 
(see Brut, 84, 289; "Quare si anguste et exiliter dicere est 
Atticorum, sint sane Attici").
Brutus and his contemporary C, Licinius Calvus were pro­
minent in this group which, inevitably, met v/ith opposition 
from Cicero. He condemned them for poverty of thought and 
dryness of expression and for the mistaken view that the most 
concise and severe style represented true Atticism, see Orator 
9, 28 "Putant enim qui horrid© inculteque dicat, modo id 
eleganter enucleateque faciat, eum solum Attlee dicere”. c.f. 
Brut. 82, 285; ieium^itatem et siccitatem et inopiam, dum
modo sit polita, dum urbana, dum elegans, in Attico genere 
ponit ... 'Atticos, inquit, volo imitari.' Quos? nec enim 
est unum genus
They retorted by accusing Cicero of verbosity and
16.
diffuseness. Tacitus (Dial. 16 & 85) and Quintilian (xil 1,
22) refer to the controversy between Cicero and the leading
Atticists, his 'obtrectatores', "quibus inflatus et tumens ... 
et parum Atticus videretur". (Dial. 18) It was carried on 
in letters, evidently known to Tacitus and Quintilian. Here, 
Cicero's real judgment of Brutus appears, shorn of compliment - 
see Dial. 18; "Legistis utique et Calai et Bruti ad Ciceronem 
missas epistulas, ex quibus facile est deprehendere CalBum 
quidem Ciceroni risum exsanguem et aridum, Brutum autem otiosum 
atque diiunctum; rursusque Ciceronem a Cal#o quidem male 
audisse tamquam solutum et enervem, a Bruto autem, ut ipsius 
verbis utar, tamquam frac turn atque elumbem". The use of the 
unusual word 'elumbis' in the metaphorical sense, of style, with 
the meaning 'enervated' has no parallel elsewhere; it provides 
another example of that inclination towards the abstruse in 
Brutus.
Quintilian (XII 1, 22) notes that Cicero was not wholly 
approved by Brutus and CalSfus, "qui certe compositionem illius 
etiam apud ipsum reprehendunt”.
Of all those who took part in the controversy, Tacitus 
finds Brutus alone in his manner of conducting it - see Dial.
25: «Ham quod invicem se obtrectaverunt et sunt aliqua
epistulis eorum inserts ex quibus mutua malignitas detegitur, 
non est oratorum vitium sed hominum •.. solum inter hos 
arbitrer Brutum non malignitate nec invidia sed simpliciter et
17.
ingenue iudicium animi sui detexisse". Even here, then, he 
practised "mediocritas". Yet Tacitus' description contrasts 
with Cicero's complaint of the haughty tone of Brutus' letters 
to him ("contumaciter, adroganter ... solet scribere" Att. VI 
1 , 7. c.f. 3, 7). Possibly Tacitus judged differently or was 
less sensitive to inconsiderate frankness - c.f. Dio's comment 
on Cicero (46, 29, 1); <=cotos uîcif yx/ y r w» t i<*er^Ko/>ci
T>j lToi^/0(T (-<< TT Toi. ô u o L t o ^   ^y rc ^ y
j ^ t f o o  T ' y /  S i t o Z < K i /  TTC. ^  u. j .
In criticising the Attici in the "Orator" and "Brutus"
Cicero never plainly acknowledges that Brutus, whom he wished 
to convert to his own style of oratory, v/as one of them. On 
the contrary, in the "Brutus" he fails to give a true repre­
sentation of Brutus' views; perhaps he is intending to give a 
picture of his ideal Brutus and at the same time enabling 
himself to attack the Atticists without openly criticising the 
real Brutus. Thus, for instance, Brutus, in the dialogue, 
expresses pleasure at Cicero's digression to demonstrate the 
Atticists' faults (85, 292. "mihi ... fuit periucunda") and 
throughout he is made to agree with Cicero. He calls the 
Stoic orators "ad dicendum inopes" (31, 118) - but is allov/ed 
to exclude his uncle Cato - and later asks if restraint 
(sanitas) is not a defect, for the orator must inflame his 
audience (80, 279); he extols Marcellus (71, 249-250) and.
18.
therefore, Cicero ("tui similem in dicendo")
(see Filbey C.P. VI pp. 325 ff.).
But in the final passage of the "Orator", Cicero hints at 
their differences, see 71, 837; "Habes meum de oratore.
Brute, iudicium; quod aut sequere, si probaveris, aut tuo 
stabis, si aliud quoddam est tuum". The truth emerges in a 
letter to Atticus: "Quin etiam cum ipsius precibus (c.f.
Or. 71, 838) paene adductus scfipsissem ad eum de optimo 
genere dicendi, non modo mihi sed etiam tibi scripsit sibi 
illud quod mihi piaceret non probari" (Att. XIV 80, 3).
The clash of opinion is characteristic of their troubled 
friendship, inevitable in the encounter of two such different 
personalities. The same style could not please both. For 
that reason Cicero refused to correct the speech Brutus deli­
vered after the assassination and later published, see Att. XV 
la, 2. "Itqque eam corrigera non potui. Quo enim in genere 
Brutus noster esse vult et quod iudicium habet de optimo 
genere dicendi, id ita consecutus in ea oration# est, ut 
elegantius nihil possit; sed ego secutus aliud sum siwe hoc 
recte siBe non recte."
The style cultivated by the Attici exactly suited Brutus, 
but he strove too laboriously to acquire it and, lacking 
natural eloquence, he displayed chiefly the defects to which it 
was prone; it v/as apt to become too plain, meagre and 
spiritless in aiming at simplicity and dignified restraint.
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Cicero's criticism of Callus might justly be applied to 
Brutus: Brut. 82, 285: "accuratius quoddam dicendi et
exquisitius afferebat genus; quod quamquam scienter elegan­
ter que tractabat, nimium tamen inquirens in se atque ipse 
sese observans metuensque ne vitiosum colligeret etiam verum 
sangùinem deperdebat”,
In describing the speech he had refused to correct,
Cicero characterizes Brutus' style, and points to the vital 
deficiency which all his study and practice could not supply, 
see xy, f "est enim oratio scripts elegantissime sententiis, 
verbis, ut nihil possit ultra; ego tamen, si illam causam 
habuissem, scripsissem ardentius."
His speeches in general, too carefully avoiding rhetorical 
flourishes, were evidently cold, dull and monotonous, see Cic. 
Or. 31, 110: "tu autem eodem modo omnis causas ages? ... aut
in isdem causis perpetuum et eundem spiritum sine ulla 
commutâtlone obtinebis?"
Later critics, too, found him uninspiring as an orator 
(see Tac. Dial. 21; Quint. X 1, 123). Tacitus dismisses the 
speech "pro rege Deiotaro" - "ceterosque eiusdem lenitudinis 
ac teporis libros". Statius (Silvae IV 9, 20-23) criticizes 
the taste of a friend who gave a copy of Brutus' works as a 
present ("Bruti senis oscitationes"). However admirable 
Brutus' oratory might appear to a fellow-student of the art, 
it was not of a kind to appeal to a wide audience, and so
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failed of its primary object. Cicero's observations on 
Calaus again are probably true of Brutus, see Brut. 88, 283;
"itaque eius oratio nimia religion# attenuata doctis et
attente audientibus erat inlustris, a multitudine autem et a 
foro, cui nata eloquentia est, devorabatur." According to
Cicero, all the Atticists were unpopular (ib. 84, 889): "At
cum isti Attici dicunt non modo a corona ... sed etiam ab 
advocatis relinquuntur ... subsellia grandiorem et pleniorem 
vocem desidérant."
Brutus seems to have experienced this reaction in his 
audience - see Brut, 51, 198: "Ego vero, inquit ille, ut me
tibi indicem, in eis etiam causis in quibus omnis res nobis 
cum iudicibus est, non cum populo, tamen si a corona relictus 
sim, non queam dicere." The dependence on the crowd, sug­
gested here, is surprising in Brutus, who despised and avoided 
the type of oratory most likely to appeal to the general 
listener.
Possibly this, too, is merely part of the Ciceronian 
picture of him; yet there is no obvious reason for misrepre­
sentation here.
In spite of his defects, Brutus displayed some impressive 
qualities. Quintilian (XII 10, 11) names "gravitas" as his 
distinguishing characteristic and comments on the impression of 
earnestness and sincerity gained from his works; "Brutus 
suffecit pondéré rerum; scias eum sentire quae dicit" (X 1,123),
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Tacitus picks out the same trait (Dial. 25 «... gravior 
Brutus"). Caesar himself, hearing Brutus speak, was struck 
by his vehemence (see below 6, 7 and Cic. Att. XIV 1,2 "...
quicquid vult, valde vult"), The same speech Tacitus later 
stigmatized as cold and dull (Dial. 21), but he found more 
vigour in other speeches, see Ann. IV 24 "Bruti contiones 
falsa quidem in Augustum probfa, sed multa cum acerbitate 
habent."
Other written works of Brutus include a political 
pamphlet 'de dictatura Pompei', published in 52 B.C., of which 
Quintilian has preserved a fragment, expressing Brutus' atti­
tude to autocracy, see IX 3, 95: "Praestat enim nemini
imperare quam alicui servira; sine illo enim vivere honeste 
licet, cum hoc vivendi nulla condicio est." Seneca (Contr. X 
1, 30, 8) quotes his direct attack on Pompey, "cum quidem eius 
civili sanguine non inquinatas solum manus sed infectas ait".
His eulogy of Cato appeared early in the year 45 and seems 
to have displayed his usual faults of style. Atticus was not 
satisfied with it (Att. XII 21, 1 "... ea quae requis1eras") 
and Cicero repeats Caesar's verdict: "Bruti Catone lecto, se
sibi visum disertum" (Att. XIII 46, 2).
In addition to his work on Polybius, written in 48 B.C. 
(see C.4, 8), Brutus made epitomes of the annals of Fannius and 
Caelius (Att. XII 56 XIII 8 Teuffel 209, 3). He also produced 
some verses - probably youthful attempts. Tacitus thinks
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little of them and classes them with the verses of Caesar 
and Cicero, see Dial, 21 "Fecerunt enim et carmina et in 
bibliothecas rettulerunt, non melius quam Cicero sed felicius 
quia illos fecisse pauciores sciunt." Pliny (Ep, V 3, 5) 
excuses his own attempts at verse by citing famous men who 
shared this weakness, his list Including Brutus.
C.2, 5-8. Plutarch, passing over Brutus' work in Latin, of 
which he was no critic, discusses only his Greek style as 
exemplified in his letters to the Asian communities in 42 B.C. 
He gives some examples of the epigrammatic, laconic brevity 
which characterized this style. It was akin to the deliberate 
austerity of his Latin, but seems to have been more exaggerated. 
The quotations correspond to nos. 1 (p.178), 69, (p.191) and 25 
(p.182) of the collection of Greek letters attributed to Brutus 
(Spist. Graec. pp. 171-191), except in one particular. The 
letter to the Samians (c.2, 7) is addressed to the Lycians in 
HerCher.
The existing letters are full of difficulties and are 
probably not a completely genuine collection (see below on cc. 
30-33; and Smith C.Q. XXX pp. 134 ff.). This passage in 
Plutarch certainly provides external evidence in their favour; 
his quotations may be authentic examples of Brutus' style.
The letters as we have them are all brief, some consisting of a 
single line (e.g. no. 33). They rather resemble hasty notes, 
except in some instances where rhetorical antithesis is
23.
consciously used (e.g. no. 11, pp. 179-80); and here it
seems too elaborate for the particular occasion. It may be
that these were the embellishments of later rhetoricians, 
using the original letters as a basis. The replies are 
admittedly the work of the editor Mithridates (pp. 177-8),
And in the case of no. 11 in Hercher, the letter is suspect in 
itself since it contradicts all the sources. For Brutus* 
distinctive style we have only Plutarch’s evidence,
Mithridates indeed mentions it ( r ) but he
also admits that the original letters may have been written by 
secretaries ( cct-c £.is Tv ^t<r9^oo
), in which case they could not be taken as evidence 
of Brutus* style. Farther, in c.53, 7 (below) Plutarch sug­
gests that forged letters of Brutus were already known in his 
day (A.fSmith, p. #03).
Other letters of Brutus 7/hich have not survived are 
mentioned by Charisius and Diomedes (G.L. 130, 15. 388, 7 K), 
including one addressed to Caesar.
24.
C.3 Cyprus.
Plutarch; Cato Minor 34-39
Dio. 38, 30, 5. 39, 22, 1-4
Veil. II 45, 4-5
Livy Per 104
Cicero: de domo sua 20, 52. 25, 65
Att. V 21. VI 1-3
de vir. ill. 80, 2. 82, 4.
Val. Max. VIII 15, 10.
S.T. Oost; Cato Uticensis and the annexation of Cyprus 




Boissier: Ciceron et ses amis pp. 330-336
Tyrrell and Purser III Intro, XXV-XXXII VI Intro, xcvii ff.
Meyer; Caesar^s Monarchie p. 455,
The mission to Cyprus (58-56 B.C) on which Brutus accom­
panied Cato is the only event of his early career given in 
any detail by Plutarch.
The annexation of Cyprus was proposed and passed in the 
assembly by Clodius early in 58, and by a separate measure,
Cato was appointed to undertake it as * quaestor cum iure 
praetorio* (Veil. II 45, 4). The object of the appointment 
was to remove Cato from Rome for a time *per honorem 
turpissimum* (de domo 25, 65) and to lengthen his task, the
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restoration of certain Byzantine exiles was included in the 
decree (de domo 20, 58. Plut. Cato Min. 34, 5).
Cato despatched this business first, sending Canidius on 
to Cyprus. When he became suspicious of his representative, 
he directed Brutus to act for him until he should arrive 
himself (3, 8).
In Cyprus, the younger Ptolemy committed suicide on being 
deprived of his kingdom. All his personal possessions were 
appropriated and sold for the benefit of the Roman treasury 
(c.f. Livy Per 104). In this, Brutus was his uncle * s assistant 
and returned with him to Rome in 56, conveying the royal treasure. 
Both Senate and people are said to have come down to the Tiber 
to welcome Cato on his return, in admiration of his integrity 
(Pint. Cat. Min. 39. Veil. II 45, 5. Val. Max. VIII 15, lo).
S.T. Oost, however, has recently pointed out some diffi­
culties in the pro- Cato accounts, not least (one that Plutarch, 
Cato 38, reveals by elaborate explanation) the loss of both 
copies of his accounts on the journey home. Ptolemy*s house­
hold officers testified to his honest administration but, the 
written record being lost, it could not be proved - or 
questioned. This raises "a suspicion of illegality”: Oost
agrees that it can be no more, but he is inclined to think that 
if Cato himself was unimpeachable he may have been willing to 
overlook the misconduct of friends or relatives. Clearly, he 
suspects that Cato may have been protecting Brutus.
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The suspicion cannot be confirmed from reports of 
Brutus in other public affairs. He was not associated with 
the misgovernment of Appius Claudius in Cilicia, 53-52 B.C.
(de vir, ill, 82, 4) and in Cisalpine Gaul he contir^d to be 
honoured as a benefactor long after his death (see c. 58).
Private financial transactions were a different matter; 
it would appear that he drew a clear distinction between 
private and state business. For in the sample of his 
affairs found in Cicero's letters (Att. V 21. VI 1-3), an 
aspect of his life overlooked by Plutarch is revealed.
In his dealings with Ariobarz%ies of Cappadocia and still 
more with the town of Salamis in Cyprus, Brutus shov/ed that he 
was imbued with the ideas of the Roman aristocracy and shared 
its irresponsibility towards the provinces. Cicero was sur­
prised and disappointed in him (Att. V. 21, 13. VI 1, 6). He 
was particularly shocked by the circumstances of the Salaminian 
loan; the discreditable agents employed, the high rate of 
interest charged, the harsh measure taken to recover the debt - 
including the besieging of the town council with a troop of 
horse, which resulted in the death of several members (Att, VI 
1, 6. 2, 8). Cicero during his proconsulship in Cilicia in 
51 was expected to show himself accommodating in this affair.
He was reluctant to offend Brutus so early in their acquaintance, 
but could not in conscience accede to his requests (c.f. VI 2,7 
«fieri non poterat nee si posset ego pati possem”) and he was
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further annoyed by the tone of Brutus* letters, see VI 1, 7 
*ad me ... contumaolter, a d r o g a n t e r , s o l e t  
soribere* c.f. VI 3, 7. Yet, after all, when Atticus upheld 
Brutus, he would not assert his own judgment. The Salaminian 
case was left open, to be decided by his successor, and the 
sequel is unknown.
The influence of contemporary society and its practices 
can be seen at work here. Brutus showed a complete lack of 
regard for the Cyprians and was not above circumventing the 
law in his private interests: he secured two decrees to
exempt his agents from the provisions of the lex Gabinia on 
usury (Att. V 21, 11-12).
He was accounted an honest man in his own day, but his 
conception of justice and of duty was narrow, unimaginative, 
based on set rules and not illuminated by liberal thought or 
feeling: a failure not uncommon in his race and class.
«Neither religion nor sympathy aroused in them a sense of the 
claims of aliens and dependants” (Inge: Society in Rome, p.39).
Non-Romans, more particularly the despised subject-nations of 
the East, did not come within the pale of their consideration. 
The provinces existed purely for their personal advantage (c.f. 
Boissier p. 334). Brutus evidently concurred in this opinion. 
He was not enlightened by his study of philosophy, nor could 
his limited understanding conceive a wider sphere of duty than 
tradition prescribed «nourrie dans les opinions egoîstes de
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l*aristocrafce romaine /son n'avait pas assez d'étendue
ni d'élévation pour en découvrir l'iniquité'' (Boissier op. 
cit. p. 335).
His letters prove that he was not indifferent to the 
claims of friends and clients within his ov/n world; here, he 
obeyed the precepts of his own treatise 'de officiis'. Gelzer 
(PW X 1006) comments on the proportion of letters on behalf of 
friends or dependants in the small surviving collection of 
letters to Cicero (see ad Brut. I 6, 2-4. 7. 11. 13.). They 
include appeals in the interests of his nephews and step-son, 
recommendations of the affairs of his friends, Flavius and 
Antistius Vetus, and a plea for Glyco, Pansa's physician and a 
relation of one of Brutus' freedmen, when he was charged with 
responsibility for Pansa's death. "Nihil minus credendum 
est .,. Rogo te et quidem valde rogo (nam Achilleus noster non 
minus quam aequum est laborat) eripias eum ex custodia 
conservesque. Hoc eg'o ad meum officium privatarum rerum aeque 
atque ullara aliam rem pertinere arbitror” (I 6,2)• In his own 
sphere, therefore, he did not fall short of what was expected of 
a Roman 'nobilis'; but he failed to extend his sympathies 
further.
This picture bears slight resemblance to Plutarch's 
magnanimous philosopher. There is no reference in the life to 
Cicero's revelations. If he knew the letters from Cilicia 
(and he quotes Cicero elsewhere) he must have suppressed his
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knowledge and wilfully falsified his portrait here. For he 
states (c.3, 3) that Brutus had no taste for his task in 
Cyprus in 58, since it was unworthy of a scholar.
The reaction against Plutarch has led to another kind of 
distortion, in which the character of Brutus is torn out of 
its proper environment and judged with undue emphasis on this 
aspect (see Tyrrell and Purser loc. cit. Carcapino II p. 107 f.).
The Roman temperament, and the general lowering of moral 
standards in the dissolution of the Republic partly explain 
why Brutus did not find the profitable business of usury 
incompatible with the pursuit of 'virtus'; also, why the 
admiration of antiquity was not affected by his less philo­
sophic activities. Carcapino believes that the publication 
of Cicero's correspondence was intended by Augustus to dis­
credit former opponents; if so, it was singularly ineffective 
until modern times,in this instance. No use is made of the 
letters Att, VI 1-3 by historians of the Empire. Unless this 
is a conspiracy of silence, it may be supposed that they did 
not find them worthy of particular note (- @n attitude more 
recently adopted by Syme p, 57-58 note, Meyer p. 455 note,
Tenney Frank p, 342, Ferrero II p. 304). The discovery that 
Brutus was, in this respect, not so very different from his 
contemporaries cannot but affect a modern estimate of him; but 
it was a defect of the age - cf. Meyer p. 455: «nicht schoen;
aber er 1st echt roemisch-republikanisch”.
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CO. 1 - 4  (additional).
In his introductory chapters, Plutarch offers no detailed 
account of Brutus' early life before 49 B.C. His biography 
concentrates on the last three years, since the assassination 
of Caesar and its consequences provide the central interest, 
without which the rest would have little value. While no 
complete picture of the earlier years exists, some information 
can be gathered from other sources.
On the date of Brutus' birth, accounts disagree. There 
are three references; Cicero (Brut. 94, 324) speaking of 
Hortensius, says "annis ante decern causas agere coepit quam tu 
/Brutu^ es natus”, i.e. his birth-year was 85 B.C. But 
Velleius (II 72, 1) gives his age at his death: "Hunc exitum
M. Bruti partium^ septimum et XXX annum agentis, fortuna esse 
voluit”. Livy (Per 124) gives his age at death as about forty; 
but the main controversy is between the conflicting statements 
of Cicero and Velleius. Nipperdey (Rhein. Mus. XIX 291) 
attempted to solve the problem by emending Cicero to "annis 
ante sedecim" - a reading adopted by the Teubner text of 1902. 
Seeck (Hermes 42, 505-8) who upheld Velleius tried to refute 
the arguments in favour of Cicero (unemended) from Brutus' 
career. It is doubtful if this can be done successfully. In 
spite of Seeck's arguments, it is probable that Brutus held the 
quaestorship in 53 B.C. (see de vir. ill. 82, 3-4), and since
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Sulla's lex annalis of 81 was still in force Brutus must have 
been born not later than 84 B.C. - therefore, Cicero's date is 
very apt. Moreover, if - as now seems certain - he was 
triumvir monetalis as early as 60/59 B.C., then Velleius must 
be rejected; Brutus would not have entered on his public 
career before the age of twenty, except in unusual circumstances 
None of the authorities suggest* that he was an exception to the 
rule. On the contrary, their emphasis on his education both at 
home and abroad leads naturally to the conclusion that he did 
not enter public life before the normal age, i.e. that Cicero's 
indirect evidence is to be preferred to Velleius' definite 
statement,
Brutus' education was begun by the Greek freedman,
Staberius Eros (who also taught Cassius). His generous sym­
pathy for the children of the proscribed under Sulla's regime 
is described by Suetonius (de Grammaticis 13), see also Pliny 
NH 35, 199 on Eros' arrival in Rome as a slave. Brutus 
continued his studies at Athens under the rhetorician Pammenes 
and the Academic Aristus (Cic. Brut. 94, 324. Acad. I 3,12) and 
also at Rhodes (de vir. ill. 82, 2).
During this early period, he was adopted by his uncle and 
became officially Quintus Caepio Brutus (c.f. Phil X 11, 25-26). 
The exact date is not knovm. Grueber (CRRBM Ip. 480) and some 
others have supposed that it was shortly after the death of his 
father in 77 B.C. The first existing reference belongs to the
summer of 69 (Cic. Att. II 84, 8 *q. Caepio, hie Brutus").
For this reason the adoption has been dated to the same year 
by Gelzer (PW X 976) and Muenzer (PW II 1779). The 
identity of his adoptive father is uncertain - see Muenzer 
P W ^ A ^  1775-1730 on the Caepiones of this period. Gelzer, 
whose conjecture seems the most reasonable, identifies him 
with Pompey's legate in the campaign against the pirates, 67
B.C. (Florus I 41, 10) and the Caepio betbothed to Julia 
before her marriage to Pompey (Plut. Caes. 14, 3, Pompey 4%4, 
Scnat. Jul. 81. App, II 14, 50 Dio 38, 9). He was probably a 
brother of Servilia, but not Cato's favourite half-brother who 
died in 67, leaving his own daughter and Cato as joint heirs; 
possibly, he was an elder half-brother of Servilia,
Muenzer (II 1779) records the suggestion that the Caepio 
betrothed to Julia was in fact Brutus. Syme (p. 34) adopts 
this view and believes that the proposed marriage was the work 
of Servilia, But there is no evidence in the sources to 
support it.
About 60-59 B.C. Brutus entered on his public career, 
filling the minor office of triumvir monetalis, see Broughton; 
Magistrates of the Roman Republic II p. 448; Sydenham: Roman
Republican Coinage pp. Ixiv and 150; Grueber CRRBM Ip. 479. 
The coins issued by him commemorate L. Junius Brutus and 
Servilius Ahala (see above c.l). Babelon (Monnaie de la Rep. 
Rom. II p. 114) assigns them to the period after Caesar's death;
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but the later coins of Brutus were not struck at Rome.
Grueber holds it certain that they were issued by Brutus as 
an ordinary officer of the mint and not later than 59 B.C. 
Sydenham (followed by Broughton) prefers the year 60 but agrees 
on the period.
In the year 59 also, Brutus' name first appears in politics 
in connection with the affairs of Vettius and the alleged plot 
against Pompey. In Cicero's account, Vettius' first deposition 
in the Senate emphatically named Brutus among the "manus 
iuventutis”, but his statement next day, when Caesar brought him 
before the people, excluded all mention of Brutus (Att. II 24, 3) 
It v;as evident that he had been coached in his story. Me rivale 
(I 1, 97) and others thought there was some plot among the hot­
headed younger men. Only Dio, however, of the authorities, 
believed in it, and he named Cicero and Lucullus as its authors 
(38, 9, 1-4). Cicero gave it as the general opinion that the 
plot was a fabrication (Att. II 24, 3). He himself suspected 
Caesar and later openly accused Vatinius (in Vat, 10, 24-11, 27. 
Pro Sest. 63, 132). Suetonius also implies that Caesar was 
responsible (lul. 20, 5). It is more likely to have been 
arranged by his partisans (Plat. Lucullus 42, 7) or some agent 
like Vatinius, in order to rouse Pompey's suspicions of the 
'nobiles). Had Caesar been the author, he would surely have 
chosen a better tool for his purpose than Vettius.
The use of Brutus' name would obviously make a fictitious
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plot more plausible; his hostility to Pompey was well-knovrn, 
and he had recently proclaimed his Republican sympathies 
through his coins. Other connections o f his were implicated 
also - Bibulus, Lucullus, Domitius Ahenobarbus and Aemilius 
Paullus (who was not even in Italy at the time).
On the affair of Vettius, see also App. II 12, 43-13, 46. 
Dio 37, 41, 2. Oros. VI 6, 7. C.A.H. IX p. 520-21. Rice Holmes: 
Roman Republic I p. 323-4 and note p. 479 ff. In 58 B.C. 
Brutus left Rome for Cyprus (see c.3). From his return in 
56 to 53 B.C. he was probably at Rome, though not active in 
public affairs. His marriage to Claudia must have taken 
place about this time. The same years saw the beginning of 
his acquaintance with Cicero (c.f, F. XV 14, 6).
Sometime before the Civil War, he entered the college of 
pontifices (see Cic. Brut. 42, 156. 58, 212. ad Brut, I, 5, 3. 
15, 8, For numismatic evidence see Grueber op. cit. II p.
472 f, Plafe CXI, 7, Broughton, op. cit. II pp. 576. 254).
In 53, he accompanied his father-in-law, Appius Claudius, 
to Cilicia, probably as his quaestor (de vir. ill. 82, 3-4),
His close association with this man from 54 to 49 is nowhere 
mentioned by Plutarch; Appius v/as scarcely the best companion 
for his young philosopher. He forms a complete contrast with 
Cato and provides an example of the senatorial nobility at its 
worst. From Cicero, his successor, we have evidence of his 
rapacity and mismanagement in Cilicia and of his insolence
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towards Cicero himself (Alt. V 15, 2, 16, 4. 17, 6. VI 1,8. 
c.f. F. V 10, 8). He was also seriously implicated in 54 
with his fellow-consul Domitius, Cato's brother-in-law, in 
the discreditable bargain concluded with the candidates for 
53, The resulting scandal disconcerted Domitius - but 
Appius had nothing to lose by it (Att. IV 17, 8. 15, 7. Q.F,
II 14, 4. 15, 2). On his return from Cilicia, he v/as tried 
on a charge of maiestas but secured an acquittal. In the 
same year, 50 B.C., he was even elected censor: his activities
in the office are described by Caelius (F. VIII 14, 4).
Brutus escaped implication in the scandal of the 
Cilician administration (de vir. ill. 82, 4), in spite of his 
.association with Appius. This, and his appearance for the 
defence at his father-in-law's trial, outlines his career in 
the Civil War.
He seems to have attracted attention early in life.
Cicero, who was so much his senior in years and rank, sought 
his friendship on the recommendation of Atticus (Att, VI 1,
3 & 7). He was very well connected, and at the same time his 
character and habits, his relation to Cato, distinguishing him 
from the majority of his contemporaries, gained him a conside­
rable reputation before he had actually achieved anything 
notable,
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c,4. The Civil War, 49-48 B.C.
On the outbreak of war, Brutus - according to Plutarch - 
was expected to join Caesar, since he had always held aloof 
from Pompey on his father's account.
The elder Marcus Brutus is identified with the tribune of 
S3 B.C. (see Cic, pro Quinct, 20 . 65, 69) v/ho proposed to found 
a colony at Capua (de leg. agr. ii 38, 89. 34, 98-93. 98).
Like others of his family, he was a lawyer (Cic. Brut. 62, 888. 
F, VII 88. de fin, 1, 18) and supported the Populares. He 
seems to have been expelled from Italy with the followers of 
Marius in 88 B.C., for he is said to have returned later from 
Spain with other exiles to join Cinna (Liciniqnus 35, 5). He 
escaped the proscriptions, but after Sulla's death in 18 B.C. he 
was one of the leaders in Lepidus' uprising and held Cisalpine 
Gaul for him. Besieged in Mutina by Pompey, he surrendered 
and v/as given a safe-conduct, but soon after, executed on 
Pompey's orders (Plut, Pompey 16, App. II tii, 464. Oros. V 82, 
16-17 Livy Per. 90).
4, 3. Brutus' refusal to acknowledge Pompey before 49 must 
have been very marked, for by his marriage to Claudia he had 
formed a connection with Pompey, whose elder son had married 
Claudia's sister. In 52, however, Brutus had openly shown his 
hostility on political as well as personal grounds with the 
publication of his pamphlet (see above on c,2) - in this
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connection, it is notable that he was not deterred by his 
alliance with the Glaudii from condemning Clodius, his wife's 
uncle, and defending his murder (Quint. Ill 6, 93).
There were other considerations which might have drawn 
Brutus to Caesar's party. The political sympathies of his 
family had lain with the ppposition to the Senate in the 
previous generation. Not only his father, but the Brutus who 
was praetor in 88 B.C. and died at Lilybaeum in 82 (Livy Per. 
89) and L. Brutus Damasippus, praetor in 82, followed Marius. 
His mother Servilia was brought up with Cato and Caepio in the 
house of their uncle, the younger Drusus, at the time when the 
Italian question was being pressed (Plut. Cato Minor I, 1-2, 
2,1). -Although her second husband, D. Junius Silfipus, was 
allied with the Senate, Servilia no doubt retained her earlier 
sjnnpathies in her association with Caesar and exerted her 
influence on his behalf. Moreover, if Gelzer's conjecture is 
right, Brutus' adoptive father was, up to 59 B.C., one of 
Caesar's adherents, .Another Caesarian, M. Aemilius Lepidus, 
became his brother-in-law; while his father-in-law, Appius 
Claudius, had no strong political affiliations.
Brutus' decision in favour of Pompey seems to have been 
largely the work of Cato. He himself, like Cicero, might have 
preferred to remain neutral, since he had no enthusiasm for 
either leader. And in avoiding Pompey he had the excuse of 
family loyalty.
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Plutarch implies (4, 3) that he overcame his reluctance 
at the beginning of the war, before he went to Cilicia as the 
legate of Sestius, But from another source it appears that 
he required a plain direction from Cato before declaring 
openly for Pompey- (de vir, ill. 82, 5 «civili bello a Catone 
ex Cilicia retractus Pompeium secutus est"). Plutarch's 
narrative alone, i.e. the journey to Cilicia and decision there 
to proceed to Macedonia, without his interpretation supports 
this account; and Lucan, in his imaginary conversation between 
Cato and Brutus, presents a similar picture (Bell. Civ, II 
234 ff.), 11. 246-7 Namque alii Magnum vel Caesaris arma
Dux Bruto Cato solus erit.
11. 323-5 Sic fatur et acres
Irarum movit stimulos iuvenisque calorem 
Excitât in nimios belli civilis amores. 
c.f. Cicero's report of him in June 48 B.C.; Att. XI 4a "Brutus 
amicus; in causa versatur acriter",
4, 5. There is no other account of Pompey's warm reception of 
Brutus in Macedonia (see Plut, Pompey 64,5 ff,). It may be an 
exaggeration of Brutus' reputation and the regard in which he 
v/as held, on Plutarch's part.
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, 5-8. Caesar and Brutus.
Cicero : Att. II 24. XI 13. 15. XIV 1. XII 19. 27. 29. 
36. XIII.
Fam. XIII 10-14. VI 6,10. VIII 10. XV 14.
Appian: II 87, 365. Ill, 462.-113, 470.
Dio: 41, 63, 3. 42, 6 & 13. 44, 19, 5.
Suetonius : Divus lulius 50, 2. 82, 2.
Plutarch : Caesar 57; 62. Antony 11.
Cato Minor 24. Crassus 17-30,
Caesar: Bell. Civ. Ill 34. 36. 101-106. (Bell. Alex. 
66-68).
T. Rice-Holmes: The Roman Republic III 210^211, 482. I 436
ff.
R. Syme: The Roman Revolution pp. 58-59.
E. Meyer: Caesars Monarchie pp. 451. 455-6.
Abbott : Society and Politics in Ancient Rome pp. 66 
ff.
J. Carcopino: Correspondance de Ciceron pp. 104 ff.
G. Walter: Caesar (Eng. trans. I & II)
Deutsch: Caesar's 8on and Heir (University of
California publications CP IX pp. 168 ff.)
L.C. Purser : M. Brutus as Caesarian (Hermathena IX 
1894-96 pp. 369 ff.)
C.5. Caesar's concern for Brutus is illustrated here by 
the report of his orders at Pharsalia: no*/
(cf. App. II 112, 468). It is attributed to 
consideration for Servilia and belief that Brutus was his son.
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5, 2-4, Caesar's connection with Servilia was notorious.
Cicero, in his account of the affair of Vettius in 59 hinted 
that the withdrawal of Bfutus' name v/as due to Servilia's 
influence with Caesar, see Att. II 24, 3 "Primum Caepionem de 
oratione sua sustulit ... ut appareret noctem et nocturnam 
deprecationem intercessisse
Suetonius refers to it (lul. 50,2 "ante alias dilexit M. 
Bruti matrem Serviliam") and Appian (ll 112, 469) gives it as 
one of several possible motives for Brutus' part in the con­
spiracy.
5, 3-4. The incident of the letter, during the debate on the 
Catilinarians is repeated in Cato Minor (c. 24, 1-4). It is 
the earliest indication of any connection between Caesar and 
Servilia.
5, 2. The legend that Brutus was Caesar's son appears to have 
grown only when the dramatic possibilities of such a relationship 
could be exploited. There is no contemporary reference to it, 
Cicero's letters contain no hint of such a rumour, though he 
was aware of the relations of Caesar and Servilia and did not 
spare the reputations of Brutus' half-sisters (see Att, VI 1, 25. 
Suet. lul. 50, 2). Had he entertained any idea of it, he would 
surely have referred to it somewhere. Neither is it found in 
Nicolaus' contemporary biography of Augustus. It appears only 
in the later historians, partly to explain the favour shown to 
Brutus by Caesar, partly to heighten the dramatic effect of the
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assassination. This, too, is the source of Caesar’s supposed 
last words to Brutus: "... tradiderunt quidam M. Bruto
irruenti dixlsse; /«I (Suet. lul. 82, 2; cf.
Dio 44, 19, 5.) Suetonius and Dio alone repeat this story, 
and both discredit it.
The legend can have no foundation in fact. If Brutus was 
born in 85 B.C., Caesar at that time was only fifteen - or, 
possibly, seventeen (Eutrop. VI 24. see Rice-Holmes op. cit. I 
426 ff.). Even if Velleius could be proved right and Brutus’ 
birth placed in the year 78, it would be equally impossible, 
for Caesar was then just returning to Rome, after receiving the 
news of Sulla’s death (Suet. lul. 3,1). In any case, there is 
no reason to believe that he was intimate with Servilia so early 
in his life. The earliest references belong to the years 63 
and 59 (see above 5, 3 and Cic, Att. II 24. Suet. lul. 50, 2 - 
Caesar is said to have presented her with an expensive pearl 
during his first consulship). Plutarch appears to be placing 
the incident of December 63 and Brutus’ birth in the same period, 
without considering its absurdity. He repeats the popular 
story, but from the rest of his narrative it is clear that he 
could not have attached much importance to it.
C.6, 1-3. Immediately after Pharsalia, Brutus surrendered to 
Caesar and was pardoned at once, see Plut. Caes. 46, 4 and 62, 4 
App. II ill, 464. Dio 41, 63, 6. Nic. D&m. 19. Veil. II 52, 5. 
de vir. ill. 82, 5.
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6, 4-5. The betrayal of Pompey’s plans to Caesar is 
mentioned only by Plutarch, Apart from the improbability of 
Brutus’ knov/ing any private plans of Pompey, Caesar’s own 
account, if it may be trusted, provides evidence to the con­
trary, see B.C,III 102-106 on Caesar’s movements after 
Pharsalia; especially 106, 1 "paucos dies in Asia moratus 
eum audisset Pompeium Cypri visum, coniectans eum in Aegyptum 
iter habere propter necessitudines ...., Alexandream pervenit”
From this it is clear that Caesar did not make his way 
direct to Egypt from Larisa and that he was well able to guess 
the direction of Pompey’s flight, without aid from Brutus.
6, 6-7, Brutus evidently met Caesar again in Cilicia in 47 
on his return from the Alexandrine war (cf. Bell. Alex. 66. 
Cic, Phil, II 11, 26). There, he interceded for Cassius.
Cassius, in command of a section of/Pompeian fleet, had 
been active in Sicilian waters in the summer of 48 B.C. (see 
B.C. Ill 5, 3. 101. Dio 42, 13, l). On being assured of the 
victory of Pharsalia, he ceased operations against Caesar’s 
shipping and sailed away from that area (B.C. Ill 101, 7).
Dio (42, 13, 1) implies that he went first to Cato, but after 
receiving news of Pompey’s death left to make his peace with 
Caesar. Appian, too, (II 87, 365) suggests that Cassius 
parted from Cato and Scipio when he sailed east, but in his 
account (II 87, 365. 88, 370-372), Cassius, making his way to 
Pharnaces in Pontus, encountered Caesar at the Hellespont and
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instantly surrendered, though with his seventy triremes he 
might have overwhelmed Caesar’s small boats. Appian clearly 
identified this Cassius with the tyrannicide (see II tii, 464), 
but Bio (42, 6, 2) and Suetonius (lul. 63) in relating the same 
story, call the Pompeian captain Lucius Cassius. From Caesar 
(B.C. Ill 101-102) it seems impossible that Gaius Cassius could 
have reached the Hellespont by that time, for he did not leave
Sicily until he had definite news of Pharsalia - the Pompeians
distrusted the first reports - and Caesar himself is shovm 
hastening into Asia in pursuit of Pompey. Appian is alone in 
his account and is probably mistaken in assuming that it was 
Gaius CassiB who surrendered at the Hellespont,
This is the conclusion of Rice-Holmes (op. cit. Ill p. 482),
S. Meyer (op, cit. p. 536 note) and Carcopino (Hist, Rom. II 2, 
index of Cassii). The Cassius mentioned by Suetonius and Dio 
could not have been the brother of Gaius (as Froehlich thought - 
PW III 1680 & 1728), for he was a Caesarian (B.C III 34. 36), 
but is otherwise unknown.
Cicero at Brimdisium March - May 47 heard rumours of 
Cassius’ movements at Rhodes; his proposed journey to Caesar 
at Alexandria, abandoned on hearing of the revival of the 
Republican cause in Africa (see Att, XI 13, 1. 15, 2). Cicero 
clearly ranks him with those who had not yetocommitted themselves 
to Caesar’s cause and would be welcomed back in the event of a 
Republican victory (XI 15, 2). But he was at Tarsus (Phil. II
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11, 26) when Caesar arrived there and was reconciled to him 
before August 47 - the date of F. XV 15: «Tu enim earn partem
petisti, ut et consiliis interesses ... ego ... ab illo 
longissime et absum et afui" (15, 3). It seems probable, then, 
that he was pardoned at Tarsus. He became Caesar’s legate 
(F. VI 6, 10), perhaps in the campaign against Pharnaces, for 
he took no part in the African and Spanish wars,
I9hile Caesar was settling the affairs of Asia in 47,
Brutus pleaded for Deiotarus of Galatia, who was penalized for 
his adherence to Pompey. There is considerable confusion in 
the text here (c. 6, 6), but if the reading /\ 
is correct, Plutarch must have been misinformed,
6, 7. Cicero has a different version of Caesar’s comment on 
Brutus’ speech, see Att. XIV 1,2 «De quo ... Caesarem solitum 
dicere: Magni refert hie quid velit, sed quicquid vult,
valde vult; idque eum animadvertisse cum pro Deiotaro Nicaeae 
dixerit.w It is not known whether this was the Bithynian or 
Ligurian Nicaea (see Tyrrell and Purser V p. 225). For 
Deiotarus’ appearance before Caesar, see Bell. Alex. 67.
Brutus’ plea was not successful, for Deiotarus was forced to 
cede part of his territory (B.B. 68, 3; cf. Dio 41, 63, 3).
Brutus seems to have remained with Caesar during his stay 
in Asia, but left him to visit Marcellus at Mytilene (Cic.
Brut. 71, 250) while Caesar returned to Italy («ait Brutus C. 
Caesarem Mytilenas praetervecturn ,.*« Sen. Cons. ad. Helv. 9,8)
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This was in the late summer of 47 B.C., see Cic. Att. XI 
21, 2. "Ille ad Kal. Sept, Athenis non videtur fore. Multa 
eum in Asia dicuntur morari."
6, 10-12. Before leaving Rome again for Africa, Caesar made 
Brutus governor (legatus pro praetore) of Cisalpine Gaul for 
the year 46, see Cic. F. VI 6, 10 "Brutum Galliae praefecit" - 
App. II ill, 465. In the "Brutus” (46, 171), he is said to 
he leaving for his province in the near future. Several 
letters of Cicero (F. XIII 10-14) are addressed to him in Gaul, 
recommending various people or business interests.
Plutarch’s praise of Brutus’ administration cannot be 
checked from other sources. The chief reference is in Cicero, 
whose complimentary phrases cannot be taken literally, see 
"Orator” 10, 34. "itaque efficis u^ium gratiae causa nihil 
facias omnia tamen sint grata quae facis. Ergo omnibus ex 
terris una Gallia communi non ardet incendia in qua frueris 
ipse tua virtute."
It is not clear what Plutarch has in mind in his com­
parison of Gaul under Brutus with the other provinces and 
their unhappy state - unless, pehhaps, he is embellishing 
Cicero. Contemporary sources do not present this picture. 
Cicero is presumably referring rather to the disturbed state 
of other provinces than to gross maladministration. At that 
time, apart from Africa and Spain, where the civil war contins d, 
Transalpine Gaul had seen a rising of the Bellovaci, which was
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suppressed by Decimus Brutus (Livy Per. 114), and Syria was 
thrown into confusion by the Pompeian Caecilius Bassus, who 
incited the legions there to revolt and murder Caesar’s legate 
and kinsman Sextus Julius Caesar (Livy Per. 114. App. Ill 77, 
312-316).
As an indication of Brutus’ popularity in the Cisalpine 
there is the story, told by Plutarch in the Comparison (c. 58),
of Augustus’ visit to Milan, where he found a statue of Brutus 
still standing; he allowed it to remain there, commending the 
people for their loyalty to a benefactor.
6, 12, Brutus was succeeded in March 45 B.C. by Pansa, and
left the Cisalpine, It is not clear from Plutarch’s narrative 
that there was any lapse of time between Brutus’ governorship 
and Caesar’s return through the province. But in fact Brutus 
travelled north again to meet him on his return from Spain some 
months later. The interval Brutus passed in and near Rome, 
in constant communication with Cicero, whose letters record his 
movements following his return to Italy (see Att. XII 19. 27. 
29. 36 XIII passim). He spent some time on his estate at 
Tusculum, where he was Cicero’s neighbour (Att. XIII 7a, 11, 
44). In June 45.he took an important step, divorcing Claudia 
in order to marry his cousin, Porcia, Cato’s daughter (Att.
XIII 9, 2. 10, 3). It was unexpected, and caused much 
speculation, see Att. XIII 10, 3 - "sermunculum ... omne#t”, 
"Sunt enim qui loquantur etiam mecum." The sudden formation
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of this alliance, after his reconciliation with Caesar, 
showed a decided independence of action and proved that he 
had not entirely abandoned his former allies for Caesar’s 
friendship. Indeed, it marked the beginning of his return 
to them and the re-assertion of Cato’s influence over him.
After his uncle’s death, he may have felt some regret or 
shame for his own course (see Syme op. cit. p. 53), This 
strengthening of the family tie could only draw him back to 
Cato’s Republican principles and dispose other men to 
associate him even more with Caesar’s most determined opponedtr. 
It could not, therefore, have been welcome to Caesar, and 
certainly did not meet with Servilia’s approval (Att. XIII 
22, 4). Cicero was eager to hear if any word had come from 
Caesar (Att. XIII 16, 2. 17, 1), but he seems to have let it 
pass in silence.
7, 1-6. After his return to Rome, Caesar continued his 
favours to Brutus. He nominated him praetor urbanus for 44 
and promised him the consulship for 41 (at least, according to 
Velleius II 56, 3).
Plutarch suggests that Caesar was responsible for the 
estrangement of Brutus and Cassius, which followed the appoint- 
ment; cf. App. II 118, 466. It is quite possible that he 
chose this means of hindering any political combination between 
two potential enemies of his regime. Meyer (op. cit. p. 540), 
in support of this interpretation, points to his similar method
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with Antony and Dolabella, who were brought into conflict 
over the consulship of 44,
At the same time, he seems to have emphasized the personal 
nature of his preference of Brutus, in the source used by 
Plutarch and Appian, at least (cf. Plut. Gaes. 57, 5. App. II 
112, 467). It is quite consistent with his other acts and 
appointments, a part of the personal government by one man, 
who was to choose his own ministers. The resentment of the 
fnobiles* and their accusations of tyranny inevitably followed. 
7, 1. For Cassius' relationship to Brutus as husband of his 
half-sister Junia Tertia, see also Cic. Att. XIV 20, 2. XV 
11, 1. Dio 44, 14, 2. Tac. Ann. Ill 76.
7, 3, 7T(?XX^  Toc> K^(T<rLou
Cassius won a considerable military reputation from his 
exploits at Carrhae and in Syria, 53-51 B.C. Quaestor to 
erassus, he was left in command after the triumvir's death, 
retrieved the disaster of Carrhae as far as possible and, with 
the re-organised remnants of Crassus' army, defended Syria 
from the Parthian invasion which followed, even inflicting a 
defeat on the Parthian forces in 51 after repulsing them from 
Antioch, see Plut. Crassus 17-30. Livy Per 108. Cic. Phil. XI 
13, 35. Eutrop. VI 18, 8. Oros. VI 13, 5. Joseph Bell. lud. 
180-182. Ant. XIV 105. 119 f. de vir. ill. 83, 2.
Cicero unfairly belittled his successes (Att. V 18, 1.
20, 3. 21, 2), though he wrote to Cassius himself in glowing
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terms (F. XV 14), Cassius was succeeded by Bibulus and left
Syria in the autumn of 51 B.C.
8, 1-4. Plutarch believed that Caesar entertained some mis­
givings concerning Brutus and received warnings of him. The 
sayings of Caesar recorded here are repeated in the Lives of 
Caesar (62, 10) and Antony (11, 6) and in the Moralla (206, 14), 
In «Caesar" 62, 6, he reveals his mistrust of Cassius, too;
T / I L  UixTi/ J^ oJcra~tc)^  ^ £u-o<^
Q O  ^ «^ AT£.C ^ w / .
8, 3. Plutarch's interpretation of this remark of Caesar
( o Ùk  ^ i /  ^O K C C  B>/fOÔTOs ^ l /o c  ucct^e< (- T o
/ / / /
is scarcely possible. It is difficult to believe that Caesar 
could ever have considered Brutus as a possible successor.
He must have seen his complete lack of the abilities necessary 
for such a position, quite apart from his knowledge of Brutus' 
Republican views. His eagerness to secure him as an ally does 
not mean that he saw in him a possible heir. The absence of 
Brutus' name from his will suggests the contrary (see Deutsch, 
Caesar's Son and Heir pp. 168 ff,).
Plutarch may be offering his own opinion here, or possibly 
recording some tradition imown to him. Carcopino apparently 
accepts his view and finds in it one reason for Octavian's 
animosity towards Brutus (op. cit. II p. 106).
The favours bestowed on Brutus by Caesar were noted by 
other authorities (e.g. Appian II 111, 464-465; 112, 467.
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Dio 41, 63, 6. Veil. II 56, 3. 52, 5) but Plutarch lays 
more emphasis on Caesar's personal regard for Brutus. This 
he attributes in the first place to the influence of Servilia 
(c.5, 1); later he refers it to Brutus' ovm merits.
Caesar may have protected Brutus' name in the affair of 
Vettius to please Servilia; but, though she retained enough 
influence v/ith him to secure the reversion of Aquila's estate 
after the Civil War (Att. XIV 21, 3), it is not probable that 
his attitude to Brutus in later years was determined to any 
extent by his old attachment. And it was only after Pharsalia 
that his recognition of Brutus became marked. He pardoned him 
at once, and other Pompeians at his request, according to 
Plutarch; he sent him to the important Cisalpine Gaul and 
preferred him before men with better claims, even before some 
of his own followers. Moreover, he bore with open expressions 
of Republicanism from Brutus and showed no open displeasure at 
his marriage to Porcia. It was not his habit to interfere in 
the lives of his followers; see Matius to Cicero F. XI 28, 7 
"Caesar numquam interpellavit quin quibus vellem atque etiam 
quos ipse non diligebat, tamen iis uterer."
He pursued this policy, even when Brutus' friendships and 
family alliances could not avoid political implications. In 
this case, there v/ere other reasons for it, not connected with 
personal considerations, either for Servilia or for Brutus.
He had need of men like Brutus in his work of pacifying and
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reorganizing the state. His influence and his reputation 
would assist Caesar's cause; there were already too many 
disreputable adventurers among his partisans. The adherence 
of Cato's nephew and pupil would be a decided asset, Brutus 
was, more than any other, heir to Cato's ideas, both political 
and philosophical. It was natural that Cicero, Cassius, and 
other Republicans should begin to look to him, to expect him 
to take part in any Republican revival. To secure his support 
for Caesar's regime would thwart Cato's worshippers and destroy 
a potential centre of resistance at once. Caesar therefore 
set himself to win him over. It is noticeable that both the 
Republicans and Caesar evidently saw homething in Brutus, in 
spite of his defects, which they felt to be worthy of con­
sideration.
For any private affection of Caesar's part there is little 
evidence; but it is significant that he did not mention Brutus 
in his will, while both Antony and Decimus Brutus were among his 
secondary heirs,
Brutus' opinion of Caesar must have been influenced by 
Cato's unyielding opposition to him, Dio says he always 
showed hostility to Caesar, see 44, 15, 1 ^
first clear indication of it 
is his refusal to serve as Caesor's quaestor in 53 B.C., "quod 
is bonis eumaibus displicebat (de vir, ill, 82, 5). Yet in the 
Civil War he chose to make his peace with Caesar rather than
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follow Cato and the more determined Optimates to Africa. In 
this he shared the opinion of Cicero and Cassius (see F. XV 15) 
and was prepared to support Caesar's rule against the violence 
of Pompey's sons for the sake of peace, cf. Cassius' opinion 
F. XV 19, 4^and the words given to Brutus himself by Cicero; 
"doleo nihil tuam perpetuam auctoritatem de pace valuisse"
(Brut, 76, 266), But he never became a Caesarian. G.E. 
Schmidt's theory, that Caesar used him as a decoy to lure 
Republicans into acceptance of his supremacy is not tenable 
(see Purser, Hermathena IX pp. 369 ff.). It is quite out of 
character. Brutus had not the subtlety and tact for such a 
role, even if he had become a convinced Caesarian. In 
particular instances brought forward by Schmidt, the natural 
interpretation is the very opposite of his e.g. Brutus' visit 
to Marcellus. If this was intended, as Schmidt maintains, to 
convert one of Caesar's bitter enemies, it was unsuccessful.
On the contrary, his references to Marcellus in his "de virtute" 
(see above on c.2, 2) suggest that he was the one to be won over. 
It is equally unlikely that his requests to Cicero to write on 
Cato and on oratory were invitations to come out in support of 
the new dispensation. Again, the result was just the reverse 
of what a Caesarian would have wanted. Cicero was so much 
aware of this that he insisted on Brutus' sharing the responsi­
bility for his "Cato", evidently from fear of Caesar (Or. 35,
238).
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Nothing, in fact, in Brutus' character or career will 
support the theory. He took office under office under 
Caesar, but without dissembling his Republican sympathies.
He openly lauded irreconcilable opponents of the dictator - 
Marcellus in the de virtute, Cato in the laudatio composed 
after his uncle's death (Sen. Cons. ad. Helv. 9, 7-8. Att.
XII 21 & XIII 46, 2). It appears from Plutarch (below 40, 7) 
that he censured Cato's suicide, but that may have been an 
attempt to justify his own compromise with his principles 
(see Meyer op. cit. p. 452). However, he acquiesced in 
Caesar's regime only so long as he believed that Caesar would 
restore Republican government at the conclusion of the v/ar and 
abdicate, following the example of Sulla in 79 B.C. He clung 
to this hope long after Cicero had abandoned it. In July 45 
B.C. he wanted Cicero to write to Caesar (Att. XIII 44, 1); 
at that time he was himself preparing to go to meet the 
dictator as he returned from Spain (Att. XIII 23, 1), doubtless 
to discover his plans for the future. His interview with 
Caesar left him optimistic. He wrote to Rome, reporting his 
impressions, but Cicero was not convinced, see Att, XIII 40, 1.
■> ^  ■A
«Itane? Nuntiat Brutus ilium ad bonos viros? .
sed ubi eos? Nisi forte se suspendit ..."
Brutus too must have been disillusioned during the last 
months of the year, as it became quite clear that Caesar had no 
intention of abdicating. He was reputed to have crlticiaed
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Sulla and to have said that the Republic was an empty word - 
see Suet. ^ul. 77 "Nihil esse rempublicam; appellationem 
modo sine corpora ac specie ..." Whether the report was 
true or not, it expressed his disregard of the constitution,
and that soon appeared in his actions.
7, 7. While doubts of Caesar and his own position were 
beginning to assail Brutus, he was first approached by his 
friends who hoped to draw him away from Caesar entirely and 
to persuade him to take an active part again in the defence 
of the Republic.
Plutarch says they were the friends of Cassius, but there 
were others interested in Brutus' political direction, Cicero, 
for instance, who had tried to rouse his ambition and his 
pride in his ancestry in the «Brutus" (see 6, 22. 97, 331-2). 
He was disappointed by Brutus' acceptance of Pharsalia (cf. 
Att. XIII 40, 1) and puzzled, too, when Brutus wrote to
clear Caesar of any suspicion of complicity in the murder of
Marcellus. He felt that this defence was unnecessary (Att. 
XIII 10, 3 - June, 45). He need not have feared that Brutus 
was becoming a loyal follower of Caesar. There is no reason 
to suppose that he ever felt any personal attachment to him.
He had little opportunity to become well acquainted with him. 
Caesar was away in Gaul from the time when Brutus was 
beginning to appear in public life (Cic. Brut. 71, 248).
After Pharsalia, in the years 48-44, he spent some time in
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Caesar's company, but of his reaction to Caesar's personality 
there is no evidence. Knowledge of his mother's relations 
with Caesar may have affected his private opinion (cf. App.
II 112, 469), though it did not prevent him accepting favours 
from Caesar.
One of the outstanding features of his relations with 
Caesar is the freedom of action and speech which he retained, 
even when Caesar v/as at the height of his power. He never 
stooped to flattery, nor did he win Caesar's favour by 
conciliating him.
This undaunted frankness is another aspect of the 
"superbia" which the elder Seneca noted in him (Suas. VI 14) 
and which so often offended Cicero, Too inflexible^outspoken 
and ungracious in ordinary social intercourse, he was saved by 
those very qualities from joining in the general adulation of 
Caesar.
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cc. 8-18. The conspiracy against Caesar.
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C.8, 5f, Cassius: his character and the nature of his
opposition to Caesar ( B o y < o 1 UciXkct/ LBc<
j’ ut<ro T(J/)‘<v^ i^ a^ ) .
Plutarch gives first as the popular belief, this sketch 
of Cassius as a violent character stirred by personal
resentment against Caesar. (cf. Veil. II 56, 3). He then 
refutes it (c.9, 1-4) and affirms that Cassius was moved by 
hatred of autocracy itself, relating the anecdote of his 
encounter with Faustus Sulla in his schooldays, as early 
evidence of his Republican sympathies. The same story is 
told by Valerius Maximus (ill 1, 3).
There is no convincing evidence to support the popular 
view. Cassius does not seem to have entertained any strong, 
personal dislike of Caesar, certainly not before 44 B.C.
During the Civil War, he had not been associated with the 
extreme Optimates, though he followed Pompey from the 
beginning. In February 49, he was acting as Pompey's messenger 
to the consuls at Capua (Att. VII 81). Although he showed no 
hesitation in reaching this decision and took an active part in 
the war, he shared Cicero's views. They had discussed the
situation - probably when Cassius was Cicero's guest at Formiae 
in February 49 (Att. VII 23-25) - and had reached the same 
conclusion. They would not take part in a prolonged and 
desperate struggle but would let one battle settle the issue 
for them. See Cicero's letters to Cassius of 47 and 45 B.C.
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(F. XV 15 "utaque nostrum spe pads et odio dvilis sanguinis 
abesse a belli (necessarea) pertinacia voluit ,,. Sermo 
familiaris meus tecum et item mecum tuus adduxit utrumque 
nostrum ad id consilium ut uno proelio putaremus si non totam 
causam at certe nostrum indicium dejfinire convenire".
In accordance with this decision, Cassius ceased 
operations with his fleet after Pharsalia (Caes. B.C. Ill 101), 
later surrendered, and was actively employed by Caesar, see 
F. VI 6, 10 "Casslum sibi legavit". cf. F, XV 15, 3 «Tu 
enim earn partem petisti ut et consiliis (i.e. Caesaris) 
inter©sses«.
While Cassius was at Pompey's headquarters at Luceria in 
49 B.C. he seems to have advised Cicero not to commit himself 
by leaving Italy. See F, XV 15, 4 «atque utinam primis illis 
(sc. litteris) quas Luceria miseras paruissemî sine ulla 
enim molestia dignitatem meam retinuissem.«
During the African and Spanish campaigns Cassius was given 
no appointment but lived in retirement in southern Italy 
(F. XV 17, 4. 19, 1). Froehlich (PW III 1729) supposes that 
during this period of enforced idleness his opposition to 
Caesar first emerged. But his letter to Cicero of January 45 
(F. XV 19) contains no hint of bitterness. On the contrary, 
he expresses anxiety concerning Caesar's position in Spain and 
has no wish to see Pompey's son victorious: «peream, nisi
solicitas sum, ac malo veterem et clementem dominum habere quam
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novum et crudelem experirl". (19, 4).
In the same letter, he declared his intention of returning 
speedily to Rome, should Caesar be successful. Clearly, he 
was not an inveterate enemy of the dictator. Cicero later 
asserted that he had planned to assassinate Caesar in 47 B.C. 
on his arrival in Cilicia (Phil. II 11, 26), but there is no 
other evidence to support or refute this story, and, since 
Cassius was most probably reconciled to Caesar at Tarsus on 
that occasion (see above) it seems, at least, doubtful.
There is more reason to suppose that, like Brutus, and others, 
he hoped the constitution would be re-established at the end of 
the war and supported Caesar's dictatorship only while he 
believed it to be a temporary measure. When that hope was 
disappointed, his attitude to the "old and merciful master" 
promptly changed.
As to his resentment of personal slights - he may have 
been exasperated by his defeat in the contention for the 
praetorship; the choice of a younger man, though Caesar 
himself admitted that Cassius put forward the better claim, 
gave him a taste of the new regime which was certain to 
infuriate him. But it was an additional rather than a main 
cause of his hostility. The quarrel with Brutus which 
resulted was not maintained long (see below c, 10, 3).
8, 6. The story of Caesar's confiscation of his lions at 
Megara during his aedileship cannot be taken seriously.
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There is no hint of it in accounts of Caesar's legate, Calenus, 
at Megara (Plut. Caes. 43, 1. Dio 42, 14, 3). Moreover, at 
the beginning of the war, Cassius was one of the tribuni plebis 
(Att. VII 21, 2), There is no record of his aedileship - if 
he ever held the office. And apart from this, the story 
itself is too trivial to be regarded.
It is not necessary to search for such petty motives to 
explain Cassius' conduct. It is enough that he was a Roman 
'nobilis' and a true representative of the old governing class, 
whose position and privileges were threatened by the supremacy 
of Caesar. Hence, his active opposition when he became fully 
aware of the threat. He came of a family prominent in the 
history of the Republic and, true to its kind, intolerant of 
extraordinary powers which could raise one of the 'nobiles' 
above his peers. See Cic. Phil. II 11, 26 - "C. Cassius in ea 
familia natus quae non modo dominatum sed ne potentiam quidem 
cuius quam ferre potuit
In taking office under Caesar, he did not dissemble his 
real sentiments. According to Dio (44, 8, 1), when a majority 
of the Senate decreed an unusual number of honours for Caesar 
on one day, Cassius declined to vote. In Nicolaus' account of 
the Lupercalia (Vita Caes. 21), it was Cassius who stepped 
forward and removed the diadem when Caesar protested.
Cassius was a perfectly sincere Republican, but not, 
necessarily, an idealistic one. "... to a Roman senator, the
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res publica was at the same time a form of government and a 
v/ay of life. Free political activity among his equals was as 
a rule considered to be the senator's vocation and his aim in 
life» (Wirszubski op, cit. p. 88) cf. Phil. XIV 6, 17 "Magnus 
est in re publics campus ... multis apertus cursus ad laudem".
The?political activity was checked by Caesar's victory.
The state became 'res privata'. All honours and dignities 
were in the gift of one man (Suet. lul. 76, 2) and the 
'nobiles' were not content to be humble recipients. "gravis 
... erat liberis ipsa beneficiorura potentia." (Florus II 13, 92) 
cf. Nie. Ddm. 19: ^
troXXji^ urrjjjyc ^
) ^ / f  ^V 3 \ /_Ty S A U T T £ t .  .
Caesar's complete ascendancy ""after the victory of Munda, 
his disregard of constitutional forms, his seeming contempt for 
the senate (see App. II 107, 445-446. Dio 44, 8, 1-4. Suet, 
lul. 78, 1. Livy Per 116. Cic. F. VII 30) made the 'nobiles', 
both former Pompeians and Caesarians, ready to combine against 
him in the interests of their order. They were all, equally, 
affected. The life for which they had been prepared and to 
which they looked forward with confidence was no longer open 
to them.
At the same time, to strict Republicans Caesar's rule was 
a "tyranny", not so much in the quality of his government as in 
his own position, which violated the spirit of the constitution.
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Instead of the traditional distribution of power, all 
authority was vested in one man, who stood above the law.
See F. IV 9, 2 "Omnia enim delata ad unum sunt; is utitur 
consilio ne suorum quidem sed suo". Suet. lul. 77 
"debere homines consideratius iam loqui secum ac pro legibus 
habere quae dicat».
Such considerations formed the basis of senatorial 
opposition to Caesar, which came to a head in the conspiracy.
The conspirators' object was to reverse the decision of the 
Civil War and to re-establish the traditional form of 
government.
The motives of each individual cannot now be satisfactorily 
analysed. Petty resentments and jealousies could not have been 
absent, in such a large number; the leaders of the movement 
would welcome the support of all who were hostile to Caesar, 
including those who had private quarrels (see Tenney Frank p. 342) 
There were followers of Pompey who had suffered from the Civil 
War and were eager to retrieve their losses and the disgrace of 
defeat - for Instance, Quintus Ligarius, Pontius Aquila, Servius 
Sulpicius Galba. There were also dissatisfied friends of 
Caesar (who, according to Seneca, out-numbered the others - 
Dial. V 30, 4) who had not received the rewards they expected 
or v/ho were affended by the advancement of former Pompeians
(Nic. Dqm. 19).
"Many ... may have been actuated by paltry and personal
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considérations. But these, after all, were not the real,
dynamic forces at work" (Ferrero op. cit. II p. 306). The
aim of those vfho set the conspiracy on foot was the
restoration of the Republic; that is, of senatorial authority
and freedom for political competition among the 'nobiles'.
The most prominent members owed their advancement to Caesar
and could expect no more from Caesar's death than they were
likely to receive if he lived - except that free activity which
they claimed as a right. Among conspirators known by name
there are more ex-Pompeians than Caesarians (see PW X 255), 
of
yet/the inner group only Brutus and Cassius had previously
opposed Caesar: Decimus Brutus, Trebonius, Tillius*,Cimber,
the brothers Casca were all Caesarians and the first two were
in high favour with the dictator. Both had been allotted
important provinces for 44 B.C., Trebonius had held the
consulship for the latter half of 45, Decimus v/as nominated
consul for 42. They had no reason to be among the disappointed
friends who turned against Caesar. On that account Meyer
(op, cit, p, 538) defends them and asserts the essential
mis-
idealism, hov/ever/placed, of their motives.
The predominance of the Caesarians and the choice of 
Cato's nephew for the head of the conspiracy proved that it 
was in no sense a resurrection of the Pompeian cause. The 
loyalty of its members was to the Senate and the constitution. 
They were senators first and only then Caesarians or Pompeians.
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Republicanism was not merely a facade, a hollow slogan, 
behind which petty quarrels and disappointed expectations 
sheltered. But within the dual conception of the Republic - 
as a form of government and a way of life - could be con­
tained a wide range of motives from strict regard for legal 
forms to selfish anxiety for the preservation of class 
privileges. At its best their Republicanism was narrow in 
outlook, clinging to outworn tradition, with no constructive 
programme.
For Brutus, the sources in general agree in presenting 
him as a disinterested patriot and champion of 'libertas', 
even where his fellow-conspirators are doubted. According to 
Appian (II 112, 469) and Dio (44, 13, 1) he was influenced 
chiefly by public appeals to his family pride and by his 
connection with Cato. He v/as undoubtedly proud of the 
defenders of liberty among his ancestors, and his Republicanism 
derived primarily from Cato; the two factors form an integral 
part of his mental outlook. They are not isolated motives.
His attitude to autocracy at the beginning of his career is 
expressed in the dictum quoted by Quintilian from his attack 
on Pompey (IX 3, 95 see above on c. 2). His understanding of 
his own cause can be seen in his letters of 43 B.C. (ad Brut.
I 4, 2. I 16 & 17) which permit a comparison of the reality 
with Plutarch's idealised picture. See I 16, 8;- "ego vero 
... is sum qui non modo non supplicem sed etiam coerceam
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ç*
postulai^s ut sibi supplicetur.»
"ego certe quin cum ipsa re bellum geram, hoc est cum regno 
et imperlis extraordinariis et dominatione et potentia
quae supra leges se esse velit, nulla erit tam bona condicio 
serviendi qua deterrear." (17, 6)
«quod enim nondum senatus censuit nec populus Jomanus iussit 
id adpogantar non praeiudico neque revoco ad arbitrium meum"
(I 4, 8).
He was, principally, a constitutionalist, defending the 
laws and the senatus auctoritas. But in him the native 
Roman love of legality and aversion to autocracy were coloured 
by his study of philosophy and acquaintance with Greek ideas 
of tyranny and liberty (cf. ad Brut. I 16, 6). This made 
him, to Plutarch, a more interesting and sympathetic figure 
than Cassius and the other conspirators. His conception of 
the Republic, however, was basically the same, and he shared 
the limitations of his colleagues. He had no better under­
standing of the condition of the Republic, Yet it may be 
said that his principles, however narrow, were not insincere 
or conveniently identified with personal gain. He tried to 
prove that by refusing to penalise any of Caesar's adherents 
or to usurp authority in the confusion following Caesar's 
death.
At the beginning of 44 B.C. Rome was ripe for conspiracy. 
Opposition had been gathering since Caesar's return in the
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autumn of 45, His attitude gave offence to many;
Republicans were particularly shocked by his assumption of 
qu&si-regal honours. Moreover, the defeated 'nobiles' were 
not yet ready to accept their relegation to a secondary and 
subordinate part in politics.
Caesar was well aware of the general feeling - Cicero 
quotes his words on one occasion (reported by Matius): "Ego
dubitem quin summo in odio sim cum M. Cicero sedeat nec suo 
commodo me convenir© possit? Atqué si quisquam est facilis, 
hie est. Tamen non dubito quin me male oderit." (Att, XIV 
1, 2 cf. 2, 3). Rumours of plots against him were in the 
air, but he preferred to ignore them (see c. 8, 1 above and 
Caes. 62, 4-5). It was not in his nature to surround his 
life with elaborate precautions (see Veil. II 57, 1. Plut.
Caes. 57, 3 App. II 109, 455). He also believed that it 
would be obvious, even to the 'nobiles', tliat his preservation 
was in the interests of the State, See Suet. lul, 86, 2:
"non tam sua quam rei publicae intéressé, uti salvus asset ... 
rem publicam si quid sibi eveniret neque quietam fore et 
aliquanto deteriore condicione civilia bella subituram."
Discontent, however, was spreading. Even the people 
were becoming uneasy. There are some indications that 
popular dissatisfaction was stirred up by the opposition - 
traces of a deliberate campaign to discredit Caesar. Plutarch 
(Caes. 57, 2-3), Dio (44, 7, 2-4) and Nicolaus (20) suggest that
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the heaping of extravagant honours on him was as much the 
work of enemies as that of flatterers. The opposition lent 
its support and added to the original proposals in the hope 
that they would make Caesar odious to the city generally and 
prepare the way for a reaction. The same design has been 
seen in the notices which began to appear about this time on 
the statue of Lucius Brutus and on the tribunal of his living 
namesake (App. II 112, 469. Dio 44, 12, 1-3. Plut. Caes. 62, 
7-9. Suet. lul, 80, 3). Plutarch (9, 6 f.), with Appian and 
Dio, explains the notices as part of the plan to incite 
Brutus and draw him over to the opposition. Suetonius (loc. 
cit.) more plaudbXy includes them with other public criticisms 
of Caesar's actions, especially of his new additions to the 
Senate. The authors, so Cassius is said to have declared,
were the ifoZ:>rot K.Jotr t<r ro<^ , not the common people
/
(c.lO, 5. App. II 113, 472).
More important were the persistent rumours that Caesar 
aimed at kingship and the ambiguous incidents which brought 
this question into the open - for instance, the crowning of 
Caesar's statues by night, the greeting with the title of 'rex' 
as he returned to the city after the Latin festival in January 
44, the offer of a diadem at the Lupercalia in February.
What lay behind these incidents and who instigated them 
remains obscure. But (excluding the Lupercalia) their effect 
was to put Caesar at variance with the tribunes Gaesetius and
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and Marullus. He was displeased by their officious inter­
ference in the kingship incidents, and when they publicly 
complained that their freedom was curtailed, he lost patience 
and caused them to be deposed by the assembly; at the same 
time they were expelled from the Senate on a motion of the 
tribune Helvius Cinna. This action was highly unpopular 
(see Plut, Caes. 61, 8-10. Ant. 18, 7. Dio 44, 9-10. App. II 
108, 449-455. Suet. lul. 79, 1-8. Nic. Dam. 20. Veil. II 
68, 4-5. Livy Per 116, Cic. Phil. XIII 15, 31). The resulting 
alarm and resentment must have encouraged Caesar's enemies.
What hand they had in causing it cannot be ascertained. But 
to persuade the people that Caesar was an aspiring tyrant was 
precisely what they wanted and nothing could serve that end 
better than a clash with the tribunes of the people and an 
act that could be called appression. Caesar, by giving way 
to justifiable irritation, had played into their hands. He 
realised it himself - see Nic. Dam. 80 - his complaint to the 
Senate: t c  p a  r o ls ,
t o   ^ £cs rb o^oToi/
cf. Appian 108, 4Sf, and 109, 454 o^aioty
i/ri.Ooc<r9^(. <fo'h<<r<rc<-^  03<. c^ 7 ^ K cT<. -roCs j
^  nj f'6> J (f <- fcT'K o i b v o u .
His rejection of the diadem at the Lupercalia might 
possibly have been his answer, his attempt to vindicate himself.
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(For this incident see Plut. Caes. 61, 1^8. Ant. 12. Nic.
D m . 21. App. II 109, 456-8. Dio 44, 11, 1-3. Suet. lul. 79, 2. 
Veil. II 56, 4. Livy Per 116. de vir. ill, 85, 1. Cic. Phil,
II 34, 84-8%)
It was clearly inspired and carried out by the Caesarians 
and may have been pre-arranged by Caesar himself not so much to 
try the reactions of the people as to put an end to the rumours 
of his aspirations to monarchy (see Rice-Holmes op, cit. p. 336) 
For that purpose he ordered the offer and his refusal to be 
inscribed in the official records.
What wars his ultimate intentions were, what form of power 
he meant to establish and under what title must remain a matter 
for conjecture. The reality was his already, the trappings 
were less important. It was enough for the 'nobiles* that he 
did not mean to relinquish his power and did not refrain from 
flaunting it. Perhpfs they believed he meant to establish a 
monarchy; still, 'regnum' was a term current in political 
abuse, and the title 'rex' could be deliberately used to alarm 
the people. What really mattered was the actual establishment 
of perpetual autocracy and the extinction of Republican ideas 
of liberty.
c.lO. In this atmosphere, the conspiracy was developing.
It may not have been the only one. The rumours of other plots 
may not have been without foundation. But the successful 
conspiracy from its numbers was evidently conceived on a larger
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scale and represented a more general movement in the Senate.
Its first beginning is not known. Cassius is usually and 
in all probability rightly regarded as the originator and 
organiser of the plot. He appears in this role in Plutarch 
(c.lO, 1 and Caes. 62, 8-10) and Appian (II 113, 471 f.).
Their account has been challenged by Gelzer (PW X 898-9) and 
Froehlich (PW III 1730) because Dio (44, 14, 1-2) speaks of 
Brutus as the prime mover and Nicolaus (19) only lists 
Cassius with the principal conspirators. The evidence of 
these two authors is not really sufficient to disprove Appian 
and Plutarch (see Rice-Holmes op. cit. p. 339 note 5). Dio 
is alone in supposing that Brutus originated the conspiracy. 
Nicolaus does not name a single author: he says the plot
began with a small group and later spread widely to include a 
large number, o ls  jm£yL<rTOi^ tqSotKTO A c k u o  ^ 'Tc.
ll >007-0% . . K<^ 1 Ccilos
fSfioOr-os. . cf, Suet. lul. 80,4 where these three are called 
the 'principes' of the conspiracy.
Plutarch's account is more acceptable because it fits the 
characters of the two men., It is incredible that Brutus 
first conceived the plot and set it in motion. Reflective 
rather than active, he required some external stimulus before 
proceeding to decisive measures. Cicero had seemed dis­
appointed by his lack of response to veiled exhortations in 
45 B.C. Since then other influences had been at work; his
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observation of Caesar since his return, the promptings of
friends (9, 5 ByooTot/  ée xtcXho(_ iac^  r crui/i^b-cO’y
' /
. cf. Dio 44, 11, 4), not least,
the constant reminder of Cato in Porcia* His mind was ready 
to receive the suggestion of conspiracy, but from another.
It needed the presentation of an already defined Republican 
opposition to bring him to the point, When he knew that 
there was a plot on foot, he was prepared to join it.
Plutarch (Caes, 62, 2) adds that he had hung back because he 
was much indebted to Caesar and hesitated to attack a bene­
factor.
Cassius on the other hand was very well suited to the part 
of conspirator, secretly contacting and organising the various 
disaffected elements, giving the opposition coherence and set 
purpose. What that purpose was is shown by the general demand 
for Brutus as leader and representative figure.
y i p  oo ov^e' T^ V 77/^ c^i^ ,
JoiyjS ccoj obl'0£ i<T"TcV. . . (C.lO, 1-3).
Brutus, both from his own reputation and from his con­
nection with Cato, stood for the Republic in the general 
opinion. Not only that, but the influence he could exert 
through his kinship with many important families and through 
his friends was a consideration not to be overlooked. Repre­
sentatives of many noble families and even men who had not 
approved the idea of assassination were to follow him later.
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(see below on c. 88, 3 and 34, 3) Further, his name with 
its old. Republican associations marked him out for the head 
of a plot to remove the latest 'tyrant'. The people had 
already been reminded that the times called for another 
Brutus (9, 6f.). Decimus Brutus who also claimed the first 
consul as his ancestor (Phil. II 11, 26), could not in this 
enterprise command the same respect as Marcus. He was not 
known as a Republican, and, whatever his motives, the ties 
that had bound him to Caesar more closely than the rest 
could only make his appearance among the conspirators offensive 
and unnatural. Of the non-Caesarians Brutus was the obvious 
choice for leader. None of the others, not even Cassius, had 
the same prestige.
C.lO, 3. The interview described here by Plutarch and also 
by Appian (II 113, 471-473), in which Cassius first broached 
the subject to his brother-in-law, is doubtless a dramatic 
fiction. But it is probably true that Cassius was the first 
to approach Brutus and induce him to declare openly for the 
Republic.
Plutarch and Appian also agree in placing Brutus' 
decision a very short time before the execution of the plot 
when the subject of the debate on the Ides of March was being 
discussed. Yet from the following chapters (11-13), which 
recount Brutus' activities in assisting the growth of the 
conspiracy, a certain lapse of time must be assumed. It is
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unlikely, too, that Brutus was called in at the eleventh 
hour. When Cassius approached him, the idea of assassination 
was being seriously considered by a number of senators (whom 
Plutarch calls friends of Cassius, c.lO, 1), but probably it 
had not spread beyond this inner group before Brutus' 
accession,
c.ll. Having once entered into the plot, Brutus, 
characteristically, concentrated all his energies on it. The
first necessity was the adherence of as many friends and 
political sympathisers as possible.
Ligarius, called hère Gaius, but not found elsewhere 
under that name, must be the Quintus Ligarius numbered among 
the conspirators by Appian (II 113, 474), From Plutarch's 
account of him he can be identified with the Pompeian for 
whom Cicero pleaded successfully before Caesar in 46 B.C.
(Cic. pro Ligario F. VI 13 & 14. Att. XIII 12, 19, 20, 44). 
Plutarch (Cic, 39, 5) says Caesar was himself moved by Cicero's 
speech for Q. Ligarius and was also induced by the pressure of 
public opinion, excited by Cicero, to grant a pardon.
Ligarius' resentment was not softened and he remained hostile 
to Caesar (11, 2). Brutus, who is said to have been his 
friend, lost no time in approaching him and gaining his 
support,
C.12, 1, Ae it grew, the conspiracy began to extend from 
friends and allies of the leading members to all those who were
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prepared to take part for various reasons. The number of 
those finally involved is given as 80 by Nicolaus (19), but 
sixty or more by others. (Suet. lul. 80, 4. Eutrop. VI 25. 
Oros. VI 17, 2) . Appian gives a list of some who were v/on 
over (II 113, 474). From this and other sources, twenty 
conspirators can be identified by name; among them are ten 
known adherents of Pompey and six Caesarians - the previous 
political affiliations of the remaining four are unloiov/n,
(see PW X 255).
12, 2 - cf. Plut, Cic. 42, 1. The conspirators, according
to Plutarch, decided to exclude Cicero on account of his age 
and character. They were afraid that his natural hesitancy 
and timidity would hinder their purpose more than his repu­
tation would assist it. They could feel sure that once the 
plot was successfully executed he would approve it.
Rice-Holmes (op. cit. Ill p. 340) has queried Plutarch's 
statement, suggesting that Cicero, though he took no active 
part, may have been in Brutus' confidence. He relies chiefly 
on the evidence of ad Brut, II 5, 1: "Scis mihi semper 
placuisse non rege solum sed regno liberari rempublicam: 
tu lenius immortal! omnino cum tua laude".
This passage alone cannot stand against the evidence 
supporting Plutarch. Cicero himself in the Second Philippic 
refuted Antony's charge, that he had been the conspirators' 
adviser (*Caesarem meo consilio interfectum")- See II 11, 25
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- 15, 37 «Quis enlm meim in ista societate gloriosissimi 
facti nomen ‘ (il il, 25).
More conclusive is the evidence of private letters, in 
which Cicero constantly complains of the conspirators' policy 
and affirms that, had he been included, he would not have left 
the work half-finished (i.e. by sparing Antony). See F.
4 to Cassius: "Vellem Id. Mart, me ad cenam invitasses ..."
and F. X 28, a similar letter to Trebonius. There is no 
reason to believe that Cicero deliberately concealed his know­
ledge of the plot. The passage in his letter to Brutus does 
not immediately suggest a private discussion between them 
before the assassination. Nor was it written - as Rice- 
Holmes says - "a few weeks later"; the existing collection of 
letters to Brutus belongs to the year 45, after he had left 
Italy - by which time he had good reason to know Cicero's 
opinion on the subject.
Cicero's presence in the conspiracy would have been an 
embarrassment for other reasons than those given by Plutarch.
A man of his standing, the most eminent of the consulars, must 
have taken precedence over the rest and appeared at the head 
of the conspirators. The original group, however, had decided 
on Brutus for this position. As a symbol of the Republic, to 
lend the required air of disinterested patriotism, either 
Cicero or Brutus might have been chosen; but not both. There 
was not room for the two of them in the same confederacy.
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Neither would have wished to be subordinate to the other, 
and from their later disagreements it is clear that they could 
not work together successfully. Their lack of harmony might 
easily have wrecked the conspiracy.
A different point was raised by Boissier (op. cit, pp. 
351-3). He defends Antony's charge on the grounds that 
Cicero was the spiritual if unconscious author of the con- 
spiracy through the influence of his written works. The 
conspirators certainly called on Cicero by name immediately 
after the murder because of his distinguished position in the 
Senate and his known political sympathies. They had had no 
need of his exhortations, his regrets for the past and com­
plaints of the present regime to spur them on to action,
(See Meyer op. cit, p. 457.)
12, 3-5, The account of the debate on civil war and 
tyrannicide and its conclusion provides an example of Brutus' 
method of working, sounding his friends carefully before 
introducing to the plot those vfho were responsive. Of this 
group Labeo alone was selected; yet Favonius and Statyllius, 
though they disapproved on principle, followed Brutus when the 
assassination v;as an accomplished fact and both died at 
Philippi (see,App. II 119, 500. Suet. Aug. 13, 8. below, c.34, 
4. 51, 5),
18, 5, Decimus Brutus is mentioned by other authorities as 
one of the foremost conspirators without giving any indication
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of how and when he came into the plot. (App. II 111, 464.
113, 474. Nic. Dqm. 19. Suet. lul. 80,4. Dio 44, 14, 3). 
Plutarch's explanation - that he was first approached by 
Cassius and Labeo but only induced to join them by Brutus p 
may be nothing more than an invention to enhance Brutus' 
reputation. Fellow-officers in Caesar's army e.g. Trebonius, 
who seems to have oeen one of the first Caesarians to fall 
away (Phil, II 14, 34) were, more probably, responsible for 
contacting Decimus.
Decimus was an important acquisition. He had been so 
near to Caesar, much nearer than Marcus Brutus, that his 
defection could not but delight the opposition and disquiet 
the Caesarians.
He had served under Caesar in Gaul 56-50 B.C. (B.G. Ill 
11, 5. VII 87, 1), had assisted at the siege of Massilia in 
command of a fleet in 49 B.C. (B.C. I 36, 4) and from 48-46 
governed Transalpine Gaul (App. II 48, 197. Livy Per 114).
On Caesar's return from Spain, he rode through Italy with 
him, in company with Antony and Octavian (Plut. Ant. 11, 1).
He ranked close to Antony in Caesar's estimation and was 
chosen with him as one of his secondary heirs (Plut. Caes.
64, 1),
In addition to his importance as a high-ranking 
Caesarian Decimus brought the practical advantage of a private 
troop of gladiators, to be used as a body-guard, if necessary.
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after the assassination (App. Il 120, 503. Dio 44, 16, 2.
Veil. II 58, 2. Nic. Dam. 26g).
12, 8, The informal, almost careless, confederacy was 
considered remarkable by the authorities - cf. Appian II 114, 
475. It was no clearly defined association, bound by oath; 
rather, a private understanding. There was no intention of 
banding together as a distinct party and drawing up a political 
programme. They were acting as senators, and they assumed 
that a majority of the Senate would support them. 
d 3  The story of Forcia's attempt to force Brutus' confidence 
is told also by Dio (44, 13, 2 - 14, 1) - who says she was the 
only woman to know of the conspiracy - and by Valerius Maximus 
(III 2, 15).
Daughter of Cato and widow of Bibulus, she had every 
reason to be a determined enemy of Caesar. Her influence on 
Brutus since their marriage in the summer of 45 (see above) 
must have played a considerable part in shaping his political 
course. This anecdote (which may come from the memoirs of her 
son, Lucius Bibulus - see c. 13, 3) gives some idea of her 
character - she was evidently a true daughter of Cato (cf.
Cato Minor 73, 6). As might be expected, she was not a 
favourite with her mother-in-law who, no doubt, feared that 
she would alienate Brutus from Caesar, A letter of Cicero 
to Atticus in 45 B.C. contains a hint of strained relations;
"De Bruto nostro perodiosum, sed vita fert, Mulieres autem
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vix satis humane, quae iniquo animo forant, cum (in) utraque 
officio pareat.R (Att. XIII 22, 4)
The suggestion of antagonism between the two women, both 
desiring to influence Brutus, has been further developed by
Max Radin in his "Marcus Brutus" and by Abbott (op. cit. pp.
J-
71-72)/is used to explain the vacillations of Brutus' policy 
from 45-44 B.C. An interesting speculation, but given too 
much emphasis by these vnriters.
Apart from brief reference in c.2, 1 (
^<rT£Ao\/ \jc\/o/ji£i/o\/.. ), Plutarch has not hitherto mentioned 
this marriage. And here he says nothing of when it took 
place and its significance in Brutus' relations with Caesar 
(see above).
C.13, 3. L. Bibulus, Brutus' stepson, was already a young 
man, not as Plutarch says, ^ocCotoy/ • He held a
command in Brutus' army in 42 but survived the defeat of 
Philippi and made his peace with Antony (App. IV 104 ,
136, 575-6). See also ad Brut. I, 7.
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cc. 14-17. The assassination of Caesar.




Suetonius: Div. lul. 80, 4 - 82, 4.
Cicero; Phil. II, 12, 28. 14, 34.
de div. II 16, 37. 54, 110. I 52, 119.




Orosius: VI 17, 2-4
Florus; II 13, 93-95.
Valerius Maximus; I 7, 2. 6, 13. IV 5, 6. VIII 11, 2.
C.14, 1-4. A meeting of the Senate being called for March 
15th, the conspirators finally decided to make the attempt then, 
The senate was chosen as the most fitting place and also 
because they believed they could rely on the approval of most 
senators. If the assassination were carried out in their 
presence it could be sanctioned and the restoration of the 
Republic proclaimed at once (14, 1-2. App, 11^ 114, 476).
Dio (44, 16, 1) says their decision was influenced by the 
possibility of introducing weapons into the senate and of
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attacking Caesar there when he was quite defenceless. He 
explains further that they had delayed, hesitating to decide 
on a definite time and place, and through this delay and the 
number of those now privy to the plot they ran considerable 
danger of discovery. (44, 15, 1-3)
His account is borne out by Suetonius (80, 4) and Nicolaus 
(23) who describe several different plans discussed and rejected 
by the conspirators before they decided on the senate, e.g. 
the execution of the plot at the elections, at the theatre, 
or the Via Sacra near Caesar's house. The senate was con­
sidered better suited to their purpose; perhaps the ex-Pompeians
felt also that it was peculiarly fitting that Pompey's curia
cf.
should be the scene of Caesar's death (14, 4./Cic. de div. II 
23).
There was another reason for the choice. The conspirators 
were nov/ pressed for time. Caesar's departure for Parthia 
was imminent. The meeting on the Ides was to complete the last 
arrangements, therefore Caesar's appearance in the senate then 
offered them their last opportunity of publicly striking him 
down. It could not be delayed any longer. Other suggested 
plans were abandoned in favour of this- See Suet, lul. 80, 4; 
"postquam senatus Idibus Martiis in Pompei curiam edictus est, 
facile tempus et locum praetulerunt,"
The reason implied by Plutarch above (c.lO, 3 f.) and 
definitely stated by others (e.g. Dio 44, 15, 4. Suet. lul.
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79, 3 - 80, 1) - namely, that the plot was hurried on 
because a proposal to make Caesar king was to be brought 
forward and debated on the Ides - is extremely doubtful.
Most of the historians record the rumours cicrulating 
in Rome on this subject (Plut. Caes. 60, 2. Dio 44, 15, 3.
App. II 110, 460-461, Suet. lul, 79, 4). A prophecy was 
said to have been found in the Sfbilline Books, that Rome 
would never conquer Parthin except under a king. Following 
this a report was spread abroad that at the last session of 
the senate before Caesar's departure L. Aurelius Cotta, one 
of the Quindecemviri, would propose to give him the title 
'rex' for the forthcoming expedition; according to Plutarch 
(Caes. 64, 3) it was to be held outside Italy only. It was 
supposed, later, that the conspirators were anxious to anti­
cipate this debate, since they could neither vote against the 
proposal nor abstain from voting (Dio 44, 15, 4. Suet. lul. 
79-80. App. II 113, 470 ff,). This assumes that Caesar or 
his friends (cf. Plut, Caes. 60, 2) were responsible for the 
oracle and the spreading of the story. Meyer (op. cit. p.
529 note l) accepts this version, but it was more likely to 
have been the work of Caesar's enemies. Dio casts some doubt 
on the report (44, 15, 3) and Cicero himself, who had heard 
the rumour about Cotta some months before (Att, XIII 44, 1), 
afterwards declared it to be an imposture. See de div. II 54, 
110 on the Sybilline Books - "Quorum interpres nuper falsa
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quidam hominum fama dioturus in senatu putabatur eum quem 
re vera regsm habebamus appellandum quoque esse regem, si 
salvi esse vellemus ...
Iri that case, the conspirators must have knovm that there 
was no fear of such a question being raised in the senate.
The origin and real meaning of the affair have not been satis- 
factorily explained. It may have been part of the campaign to 
bring odium on Caesar. Cotta's share in it is obscure - but 
it may be significant that Cassius too was one of the quin- 
decemviri (see Broughton: Magistrates of the Roman Republic
II p. 3G9).
c.14, 4 f. The Ides of March 44 B.C.
The coming of age of Cassius' son (not mentioned elsewhere) 
provided an excellent excuse for the gathering of a large 
number of senators at Cassius' house on the morning of the Ides. 
The conspirators were thus able to meet without attracting 
attention.
The composure of those who had to conduct public business 
before the senate met is recorded by Appian too (II 115, 482).
It was considerably shaken before Caesar appeared.
C.15. The chief cause was Caesar's long delay, and, as the 
morning advanced, the fear that he might not come at all.
The reasons for the delay are given in greater detail in 
the Life of Caesar (63-66) and in other sources (App. II 115, 
480. Dio 44, 17, 1-3. Veil. II 57, 2. Val. Max. I 7, 2.).
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These dwell on tales of supernatural warnings and on 
Galpurnia's attempts to keep Caesar at home, in consequence of 
a disturbing dream.
c.15, 2-6. Vdiile the Senate v/as gathering, various minor 
incidents contributed to the increasing anxiety of the con- 
spirators. Ga-e-sar, accosted by a friend, nearly betrayed 
himself; Brutus and Cassius were alarmed by their encounter 
vfith Popilius Laenas, who referred obscurely to their enter­
prise (App. II 115, 483^484). Plutarch, again probably 
drawing on Bibulus, adds that news of Porcia's collapse was 
brought to Brutus and further distracted te^him (15, 5-9).
16, 1. Caesar at length arrived. Plutarch says he came 
only to postpone any important business. The^^ouse of 
indisposition is nearer the truth than that he paid any 
attention to the warnings of priests and soothsayers, especially 
since he was brought to the Senate in a litter.
No further details of events on the previous night and the 
morning of the Ides are given here. Other accounts include the 
familiar incidents; the dinner at Lepidus' house on the 14th 
and Caesar's comment on death; the disturbed night and 
Calpurnia's dream - of which there are several versions - 
Caesar's decision the next morning to postpone the meeting of 
the Senate, The authorities are agreed that he was eventually 
persuaded to change his mind by Decimus Brutus, but there are 
varying accounts; Dio says Decimus was sent from the Senate by
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the other conspirators for this purpose, Appian (II 115, 481: 
that he was already with Caesar at his house, and Plutarch 
(Caes. 64) appears to be following the same version (see Plut. 
Caes. 63-66. App. II 115, 479 - 117, 490. Dio 44, 17-18.
Nic. Dqm. 23-24. Veil. II 57, 1. Florus II 13, 93-94.
Obsequens 67. Val. Max VIII 11, 2. I 7, 2).
All the sources emphasise the supernatural element and 
the seemii:g inexorable fate - Caesar, in spite of human and 
divine attempts to warn and deflect him, going forward heed- 
lessly (cf. Appian II 116, 489 //y/ yy v _
That there really was some human attempt to forewarn him seems 
certain. Knowledge of the conspiracy was beginning to leak 
out - see Florus II 13, 94. "Manaverat late coniuratio, 
libellus etiam Caesari datus eodem die".
Most of the authorities agree that Caesar received a paper, 
containing information of the plot against him, on his way to
the Senate. Plutarch (Caes. 65, 1-2) says it was given him
by the Greek sophist Artemidorus, v/ho was acquainted with the 
friends of Brutus; others, by a person unknovm, though 
Artemidorus is said to have tried to reach Caesar with infor­
mation, in Appian's account (see App. II 116, 486. Suet. lul.
81, 4. Dio 44, 13, 3. Veil. II 57, 2. Nic. Dam. 19).
C.17. Caesar's entry into the Senate. The failure of the 
preliminary sacrifices is noted by Appian (II 116, 488-489), 
Nicolaus (24), Florus (II 13, 94). According to Nicolaus,
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Caesar thereupon betrayed some reluctance to proceed, but was 
again urged on by Decimus.
1 f^ ^ ' Antony, who was not to share Caesar's fate and whose 
presence might have proved dangerous, was detained outside by 
Trebonius (see also App. II 117, 490. Dio 44, 19, 1). Plutarch 
(Caes. 66, 4) says, mistakenly, that Decimus detained him - 
see Cicero, Phil. XIII 10, 2B and II 14, 34: "Cum inter- 
ficeretur Caesar, turn te a Trebonio vidimus sevocari".
17, 3-7. The death of Caesar,
see Plut. Caes. 66. App. II 117, 490-494. Dio 44, 19, 3-5.
Suet. lul. 82. Nic. Dqm. 24. Livy Per 116. Veil. II
56-57. Cic. Phil. II 18, 28. de vir. ill. 78, 10. 83, 6.
82, 6. Oros. VI 17, 1. Florus II 13, 95. Eutrop, VI 25.
Val. Max. IV 5, 6.
In descriptions of the scene, certain points remain
substantially the same in all, but there are many variations
in detail. Most of these details must be untrustworthy; in
the general confusion no-one could have retained a clear and
accurate impression of the scene. The conspirators surrounded
Caesar as he took his place under the pretence of presenting a
petition. Their number is not given, but they could only have
been a part of the sixty or more who vrere in the secret.
c.17, 3-6. Cimbe3f*’s part, the pre-arranged signal for the
attack, and the first, ineffective blow, delivered by Publius
Casca are well authenticated. After that, accounts differ.
c.17, 5. Casca's cry to his brother is repeated by Nicolaus
(24). Caesar's words are different in Suetonius (lul. 82, 1
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"ista quidem vis est").
c.17, 6. It seems fairly clear tiiat Caesar at first made 
some attempt at resistance. (cf. App. II 117, 492-493.
Suet. 82, 2. Nic. Dqm. 24). In Suetonius, Appian and 
Plutarch (Caes, 66, 10) it appears quite determined (see App. 
II 117, 493 -  <roi/ ),
Appian, like Plutarch, says he abandoned the attempt v/hen he
saw Brutus among his assassins; others only record that he 
was overcome by the number of his opponents - see Dio 44, 19,5
urTû rod TT^>j9oos auTtd i / /W/r-* 6lrrc^\/ M j r c  rc.
K<xfccrc<joc .
Plutarch's version is part of the later romanticised 
picture of Brutus and Caesar, as also is the story, rejected 
by Suetonius and Dio, of Caesar's last words to him.
In the melee, many of the conspirators themselves were 
wounded - including Brutus (App. II 122, 512. Nic. Dqm. 24). 
Cassius' seal is expressed by Aurelius Victor - de vir. ill.
83, 6 "in caede dubitanti cuidara, vel per me, inquit^feri".
Nicolaus (26) says that of all his friends only two. 
Censorinus and Calvisius Sabinus, tried to defend Caesar.
From all accounts it is clear that the rest of the Senate made 
no attempt to intervene. He is said to have received twenty- 
three wounds (thirty-five, in Nicolaus 24,aioMe); of all 
these only one, according to the physician Antistius, was 
mortal (Suet. lul, 82, 3).
88.
cc. 18-20. Events after the assassination, from 15th to
20th March.
Appian: II 118, 494 ^ 148, 615,
Dio: 44, 20-52.
Nicolaus; 26-27.
CicerO: Phil. II 12, 28. 14, 34-35. 35, 88 - 36, 91.
Att. XIV 10. 14. XV 11.
Plutarch; Caes. 67-68. Ant. 13.
Suetonius; Div. lul. 83-84.
Velleius: II 58-59.
Frisch; Cicero's fight for the Republic pp. 42 ff.
Syme: The Roman Revolution pp. 97 ff,
Ferrero; Greatness and Decline ... (Eng, trans.) Ill pp. 1-29 
Appendix A pp. 309 ff.
Rice-Holmes; Roman Republic III p. 568.
C.18, 1-3. The sources all present the same picutre of the 
confusion and panic which spread through the city with the news 
of the assassination. The Senate dispersed at once in disorder 
and Brutus v/as unable to deliver his prepared speech. The 
Senate's reaction upset his plans and prevented the immediate 
and formal restoration cf the Republic on which he had counted. 
His first action had been to call upon Cicero, whose name was 
so closely associated with the Senate and the constitution.
See Phil. II 12, 28; "Caesare interfecto, ... statim cruentum
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alte ext aliens Brutus pugionem Ciceronem nomlnatim exclamavit 
atque ei recuperatam libertatem est gratulatus."
18, 5-4. Brutus is genera]]y and, no doubt, rightly credited 
with the policy of moderation followed by the conspirators, in 
particular, with influencing the decision to spare Antony.
See App. II 114, 478. Nic. Dqm. 25. Plut. Ant. 15, 2. Veil. II 
58, 1.
Dio alone gives it as the decision of all, without 
reference to Brutus (44, 19, 1-3). Cicero, however, blamed 
him for allowing Antony to become dangerous: "Haec omnis
culpa Bruti" (Att. XV 20, 2).
The reasons given in the sources for this course are 
Brutus' determination to demonstrate their disinterested 
motives by beginning and ending with the death of Caesar and 
his fear that the assassination might otherwise degenerate into 
a general massacre of political opponents.
Plutarch alone adds the suggestion that Brutus hoped for 
a change in Antony, once Caesar was removed (18, 4-6). This 
is not unreasonable if, as he says, (Ant. 13) the conspirators 
had previously considered Antony as a possible confederate and 
if he was suspected of having plotted against Caesar (see c.S, 2 
Caes. 62, 10). According to Cicero, Trebonius had sounded him 
on the subject in the year 45,at the time of his estrangement 
from Caesar. See Phil. II 14, 34: « ... quem et Narbone hoc 
consilium cum C. Trebonio cepisse notissimura est».
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Brutus' later attitude to Antony further supports 
Plutarch, Even in 43 B.C. he was reluctant to give up all 
hope of reaching an accommodation vfith Antony, until the 
formation of the triumvirate finally disillusioned him (see 
8yme op. cit. pp. 184, 803).
18, 7, The dispersal of the Senate left the conspirators 
alone and completely dis concerted. They were not prepared for 
this turn of events and, without the backing of the Senate, 
could do nothing. Therefore, concern for their personal 
safety made them withdraw to the Capitol, protected by the 
gladiators.
In Plutarch's account of the Ides, the 'liberators' on 
the Capitol are joined by a number of senators and friends; 
Brutus then delivers his speech and is afterwards escorted 
down to the forum to address the people, the other con­
spirators following; but the hostility shown to the praetor 
Cinna for his condemnation of Caesar forces them to retire 
again; Brutus finally dismisses all but his confederates from 
the Capitol.
In all this, Plutarch, chiefly concerned with the part 
played by Brutus, emphasises the univeral respect he commanded, 
which influenced the people's reaction to the assassination.
From other sources it appears that the conspirators, having 
failed to arouse any popular sympathy on their first appearance 
in the forum, withdrew with their guard. Appian (II 119, 500)
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says they were joined in the forum by distinguished men, 
including Lentulus Spinther, Favonius and Dolabella, who 
wished to be associated with them. Those who later 
assembled on the Capitol to confer with them were friends and 
sympathisers rather than a general gathering, as Plutarch 
suggests, Cicero was prominent among them (Att. XIV 10, 1).
Appian agrees with Plutarch in referring the contio in 
the forum to the afternoon of the Ides; but in his account, 
Cinna's demonstration and an unexpected display of Republican 
seal from Dolabella prompt a section of the people (bribed by 
the conspirators) to call for them; whereupon Brutus and 
Cassius appear alone, both address the people and return to 
the Capitol, Later, in the evening of the 15th, Appian 
describes the opening of negotiations with Antony and Lepidus 
(II 118, 494 - 125, 521),
In Plutarch and Appian, all these events are crowded into 
one day, but since they both speak of the first session of the 
Senate on the next day, whereas it is known to have been held on 
the 17th from Cicero (Phil. II 35, 39 "post diem tertium veni 
in aedem Telluris"), Ferrero (op. cit. Ill pp. 509 ff.) has 
suggested that their narrative should be extended to cover the 
two days before the Senate's meeting. His suggestion seems 
all the more reasonable when it is remembered that Caesar had 
not appeared in the Senate until the morning was well advanced 
(above, 15, 1). Unless Ferrero's extension is adopted it must
92.
be supposed that the rest of the Ides was almost impossibly 
crowded, while on the 16th the conspirators remained completely 
passive throughout the day.
The discussion held by the Republican leaders on the 
Capitol certainly took place on the 16th (see Att. XIV 10, 1 
"illo ipso primo Capitolino die"), The embassy to Antony 
was probably sent at the conclusion of this conference, and 
as the envoys went to Antony on the evening of the 15th (Nic. 
Dqm. 27), it may be assumed that the conference occupied the 
whole of the afternoon. In that case the contio in the forum 
must be referred to the 16th - as, in fact, it is in Plutarch: 
Caes. 67, 7 .
The meeting on the Capitol was held to consider v/hat action 
should be taken and v/hat approach made to Antony. It was 
essential that the Senate meet as soon as possible and reach 
a new settlement. Cicero strongly advised Brutus and Cassius 
to convoke the Senate on their own authority, as praetors.
See Att. XIV 10, 1; "Meministine me clamare, illo ipso primo 
Capitolin© die, senatum in Capitolium a praetoribus vocarâ 
debere?".
They refused. Such action on their part would have been 
unconstitutional; it v;as the proper function of the surviving 
consul, Antony, who could not be ignored, in any case. As 
they had not removed him together with Caesar, they found it 
necessary to treat with him, in the hope of reaching a
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peaceful agreement. Ferrero (op. cit. II p. 311) even
believes that the necessity for a consul in the smooth
running of the state was an important reason, perhaps the
chief, in the decision to spare Antony. He points to the
confusion that followed the loss of both consuls at Mutina
in 43 B.C. This consideration perhaps persuaded the other
conspirators to accept Brutus' policy. But Cicero, who
thought it a mistake to trust Antony, refused to join the
embassy that was sent to negotiate with him. See Phil. II
35, 80; "Dicebam illis in Capitolio liberatoribus nostris
cum me ad te ire vellent .., quoad metueras omnia te
promissururn, simul ac timere desisses, similem te futurum
tui, Itaque cum ceteri consulares irent, redirent, in
sententia mansi".
The negative attitude of the conspirators, their lack
of any bold plan of action after the assassination, which
ruined all their hopes, has been frequently interpreted as
the result of excessive timidity or sheer lack of foresight.
It was however consistent with their policy (see Byrne op. cit. / /
p. 99). They had not planned a coup d'etat. To have done
so would have been merely to exchange Caesar's domination for 
their own, contrary to the principles of the sincere 
Republicans among them. And it would seem, from the course 
they followed, that these were dominant in the group and able 
to impose their policy on the rest. Brutus, the leading
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Republican and the most moderate, had certainly hoped to 
effect a change of government v/ithout further violence or 
illegality. Hence his lack of plans - he had expected the 
Senate to deal with that part of the affair, after he and 
his associates had removed the dictator. men he was dis- 
appointed in his expectations that the Senate could auto- 
matically resume its old functions on the death of Caesar, 
vdien he found the people unimpressed by declarations of 
liberty, he saw no lawful course open to him but to approach 
Antony in order to arrange a meeting of the Senate. Then 
the delayed restoration of the Republic might yet be effected.
Brutus' counsels prevailed. The conspirators had mis­
taken the temper of the people (cf. App. II 120, 504 ire .
C) O'/TO Ÿio oiol/'
IwL rc Ù rr^^cCL f i û o ù r o u ... ). They could
expect no support from the legions or from Caesar's veterans - 
while Antony had good hopes of commanding the soldiers' 
loyalty and Lepidus was even then master of armed forces 
stationed on the island in the Tiber. Byrne (op. cit. p. 99) 
believes that if the conspirators had resorted to violence the 
Caesarians would have retaliated and quickly overwhelmed them. 
Therefore they were obliged to rely absolutely on the Senate, 
but there they hoped to command a majority (App. II 125, 521). 
Brutus insisted on proceeding by legal methods and, possibly in 
their confidence of the Senate's support, even the more realistic
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of the conspirators followed his lead.
The policy - and the whole enterprise - failed because 
the Senate was degenerate, unablê to use the opportunity 
offered by the death of Caesar. In those circumstances, the
passivity of the Liberators served no useful purpose, but 
merely allowed the initiative to pass to more ambitious, 
unscrupulous politicians.
Their first and greatest mistake, however, lay in their 
failure to perceive that the Senate itself had made autocracy 
not only possible but inevitable and that the removal of the 
autocrat would not, in itself, restore the Republic to a 
healthy and vigorous state. (See Wirzubski op. cit, p. 91)
It is easy to condemn them for the political blindness which 
caused more civil disturbances yet it was not unnatural that 
the old aristocracy should fail or refuse to see that its 
government had lost its efficiency and that the time for it 
was past. Admiration for Caesar should not preclude a con­
sideration of the 'nobiles'i point of view, (See Ferrero 
op, cit.Jpp, 305-6 "Great man as Caesar was, it was impossible 
that his contemporaries should anticipate the childlike hero-
worship of posterity".)
Caesar's friends are not much in evidence on the Ides of 
March, They dispersed in panic and concealed themselves until 
they saw how events were shaping. Antony fortified himself in 
his house (App, II 118, 496. Cic. Phil. II 34, 88). Lepidus
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brought up his troops from the island to the Campus Martius, 
but took no more definite action for the moment. Dolabella 
alone appeared in public, having immediately assumed the 
insignia of the consulship promised him on Caesar's departure 
for Parthia (App. II 122, 511. Veil. II 58, 3). Ferrero 
(op. cit. Ill p. 311) argues that his declaration in favour 
of the conspirators should be dated to the 16th, since there 
is no suggestion at the discussion on the Capitol that they 
then had the support of a consul.
The Caesarians, at first, were far less assured than the 
conspirators seem to have believed. They could not have 
known precisely what group had originated the conspiracy or 
hov/ many of the senators were involved,' The combination of 
Caesarians with ex-Pompeians could not have been anticipated 
and therefore the discovery must have complicated the position 
of loyal Caesarians still further. Not only had they lost 
their leader, but their party was seen to be divided and a 
political regrouping was revealed.
Appian says they found further cause for alarm in the 
poY/erful connections of the leading conspirators and in the 
power Decimus Brutus would acquire as governor of Cisalpine 
Gaul (App. II 124, 518). On the Ides, therefore, they waited 
for some move on the conspirators' part, prepared for measures 
against Caesar's chief friends and adherents,
Antony and Lepidus (who seem to have been together by
97.
the evening of the 15th - see App. II 123, 515) were reassured
by the arrival of the embassy, v/hich revealed at once the 
weakness of the conspirators' position. For the moment, they 
refused to commit themselves and returned a guarded answer.
The same night, Antony secured the possession of Caesar's 
money and papers (App. II 125, 524). On the 16th, the leading 
Caesarians, including Antony, Lepidus and Hirtius, held a 
council (Nic. Dqm, 27). Like the Republicans on the Capitol, 
they were not agreed upon the course to follov/. Lepidus spoke 
for avenging Caesar (cf. App, II 131, 547) and received some
support, but Antony seconded Hirtius' proposal to reach an
accommodation with the conspirators and the majority voted v/ith 
him. He then convoked the Senate for the following morning.
The chosen meeting-place was the temple of Tellus, conveniently 
near Antony's house (Phil. II 35, 89. App. II 126, 525). He 
was no more inclined to risk his personal safety than were the 
conspirators, securely holding the Capitol.
During the night of the 16th, Lepidus occupied the forum 
with his troops, in readiness for the morning (see App. II 126,
526, Dio 44, 22, 1, Nic, Dqm. 27. cf. Phil. II 35, 89).
Throughout that night, with fires lighted and guards stationed 
in the streets, the friends of both parties were active. (App. 
II 125, 523.)
C.19, 1, The first session of the Senate, 17th March.
Plutarch records only that Antony, Cicero and Plancus spoke
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in favour of amnesty and concord, and that the conspirators 
were granted impunity. He adds that it was decided to bring 
before the people a measure to accord them honours, which 
does not agree with other sources. More important is his 
omission of all reference to the confirmation of Caesar's 
'acta' at this session,
Dio (4 4, 1 ff.) puts a long speech into the mouth of
Cicero, whose proposals are then adopted, Appian (II 126,
525 ff.) gives the most detailed account of the session and 
the actions of the people while it was proceeding. In it 
can be seen the lack of unity among the senators and Antony's 
skilful management of them. He listened first to their 
opinions. The more enthusiastic proposed a vote of thanks 
to the Capitol Liberators. Others considered that they should 
only be granted impunity, as a concession to their distinguished 
relatives. Having heard them out Antony then laid the issue 
clearly before them: either they must agree to declare Caesar
a tyrant and annul all his enactments and appointments (which 
would not only create enormous difficulties but also deprive 
many of themjfoffice) and treat Caesar's body as that of a 
condemned criminal (thereby inviting a riot among the people 
and the veterans^ now coming in from their colonies); or they 
must reaffirm the validity of his position and his acts and so, 
logically, condemn his assassins. By presenting this dilemma, 
Antony succeeded in turning the debate to his own advantage.
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How mistaken the conspirators were in their belief that 
they could depdnd on the Senate then appears. It was as wax 
in Antony's hands. Nor were its members proof against his 
appeal to their self-interest. They were cXear^ guided to 
the decision he wanted.
He had no intention of allowing the conspirators to be 
officially approved and glorified as Liberators of the state 
from Caesar's tyranny. On the other hand, he was still 
upholding^moderate counsels he had advocated to the Caesarians. 
The condemnation of the conspirators was not in his interests. 
He was now the most prominent figure among the Caesarians, but 
he could not expect to command the loyalty of all Caesar's 
adherents, Hirtius and Pansa, for example, the consuls-elect, 
had no enthusiasm for Antony. Hence, the maintenance of his 
position depended on his ability to hold the balance between 
the two opposing parties. For the moment, the existence of 
the conspirators was necessary, to preserve the balance.
Dio (44, 34, 5-6) says Antony favoured the conspirators in 
order to check Lepidus, who, having been Caesar's magister 
equiturn, was ambitious to fill his place and had the advantage 
of an armed band in the city, while Antony as yet commanded no 
follov/ing. This illustrates the same point: Antony's need
of each side, to act as a check to the other, until he himself 
was firmly established.
The Senate, under his guidance, at length reached an
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illogical compromise, to reconcile both parties and keep the 
peace. No action was to be taken against the conspirators, 
but Caesar's 'acta' were to be confirmed en bloc. Cicero put 
forward the proposal that this contradiction be glossed over, 
after the Athenian precedent, under the form of an 'amnesty'. 
See Phil. I, 1 «ieci fundamenta pacis Atheniansiamque 
renovavi vetus exemplum". Plut. Cic, 42, 2. App. II 142, 593. 
Dio 44, 34, 1.
Cicero himself later commended Antony's course at this 
time (Phil. I 29, 31). Nonetheless, Antony was left the real 
master of the situation. The recognition of Caesar's 'acta' 
made the amnesty more of a concession to the conspirators than 
an indication of approval. Their adherence to constitutional 
forms had given Antony an advantage which he did not scruple to 
sei&e. Once their hesitation to usurp authority had restored 
his confidence, he prepared to take the initiative and, before 
long, was able to reverse the situation and undermine their 
confidence.
During the session of the Senate, Brutus held a contio on 
the Capitol and tried to conciliate the veterans by promising 
to maintain Caesar's provisions for them (App. II 137, 570 - 
142, 592).
Plutarch has no word of this, unless he has confused it 
with Brutus' first speech, delivered on the Ides. See above 
18, 10: SteU ^ G ij -r<“^
'Tels •
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Plutarch and. -Appian both describe the people as being 
moved in his favour by his address.
19, 2 f. After the debate was concluded, the conspirators
left the Capitol, but not before receiving Antony's son as 
hostage (see Phil, I 1, 2. 13, 31). A show of reconciliation 
followed. Brutus vras entertained by his brother-in-law 
Lepidus, Cassius by Antony (see Dio 44, 34, 6-7).
In Appian's account (II 142, 594) the reconciliation takes 
place on the 18th. The conspirators, after receiving as 
hostages the sons of Antony and Lepidus, come down from the 
Capitol on the invitation of the people, still favourably 
inclined to them after Brutus' speech. For the moment, any
serious disturbance of the peace had been averted. But the
show of goodwill between Caesar's friends and Caesar's 
murderers could not last. Discussion on his will and funeral 
produced more difficulties and led to an outburst of popular 
anger against the conspirators.
c,20. This discussion, in Plutarch, takes place during the 
second session of the Senate on March 18th, at which the con-
spirators are said to be present. Cassius is represented 
strongly opposing a public funeral and reading of the will, 
while Brutus, in accordance with his policy, agrees to it. 
Velleius has a similar account II 58, 2: "cum cos. Antonius 
(quern cum simul interimendum censuisset Cassius, testamentumque 
Caesaris abolendum, Brutus repugnaverat ...)".
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In -Appian (II 136, 567) at the end of the session on 
the 17th, Piso calls back the senators and puts this motion, 
causing renewed disturbance. For Piso's part cf. Suet. lul. 
S3, 1; "postulante ergo L. Pisone socero, testamenturn eius 
aperitur recitaturque in Antoni domo".
20, 3 f. Here follows a description of the popular 
excitement on the publication of the terms of Caesar's will 
with its bequests to the citiaens. This broke into open 
rioting at his funeral. In Plutarch's account of the 
funeral, Antony, seeing the effect of the customary laudatio 
on the people, began to excite them deliberately, until they 
were quite beyond control (cf. Ant. 14, 3).
With elaborations, this version is found in Appian (II 
143, 596 - 148, 615) and Dio (44, 36-52). All are agreed 
that Antony delivered a speech which influencedthe mob against 
the conspirators. Suetonius, however, has a different and 
more unexpected account. See lul. 84, 2: "laudationis loco
consul Antonius per praeconera pronuntiavit senatus consulturn, 
quo omnia simul et divina atque humana decreverat; item ius 
iurandum, quo se cuncti pro salute unius astrinxerant; quibus 
perpauca a se verba addidit".
Beside this plain, simple account, the highly-coloured 
descriptions of the other authorities are suspect. For that 
reason, Deutsch ("Antony's Funeral Speech" University of 
California Publications in C.P. IX pp. 127 ff.) upholds
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Suetonius, arguing that later historians would take the 
customary laudatio for granted, and further that Antony would 
not have made an inflammatory speech so soon after the recon­
ciliation, To rouse the mob without appearing directly 
responsible would be more consistent with his policy. All 
this is very reasonable and, without Cicero's evidence, 
Suetonius might be accepted without hesitation. But there 
are, in particular, two references in Cicero which seem to 
uphold the traditional view. Deutsch's attempts to explain 
them away are not as convincing as his arguments against the 
historians. In the Second Philippic, Cicero directly accuses 
Antony: "Tua ilia pulchra laudatio, tua miseratio, tua
cohortatio; tu, tu, inquam, illas, faces incendisti 
(Phil. II 36, 90-91) . There is also a letter of April 44 
(Att. XIV 10, 1): "At ille etiam in foro combustus laudatusque
miserabiliter servique et egentes in tecta nostra cum facibus 
immissi." The most natural meaning of 'laudatus' here is the 
delivery of 'laudatio funebris'. But it might be reconciled 
with "perpauca verba" if it were not supported by the more 
explicit statement in the Second Philippic. Unless it can be
shown that Cicero was guilty of gross exaggeration,it seems
a
necessary to assume/'laudatio' of some kind. The theatrical 
accounts of the historians may be largely discounted.
However, with or without a set speech from Antony, the 
funeral had the desired effect of forcing the conspirators to
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withdraw from public life, while Antony could not be 
directly charged with violation of Mrs amnesty.
Plutarch holds that the funeral destroyed the con­
spirators' hopes and that Brutus' vote in favour of it was 
his second serious blunder; the first being his insistence 
on sparing Antony. But the funeral riots, by keeping the 
conspirators away from the Senate and leaving Antony master 
there, only completed what the session of the 17th had begun.
The confirmation of Caesar's 'acta' had given Antony what he 
wanted. After that, it was only necessary to make the other 
part of the agreement, the amnesty, worthless to the conspirators 
and the foundations of his power were laid.
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C.19, 5, The distribution of provinces 44-43 B.C.
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Ferrero; Greatness and Decline ... Eng. tr. Ill Appendix £5 
pp. 324 ff.
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Plutarch gives a list of the provinces assigned to the 
leading conspirators, by his account, at the second session of 
the Senate on March 18th 44, i.e. Crete to Brutus, Libya to 
Cassius, Asia to Trebonius, Bithynia to Cimber and Cisalpine 
Gaul to Decimus Brutus.
He is confusing the confirmation of provinces distributed 
by Caesar for 44 B.C. with the later assignment to Brutus and 
Cassius for 43. The appointments of Decimus, Trebonius and 
Cimber were made originally by Caesar and confirmed by the 
Senate after his death, probably on March 18th. See App. Ill 
2, 4 o<roc ^ v r o ù  Koed<ryâos. £.c!\
r^ri ■r'-s
_ then follow the names of the three conspirators and their 
provinces as in Plutarch.
Decimus set out for Gaul in April. By the 26th Cicero
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had heard rumours of his arrival (Att. XIV 13, 2). The 
others probably left Rome about the same time (Att. XIV 
10, 1 - April 19th "... ut Trebonius itineribus deviis 
proficisceretur in provinciam?").
On the provinces assigned to Brutus and Cassius the 
authorities are not agreed. The appointment of Brutus to 
Crete is certain from Cicero: see Phil. II 38, 97. XI 12,
27. The same province is given in Dio 47, 21, 1 and Appian 
III 8, 29. Cassius, however, is variously said to have 
been appointed to Illyricum (Nic. Dom. 28), Bithynia (Dio 
47, 21,1) and Gyrene (App. Ill 8, 29). Appian adds an 
alternative report that both Crete and Gyrene were assigned 
to Cassius, Bithynia to Brutus. Cicero does not give the 
name of Cassius’ province, but Plutarch is probably right in 
saying Libya (i.e. O yren e ) ,
As to the date of this assignment by the Senate; the 
question was raised in June, certainly not larch. On June 
2nd or 3rd Cicero heard from Balbus that the distribution of 
praetorian provinces was to be settled (see Att. XV 9, 1).
The assignment was made before September 19th (the dramatic 
date of the Second Philippic). August 1st, the date suggested 
by Groebe in Drumann i 429, 430, has been generally accepted; 
but Frisch5 (op.cit. p. 117 note 107) argues that about that 
time diplomatic relations between Antony and the Liberators 
were broken off (see F. XI 3 - 4th August 44), therefore Antony
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was unlikely to grant any concessions to them then. On that 
account and because Cicero accused Antony of making use of 
Brutus’ province in a forged decree of Caesar (Phil. II 38,
97), he favours an earlier date.
There was also a tradition that the provinces of 
Macedonia dnd Syria had been assigned or promised to Brutus 
and Cassius for 43 B.C. by Caesar, It is found in Appian 
in many references (e.g. Ill 2, 4. 7, 24. 24, 91) and in 
Florus (II 17, 4). Piganiol (op. cit. p. 196) thinks it may 
have some foundation in a promise made by Caesar, but it 
seems more likely that it is an error arising from their 
later occupation of these provinces.
Plutarch, neither here nor elsewhere, suggests that 
provinces were assigned to Brutus and Cassius before Caesar’s 
death. (See Ant. 14. Caes. 67. Cic. 42.) On the contrary, 
in all accounts the Senate is said to have decided the matter 
after the assassination. The strongest evidence against 
Appian and Florus is provided by Cicero, who after the 
allotiment of Macedonia dnd Syria to the consuls, never 
claimed that Brutus and Cassius had been deprived of their 
rightful provinces. In fact, he later attempted to justify 
their occupation of these provinces on quite different and less 
valid grounds, and admitted that they had no legal claim.
See Phil. XI 12, 27 "... in Macedoniam alienam advolavit";
12, 28 - their justification is the law "ut omnia quae rei
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publioae salutaria assent, légitima et iusta haberentur, ... 
Huic igitur legi paruit Cassius, cum est in Syriaj scri^is
-di- A tia. A
uterentur, his vero oppressis suam lege naturae".
Cicero is evidently obliged to use such specious argu­
ments, having no better claim to put forward. There is, 
however, a curious reference in a letter to Cassius, which 
seems pointless if Cassius had no claim at all to Syria: see
F. XII 4, 2 "Dolabella valde vituperabatujf ab hominibus non 
insulsis, quod tibi tarn cito succederet, cum tu vixdum xxx 
dies in Syria fuisses."
The joke seems to suggest that Cassius was recognised as 
having a prior claim to Syria for43 B.C., where Dolabella was 
trying to succeed him before he had even entered on his term of 
office. It may, perhaps, refer to the general belief in 
Rome that Cassius would go to Syria; or the real point of 
the remark may now be lost.
Ferrero (op. cit. Ill p. 326 f ,) adopts the conjecture 
of Schwarts - that Caesar had already assigned Macedonia dnd 
Syria to Antony and Dolabella for 43 B.C. after their 
consulship. His arguments have been sufficiently refuted 
by Rice-Holmes (op. cit. p. 188 f.). Syme, however, (op. 
oit. p. 107) thinks that the assignment of consular provinces 
in March - April was probably in accordance with Caesar’s 
known intentions. Considering the proximity of these 
provinces to Parthia, it is reasonable to suppose that Caesar
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wanted reliable governors in them. He may have destined
Antony lor one of them - the choice of Dolabella for Syria 
is less obvious. In any case, it is clear that no final 
arrangements had been already decreed.
The consular provinces were decided in March or early 
April of 44 B.C. The Senate, no doubt in recognition of 
Antony’s conciliatory policy, voted him Macedonia with the 
legions stationed there; his colleague, Dolabella, received 
Syria. This must have taken place before April 18th, for 
Cicero, in a letter of that date, refers to the appointment - 
see Att, XIV 9, 3 - on the situation in Syria: he adds "sed
Dolabella et Nicias viderint".
In June, by measures brought before the people, the 
consuls were confirmed in their command for five years, and 
Antony was allowed to exchange Macedonia - while retaining 
its legions - for Cisalpine Gaul.
Rice Holmes (op, cit. pp. 192-6) believes that Phil V.
3, 7 and Livy Per. 117 refer to a single law, passed on June 
1st or 2nd. See Phil V 3, 7 "Tribuni plebi tulerunt de 
provinciis contra acta C. Caesaris, ille biennium, hi 
sexennium". Livy Per 117 ’/Âhtoniu^ legem ... de 
permutatione provinciarum per vim tulisset,"
Appian (ill 27, 102) says that Antony asked for the 
exchange in order to have some pretext for bringing the 
Macedonian legions to Italy. (For the passing of the decree
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see III 30, 115-180. 37, 150. 49, 198. 63, 851. cf. Dio
45, 25, 1, 46, 83, 4.) Piganiol (op. cit. p. 196) appears
to believe that the exchange of provinces was a separate 
measure, not passed before August. This view, in which he 
is not alone. Rice Holmes (following Sternkopf: Hermes 47,
pp. 357 ff.) attributes to the different emphasis in Cicero 
and the historians, the former dwelling on the prolongation 
of tenure, the latter on the exchange of provinces.
The extension of the consuls’ command ?/as certainly 
passed in June, see Att. XV, 11, 4 (June 8th) "Dolabella me 
sibi legavit a.d. iv Nonas ... be11a est autem huius viris 
quinquenii licentia."
As for the exchange: Antony had been eager for the
possession of Cisalpine Gaul for some time. At the end of 
April, Cicero had heard rumours of his designs on the 
province - to be put into effect at the session of June. See 
Att, XIV 14, 4; "Quae scribis Kalendis luniis Antonium de 
provinciis relaturum ut et ipse Gallias habeat et utrisque 
dies prorogetur, licebitne decerni libere?"
It appears from this that the two proposals were considered 
together from the beginning and therefore were probably passed 
as one law. It is noticeable, too, that Antony already meant 
to acquire the Transalpine as well.
In May, Antony’s plans for June were causing anxiety. See 
Att. XV 4, 1: "Antoni consilia narras turbulenta ... sed mihi
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totum eius consilium ad beHum spectare videtur, si quidem
D. Bruto provincia eripitur."
Cicero's expectation of trouble in Cisalpine Gaul in a 
letter of June 5th further supports the belief that the 'lex 
de permutatione provinciarum' had already been passed - see 
Att. XV 10, 1 "Si vero aliquid de Decimo gravius, quae 
nostris vita
From Cicero's evidence, therefore, there is no reason to 
dispute the view that the whole question of the consular 
provinces for 43 B.C. was settled as one measure in June.
The provincial situation was as follows: for 43, the
consuls' position was assured with possession of Cisalpine 
Gaul and Syria, while Brutus and Cassius were relegated to 
the insignificant provinces of Crete and Cyrene: the other
praetorian provinces were not yet allotted. In the summer 
of 44, the existing situation showed the original Caesarian 
appointments, but the Caesarian monopoly of provincial 
commands was broken by the three who had joined the con­
spirators. In the West, therefore. Further Spain was in 
the hands of Asinius Pollio, Hither Spain and Narbonensis of 
Lepidus, Gallia Comata of Plancus, but the Cisalpine of 
Decimus Brutus. The East was similarly divided: Illyricum
and Macedonia were governed by Vatinius and Hortensias, but 
beyond them, Asia dnd Bithynia were in the hands of Trebonius 
and Tillius Cimber, while Syria, as yet, was in.confusion.
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with the Caesarians Mureus and Crispus contending against 
the Pèmpeian Bassus (see below on c. 26).
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C.81. From the funeral of Caesar (20th March 44 B.C.) to
the Ludi Ippollinares (7th - 13th July).
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21, 1. On the withdrawal of Brutus and Cassius from Rome, 
some authorities (e.g. Nic. Dam. 17) agree with Plutarch that 
they left the city at the time and in consequence of the riots 
after Caesar's funeral. Appian, however, states (ill 2, 5) 
that Brutus and Cassius remained in Rome after the other con­
spirators had fled (II 148, 615) until the riots inspired by 
Amatius forced them to withdraw.
.Amatius, or Herophilus, the Greek adventurer who claimed 
to be a son of the younger Marius, had been previously expelled 
from Rome by Caesar. (cf. Att. XII 49, 1. (Kay 45), Also Att. 
XIV 6, 1. Phil. I 2, 5. App. Ill 2, 3. Nic. Dam. 14),
Returning after the assassination, he provided the city mob 
with a leader and incited them to further violence by calling
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for vengeance on Caesar's murderers. He appeared early In 
April, from the evidence of Cicero's letters, and from the 
same source it is clear that Brutus and Cassius were still in 
the city, though unable to appear in public - see Att. XIV 
5, 2. 11th April ("parietibus contineri"). On April 18th, 
Cicero heard of a conference of the Liberators and Antony.
See Att. XIV 6, 1 "Antoni conloquium cum heroibus nostris pro 
re nata non incommodum." It is very probable, considering 
their position in Rome then and their departure almost imme- 
diately afterwards, that the conference at which Antony 
showed himself accommodating was closely connected with his 
procuring a decree for Brutus, the praetor urbanus, 
authorising him to be absent from the city for more than the 
stipulated ten days (see Phil. II 13, 31).
The Liberators certainly left Rome before April 15th, 
for by that date, Cicero at Formiae had heard rumours of 
Brutus' appearance near Lanuyium (Att. XIV 7, 1). Since it 
was apparently a casual report (and may therefore have taken 
a few days to reach Cicero) Merrill (C.P. X pp. 855-7) would 
fix the date of departure as early as April 9th. Cicero 
himself had left Rome only two days before (Att. XIV l); 
therefore, Merrill's date allows one day fnly for the events 
mentioned in Att. XIV 5 and 6.
Frisch (op. cit. p. 68) suggests a date between April 
10th and 13th - it is doubtful if it can be determined more
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exactly.
Th© Liberators' first destination ytsls Lanufium, not 
.Antium as stated by Plutarch (and Nic. Dam. 17). See Att.
XIV 10, 1 "hoc meus et tuus Brutus egit ut Lanupii esset?* 
cf. XIV 7, 1.
The mistake may have arisen because they moved to 
Antium later (see Att. XV 11). Gelzer (PW X 993) tries to 
reconcile the two accounts by suggesting that Brutus and 
Cassius retired to Antium after Caesar's funeral, returned to 
Rome when some order vms restored and were obliged to with­
draw again on the second outbreak of rioting. This seems an 
unnecessary elaboration and is not supported by any reference 
in Cicero. Moreover, Appian (loc. cit.) and Dio (47, 20, 1-8) 
agree with Cicero on this point.
The vfithdrawal of the Liberators from the city was an 
admission of defeat; though at first intended as a temporary 
measure. The field was then left clear for Antony, who 
without violating the agreement of March 17th had succeeded 
in ridding himself of their presence (see Phil. II 13, 33:
"illos quos tu expulses a te praedicas et relegates."
He made use of the riots to impress on them the dangers 
of their continued presence in Rome, Merrill (C.P. X 841 ff.) 
has shown that the letter of Decimus to Brutus and Cassius 
(F. XI. 1) should be dated to this period in early April, not 
to March 16th or 17th. In it, Antony's way of working on their
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rears can be seen; "Se ... neque arbitrari tuto/urbe esse
queniquaiii nostrum; adeo esse militurn concitatos animos et 
plebis".
When he had achieved his object and made possible their
departure by senatorial decree, Antony took strong measures 
to suppress the rioters and summarily executed Amatius. His 
action was approved by Cicero and Brutus (Att. XIV S, 1.
Phil. I 2, 5).
There was still no open breach. The explosion of 
popular feeling had provided Antony with a weapon against the 
Liberators, confirming his initial advantage, but he could 
not yet afford to press this advantage too far and provoke 
them to retaliate. He also took care not to alienate the 
Senate. In March and early April he set himself to win the 
Senate's confidence - so successfully that even Cicero 
praised his policy in the beginning. See Phil. I 13, 32: 
"Proximo, altero, tertio, denique reliquis consecutis diebus 
non intermittebas quasi donum aliquod cotidie adferre 
reipublicae". See also I, 1-2, 5. II 36, 91.
Before its adjournment in mid-April, a: number of measures 
designed to conciliate the Senate were brought forward (Phil.
I 1, 3). The most important of these, in Cicero's opinion, 
and one that was taken as a pledge of Antony's honest 
intentions was the abolition of the dictatorship (see Phil. I 
1, 3. 13, 32. II 36, 91. V 4, 10. App. H I  25, 37. Dio 44, 15, 2
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Livy Per 116). It was intended and understood as an 
assurance that Antony was not seeking Caesar's position, and 
more than anything else secured for Antony at least the 
acquiescence of the Senate,
Before the end of March he also gave his support to 
Sulpicius' proposal on the publishing of Caesar's 'tabulae' - 
although he later disregarded it completely. See Phil. I 
1, 3 "adsentiri etiam nos Ser. Sulpicio ... voluit, ne qua 
tabula post Id. Mart, ullius decreti Caesaris aut beneficii 
figeretur.H cf. Phil. II 36, 91 where Cicero speaks as if 
Antony were the author of the decree. In early April, three 
senatus consulta were passed, two of them pro-Senate measures; 
the decree concerning Brutus (Phil. II 13, 31 - "M. Brutus, 
referente te, legibus est solutus si ab urbe plus quam decern 
dies afuisset.") and the proposed agreement v/ith Sextus 
Pompeius - a concession to Republicans (App. Ill 4, 11. Dio 
45, 9, 4) which was later brought to a conclusion by Lepidus 
(Dio 45, 10, 6). The Senate thus palliated was then ready 
to grant, in return, the provinces of Syria and Macedonia to 
the two consuls (see above on c.l9, 5).
Antony, however, could not afford to conciliate the 
Senate at the expense<f Caesarian support. As long as he had 
no military backing, his position in Rome depended on his 
skill in retaining the goodwill of both parties and in using 
one to check the other (see Byrne op. cit. p. 115. Frisch p. 89)
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But in mid-April he showed the Senate and the Liberators 
that his sympathies were unchanged, by delivering a speech in 
praise of Caesar at a meeting of the people (Att. Xiy 11, 1.
XV 20, 2 ) , About the same time he began to act more openly 
in other ways. In a letter of April 22nd (Att. XIV 12, l) 
Cicero first accuses Antony of misusing Caesar's papers. The
possession of these papers gave him the opportunity of 
initiating legislation at will, under cover of Caesar's name. 
His schemes, according to Cicerg were financed by public 
funds from the temple of Ops. In the Philippics and in 
private letters, Cicero constantly attacks Antony on these 
grounds (e.g. Phil. I 2, 4. II 35, 92 - 39, 100. Ill 12, 30.
V 6, 1-12. VII 10-15. XII 5, 12. Att. XIV 12 & 14 F. XII l). 
Allowinace must be made for exaggeration in his account, but no 
doubt there is some foundation for specific charges, e.g. the 
granting of citizenship to the Sicilians and the restoration 
of confiscated territory to Deiotarus in return for large 
bribes - two instances frequently mentioned. This was the 
kind of abuse that Sulpicius' measure had been designed to 
prevent.
Cicero's approval of Antony's earlier actions was soon 
followed by denunciations of the change in him, once he felt 
he had sufficiently placated the opposition - see Phil. Ill 
12, 30 "duobus aut tribus senatus consultis bene et e re 
publics factis reliquas res ad lucrum praedamque revocaverit."
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So in spite of the much-applauded abolition of the 
dictatorship, Cicero constantly lamented that, though the 
tyrant was dead, the tyranny lived on in Antony (Att, XIV 
6, 2 , 9, 8. 10, 1, 11, 1. 14, 2.). The policy initiated 
on March 17th had opened the way to it. Cicero, who had 
then supported the compromise, now pointed out its ludicrous 
aspect; "eius interfecti morte laetamur, cuius facta 
defendimus" (Att. XIV 9, 2).
From mid-April to late May, Antony v/as absent from Rome, 
travelling through the settlements of veterans in Campania and 
the south, Frisch (op. cit. p. 66) following Lange, believes 
that the journey was, ostensibly, concerned with a 'Lex Antonia 
de coloniis in agros deducendis' of March, traces of which can 
be found in the Philippics - Phil. VIII 9, 25 "Addit praeterea 
ut quos ipse cum Dolabella dederit agros, teneant ii quibus 
dati sint. Hie est Campanus ager et Leontinus". cf. Phil. II 
39, 101. In Phil, V 4,10 the lex de coloniis is mentioned 
again in connection with Caesar's 'acta' and the abolition of 
the dictatorship, which suggests that it belongs to the same 
time. But the real purpose of his journey, which Frisch (op, 
cit. p. 81) calls "a veritable recruiting expedition" was to 
provide himself with the armed force he needed to secure his 
position, especially in view of the legislation planned for 
June, when the Senate should meet again. It was to include a 
new law on Caesar's 'acta' and a new settlement for the veterans.
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Antony could not rely on the urban populace alone. He 
therefore set out to raise the veterans, returning in time 
for the session of June 1st with a considerable force,
Cicero (Phil, II 39, 100 - 41, 107) naturally gives a 
highly-coloured account of the Campanian progress and return 
to Home, but rumours of this gathering and of Antony's plans 
for June alarmed Brutus and Cassius, who v/rote to him con­
cerning their ovm position and prospects of returning to 
Rome with safety (F. XI, 2).
On June 1st Antony found himself facing a much depleted 
and unresisting Senate. The Liberators and their friends 
had decided that it would be unvfise to appear in la city full 
of Caesar's veterans. They were further influenced by fears 
of the drastic measures which, it was believed, would be 
brought forward by Antony. For the same reasons, Hirtius and 
Pansa also absented themselves (Att. XV 5. Phil, 12, 6); 
while Dolabella, whose persecution of Caesar's worshippers 
during Antony's absence had so pleased the Republicans (Att.
XIV 15, 2. 16, 2. F. IX 14. Phil. I 2, 5.) was soon bought 
over: "conlegam quidem de caelo detraxisti" (Phil. II 42, 107),
There was no opposition to Antony.
21, 3. o .
Antony's unchallenged supremacy may be said to have lasted 
from June 1st to August 1st, Plutarch's verdict on the 
character of Antony's consulship echoes that of Cicero, who was
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biassed by bis personal hatred of Antony, a hatred which
became almost an obsession. Yet even in the early months of 
44, after Caesar's death, while he still maintained friendly 
relations with Antony (see Att. XIV 12 a & b), he expressed 
his misgivings and saw in him Caesar's successor.
Charlesworth (C.H.H. X pp. 2-3) in fact believes that he 
expected to be named Caesar's heir, secured the confirmation 
of Caesar's 'acta' in this hope and suffered a bitter dis­
appointment when the will was opened.
But it is impossible to say definitely what his aims were.
He seems to have been an opportunist rather than a man with
clear-cut plans, an astute politician rather than an aspiring 
autocrat. After the assassination, his first concern was to 
ensure his o\m safety, then to secure a position of power for 
himself. He certainly had no intention of allowing the 
Liberators to triumph or of relinquishing the high place he 
had won through Caesar. It may be doubted whether he saw 
himself as another Caesar or planned from the beginning to 
take his place. Cicero protested that Antony's whole consul­
ship revealed his aspirations to "tyranny". In fact, it bore
a closer resemblance to Caesar's first consulship than to his 
dictatorship (cf. Ferrero op. cit. Ill p. 43 and Byrne op. cit. 
pp. 107-8). Even so, it was marked by less violence and bitter 
hostility than Caesar's consulship.
Antony was fortunate, too, in having both brothers in
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office during his consulship, Gaius as acting praetor 
urbanus alter Brutus' departure, Lucius as tribunus plebis.
On June 1st and 2nd, undeterred by the absence of leading 
senators he followed Caesar's example of 59 B.C. and took his 
proposals straight to the people; 'sine promulgatione' (Phil.
II 42, 109). From Cicero's references, the proposals appear 
to have been:the extension of the consuls' provincial command 
for five years (see above on c.l9, 5); a measure empowering 
the consuls with a committee to investigate Caesar's 'acta'
(Att. XVI 16e, 11. Phil. II 39, 100# - this, apparently in 
accordance with a former decision of the Senate (Att. XVI 16 c, 
11); probably between June 2nd and 9th, a lex agraria for the 
veterans, brought forward by the consuls (Phil, V 3, 7f.).
However unwelcome this new turn of events to the Senate, 
Antony was still, officially, respecting the compromise.
Early in June, he proceeded to deal with the problem of the 
future of Brutus and Cassius.
The two praetors, after abandoning the city and their 
official duties, found themselves in an anomalous position, 
dependent on Antony's goodwill. They dismissed even their 
small guard of friends and adherents at his request (F. XI 2, 1) 
Again, this seems to have been the result of Brutus' policy. 
Gelzer (PW X 994-5) believes that it was (Setated by his fear of 
giving the signal for war by determined self-assertion. For 
the sake of peace, he preferred to trust Antony - though, in
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Gelzer’s opinion, he could have raised a following in Italy, 
bad he chosen. He evidently received some support from the 
municipalities, since the gathering of *necessariiM (F. XI 8) 
was enough to bring a protest from Antony; and the Puteolani 
and Sidicini chose Brutus and Cassius for their patrons. But 
such demonstrations were fairly harmless and while they might 
annoy, could not seriously disturb Antony. The Liberators 
themselves continued to hope for a peaceful accommodation and 
had no decided plan for the future, beyond returning to Rome 
as soon as it was safe. In May, writing to Antony, they re­
stated their policy and acknowledged their reliance on him:
"nos ab initio spectasse otiura, nec quicquam aliud libsrtate 
communi quaesisse exitus declarat. Fallere nemo nos potest 
nisi tu ...» (F. XI 8, 8).
To this, Brutus clung as long as possible, hoping to avoid 
open war with Antony. But already in May he was contemplating 
exile as the only possible way (itt, XIV 18, 4).
Cicero, who had always advocated a stronger policy,
deplored their reliance on Antony and lack of direction. His
letters reflect the growing disillusionment, following his 
exultation over the Ides of March. With Antony in the 
ascendant, he was impatient of the paralysis of action, which 
had failed to offer any opposition to the consul’s domination.
See Att, XV 4, 2: «quod scribis te ne scire quid nostris
faciendum sit, lam pridem me ilia sollicitât.
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Itqque stulta iam Iduum Martiarum est consolatlo. Animis 
enira usi sumus virilibus, consiliis mihi crede puerilibus,”
Brutus, for his part, was confronted with the same diffi­
culty as at the time of the assassination - the difficulty of 
offering effective opposition without violating his principles 
or abandoning his original intention of a peaceful restoration 
of the Republic, Geiger thinks Cassius must have been at 
variance with his brother-in-law on this question (PW X 997).
If so, he nevertheless took no steps on his ovm initiative, 
but continued to be identified with Brutus. They had remained 
together since their withdrawal from Rome, And now when the 
other two most p^minent conspirators, Deoimus Brutus and 
Trebonius, had gone to their provinces, they were recognised as 
the heads of the Republican group.
In May, with the fear of Antony’s more radical plans for 
June before them, they were anxious to form an alliance with 
the moderate Caesarians, v/ho also distrusted Antony, Cassius 
urged it particularly (Att, XV 5, 1), But Cicero, who was 
asked to approach Hirtius on their behalf, was not optimistic 
(Att. XIV 20, 4. XV 5, 6), He was justified, Hirtius had 
no love for Antony, but he was equally suspicious of Caesar’s 
murderers. Negotiations proceeded no further.
Frisch (op, cit, p. 90) also argues the possibility of 
private negotiations with Antony from the proposed interview 
between Cicero and Antony’s uncle, L, Caesar, (Att, XV 4 b)
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which Brutus favoured, when it is taken in conjunction with 
a passage in the letter to Antony (F. XI 2, *Quem enim 
impedimento futurum putas cum de nobis certum sit nos 
quieturos?* It is possible that they are here referring to 
some private assurance given to Antony of non-interference on 
their part in his programme for June.
Their course must have been discussed at the conference 
at Lanus/ium to which Cicero and Atticus came (Att. XV 4, 2.
20, 2). It was probably decided then that neither the 
Liberators nor Cicero should attempt to appear in the Senate 
on June 1st. Yet, though they had withdrawn from active 
participation in public affairs, the presence of Brutus and 
Cassius in Italy was a problem that Antony could not afford to 
ignore indefinitely. Towards the end of May, Cicero heard 
that their future was to be considered by the Senate in June 
(Att. XV 5, 2). On June 2nd, he heard from Balbus what 
Antony had in mind for them: a commission to purchase corn
for Rome, Brutus in Asia and Cassius in Sicily. At the same 
time, provision was made for the assignment of praetorian 
provinces for 43 B.C. at a later date (Att. XV 9, 1), This 
was Antony’s plan to give them a decent pretext for leaving 
Italy before their year of office ended, but without con­
ceding too much to them. Cicero’s first reaction was indig­
nation. See Att. XV 7, 1 «0 rem miseraml primura ullam ab 
istis, dein si aliquam hanc legatoriam provinciam’”
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He considered the commission inferior and slighting 
(«heneficio ... contimelioso" Att, XV 12, 1. «Dionis 
legatio" - XV 10, 1), But when he went to confer with the 
Liberators at Antium on June 8th, he had decided to advise 
them to accept; it was, at least, better than continuing 
inactive in Brutus’ mock-Sparta at LanuVium (see Att, XV 9, 1. 
"Hoc certe melius quam ilia Hijy<riKj portions
He found in the family council at Antium irresolution, 
discontent, lack of agreement (see Att, XV 11). Cassius was 
resentful, Brutus hesitant, still -wanting to return to Rome.
The corn commission was not acceptable to either. But Gelzer 
(PW X 996) points out that Brutus, the constitutionalist, could 
not well ignore a decree of the Senate, Radin, on this point, 
(«Marcus Brutus” p. 186) compares Brutus’ situation with that 
of Cato in 58 B.C., when Clodius succeeded in forcing on him 
the mission to Cyprus (see above c,3). Cato accepted, though 
unwilling, because the bill was pàssed by the popular assembly 
and became law, Brutus, faced with a similar decision, was 
at first inclined to go to Asia as directed (Att, XV 11 and 12). 
It was obvious that he and Cassius could not remain in Italy, 
in their present situation. But whether they left on Antony’s 
terms or on their own in defiance of him was the question before 
them at Antium, Cassius was determined not to go tamely to 
Sicily; he would go to Greece instead (Att. XV 11, 1).
Brutus remained undecided. To go abroad, but not to their
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allotted provinces, meant either voluntary exile or a 
declaration of war. He still hoped that a change in the
situation would enable him to return to Rome. Cicero 
succeeded in convincing him that it was not safe to make the 
attempt yet (Att. XV 11, 2).
Servilia, who with Porcia dnd Tertia was present at the 
council, promised to see that the distasteful commission was 
omitted from the senatorial decree. Her influence in the 
matter does not appear to have been questioned, even by 
Cicero who disliked her; but the sequel is uncertain.
Cicero left Antium still more disheartened. «Prorsus 
dissolutum offendi navigium vel poths dissipatam. Nihil 
consilio, nihil rations, nihil ordine” (Att, XV 11, 3). The 
situation had been allowed to drift too long, beyond hope of 
saving it in Italy, At Antium, Brutus and Cassius had 
complained of past mistakes and lost opportunities. Cicero 
was more concerned about the future, but entirely agreed with 
criticisms of theif^hitherto. The Liberators had now no 
reason to linger in Italy, but Brutus decided to postpone his 
departure until the conclusion of his Games, in a last vain 
hope of a popular reaction in his favour (Att. XVI 5, 3). 
C.21, 4-6. The Ludi Apollinares, held early in July, were 
the responsibility of the praetor urbanus. Brutus had hoped 
to fulfil this duty in person, and Cicero thought he should 
(Att. XV 10, 1). But by June it was obvious that he could
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not show himself in the city with any safety.
21, 4. It was then decided that the Games should be held 
in Brutus’ absence ( <r/c£cVc?a cf. Att. XV 11, 2
’’Gonstituit igitur ut ludi absente se fièrent suc nomine” &
Att. XV 12, 1).
21, 4. -   In this last
attempt to win popular favour, the Games were prepared on a 
lavish scale. Atticus was, naturally, applied to for his 
assistance here. gee Att. XV 18, 2 « ... de Bruto, cuius 
etiam ludorum sumptuosorum curam et (iam) administrationem 
suspicor ex magna parte ad te pertinere.”
21, 6. Brutus’ request that Cicero should attend the Games
is found in a letter of 2nd July (Att. XV 26, 1). Cicero, who
was just starting on his projected journey to Athens, was not
able to oblige him: «Rescripsi scilicet primum me iam
profectum ... deinde i'VoTrcJ-rwT&i/esse me. qui Romam omnino post
haec arma non accesserim neque id tarn periculi mei causa
21, 5.
fecerim quam dignitatis, subito ad ludos venire.” /On receiving 
news of the Games and their reception, he went to see Brutus, 
who was then staying on the island of Nesis in the bay of 
Naples (Att. XVI 1-5. Phil, X 4, 8). They had two grievances: 
one, the use of «lulius” instead of "Quinctilis” in the 
announcement of the opening games (Att. XVI 1, 1), which 
greatly annoyed Brutus; he was anxious to have it rectified 
in a further announcement (Att. XVI 4, 1 - "... quam ille
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doluit de ’Nonis luliis’. Mlrlfice est conturbatus,
Itaque sese scripturum aiebat ut venationem eamquae postridie 
ludos Apollinares futura est, proscriberent (in) iii Idus 
Quinctilis.B); the other imas "tbe substitution of Accius* 
play "Tereus" for his praetexta "Brutus” which Brutus had 
expected to be performed. He was, at first, delighted with 
the people’s reception of the play, imagining that they had 
applauded the exploits of the first Brutus (see Att. XVI 2,
3. 5, 1). It is possible that C. Antonius, who as acting 
praetor urbanus presided over the Games in Brutus' absence, 
was responsible for these changes.
The celebration of the Games failed to produce the effect 
Brutus had hoped for. The choice of Accius’ "Brutus” was 
obviously intended to rouse, or test, popular sympathy for 
the Liberators - Brutus must have believed, before he heard 
of the change, that the people had responded favourably. But 
Cicero knew that no reliance could be placed on empty applause 
at the Games and criticised the people for wasting their 
energies in applauding plays instead of using them in defence 
of the Republic (Att. XVI 2, 3). In the Philippics, however, 
he gives a more favourable report, magnifying the importance 
of the demonstration at the play and representing the people as 
well-disposed towards Brutus - see Phil. II 13, 31. X 3, 1.
4, 8. I 15, 36 - "illos qui, cum adesse ... non licebat, 
aderant tamen et in medullis populi Romani ac visceribus
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haerebant. Nisi forte Accio turn plaudi ... ron Bruto 
putabatis, gui ludis suis ita caruit, ut ... studium populus 
Romanus tribueret absenti, desiderium liberatoris sui 
pernetuo plausu et clamore leniret."
This is wild exaggeration, and may account for Plutarchte 
21, 3 inaccurate description of popular feeling: o 'Sjjuos, . ^ .
\S^e>OTOv^ £To Q-Cl. ' ' •
There was no reaction in favour of the Liberators, and 
Brutus was foroed to abandon his last hope. Antony, certainly, 
was not no?7 entirely popular; the city was not pleased by
4his suppression/their hero, Amatius, in April; and later his 
attitude to Caesar’s heir cost him the goodwill of many. But 
there is no evidence that, tiring of Antony’s supremacy, the 
people began to v/ish for the return of Brutus.
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C. 22. Octavian.
Cicero: Att. XIV 5-6. 10. 12. 20-21. XV 2. 3. 12.
XVI 8-15.
ad Brut. I 15-18. 3. 4a. II 5. F. XI 5-6. 
27-28. XII 23. O.F. I, 1.
Phil. III & V.
Appian: III 9, 30 - 24, 90. 28, 105 - 48, 197-
Dio; 45, 1-9. 11-17,
Nie. Dqm: 2, 8. 16-18. 28-30.
Suetonius: lul. 83. Aug. 4. 8. 10.
Veil.: II 59-60.
Plutarch: Ant. 16. Cic. 44, 5.
Orosius: VI 18, 1-2.
Eutrop.: VIII, 1.
Beutsch: Caesar’s Son and Heir (Univ. Cal. publications
in C.P. IX p. 149 f, 196 f.)
Chilver: J.BS. 1954. 44 pp. 126-7.
Crook: CR 1954 N.S.4. pp. 152 ff.
Frisch: Cicero ... pp. 76-78. 84-88. 144 ff,
Syme: The Roman Revolution pp. 133-4. 147. 184.
Tyrrell and Purser: Correspondence of Cicero VI cxi ff.
Gelaer: PW X 1008.
22, 1-4. Octavian’s first appearance at Rome after the 
assassination v/as earlier than Plutarch seems to imply - i.e. 
during Antony’s absence, towards the end of April 44 B.C., not
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after the Ludi Appllinares in July. In the second half of 
April, he was preparing for it - see Att. XIV 12, 2 (22nd 
April): "Quid censes cum Romam puer venerit At the
beginning of May, Octavian was evidently in the city (see 
Att. XIV 20, 5) and by the 18th, Cicero had news of his 
activities there (Att. XV 2, 5).
22, 1. On Octavian’s connection with Caesar through his 
mother Atia, Caesar’s niece, see Suet. Aug. 4, 1. Suetonius 
(Aug. 1-5) also gives the origin of the gens Octavia and a 
summary of his father’s career, (cf. Cic. Q.F. I 1, 7.
Phil. Ill 6, 15.) The humbler origin of his mother’s family 
from Aricia was later used by Antony as material for propaganda 
(see Phil. Ill 6, 15).
22, 1. %  -rr<2s p c u t o u  I
£K<?s. Plutarch puts these two points in the order of importance 
they were to assume later. In Caesar’s will (according to 
Suet. lul. 83, 2) Octavian was first-fnamed heir, together with 
his cousins L. Pinarius and Q. Pedius, and then "in mea cara" 
adopted "in familiam nomenque". The exact meaning of the 
clause, with the question of Caesar’s intention and Octavian’s 
interpretation of it, has recently been discussed by 
Schmitthenner ("Oktavian und das Testament Caesars") in the 
light of Roman private law (see J.R.S. 1954 pp. 126-7. CR. 1954 
pp. 152 ff.).
The case against Octavian’s exploitation of the adoption
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is based chiefly on the provisions in Caesar’s will for a 
posthumous son (Suet. loc. cit.) and on the doubts of 
students of Roman law concerning the validity of testamentary 
adoption.
As regards the first, the provisions for a posthumous 
son do not positively prove that Octavian was not intended to 
be principal heir, nor can the position of the adoption ’in 
irria cera’ be distinctly understood as a casual after-thought 
on Caesar’s part.
The legal issue depends on the absence of evidence for 
testamentary adoption and still more on Ulpian’s statement 
(Dig. I 7, 25) that the adrogator could not act "absens nec 
per alium”.
Schmitthenner and others therefore argue that Octavian’s 
"adoption” could not have been an "adrogatio”, but was simply 
a "condicio nominis ferendi". It follows that the lex 
curiata, which Octavian was so anxious to obtain, was not 
merely irregular but wholly unprecedented, forced through by 
Octavian; hence, Antony’s earlier obstruction. Schmitthenner 
concludes that the accepted interpretation of the final clause 
in Caesar’s will was conceived in the first place by Octavian 
and used by him with outstanding success, but with no justi­
fication in Caesar’s intentions.
The question of adrogatio by will cannot be dismissed so 
easily. Too little is really known of private law to deny the
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possibility of such a procedure.
Caesar must have considered the future and no doubt hoped
to be able to appoint a successor in time. He had accepted 
certain hereditary honours (see Dio 43, 34, 3. 44, 5, 3) and, 
though he still hoped for a son, in the last years he had 
advanced Octavian and associated the young man with himself.
The will was made only a few months before his death (see 
Suet. lul. 83, 1 "testamenturn ... quod Idibus Septerabribus 
proximis in Lavicano suo fecerat.” But his choice of heirs 
was not made public - Deutsch argues that Caesar had no reason 
to publish his decision and that the actions of those about 
him provide further evidence of the general ignorance of his 
intentions (U.C.C.P. IX p. 149 f . 196 f.). Octavian himself 
did not know until after Caesar’s death (see Suet. Aug. 8, 2 
’’utque primum occisum eum heredemque se comperit” cf. Dio 
45, 3, 1. Veil. II 59, 5. Livy Per 116.). Nicolaus alone 
speaks of the adoption while Caesar was still living (Vita 
Caes. 8 'rrerroctjjuiéi^os i.e. at the time of Caesar’s
triumphs), but he later contradicts himself and gives the same 
account as the other sources (see c.l7, on Octavian’s arrival 
in Italy).
Whatever d^^mastic intentions Caesar had - and he could not 
have overlooked the enormous influence that would pass to his 
heir, adopting his name and inheriting his ’clientele’ - 
Octavian was not yet in his confidence at the time of his death.
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Octavian took his own way. At the time of Caesar’s death, 
he was pursi-ing his studies at Auollonia and preparing to 
join the Parthian expedition (c. 22 , 2 . see also Arp. Ill 9,
30 f. Suet. Aug. 8, 8. Veil II 59, 4. Nic. Dam. 16-17. Dio 
45, 3, 1). From more detailed accounts of his return to 
Italy (App. Ill 10, 33- 18, 40. Nic. Dqm. 16-18. Veil II 
59-60. Plut. Ant. 16) two points, in particular, emerge: his
decision to return quietly, resisting the suggestion that he 
should appeal to the Macedonian legions at once, and his 
determination to accept the inheritance against the advice of 
his mother and his step-father, Philinnus. He meant to he 
heir to Caesar’s power as well as to his estate. He imme­
diately assumed the name of Caesar, months before the formal 
ratification of the adoption, and v/as soon completely accepted 
as Caesar’s son by the people and the army. The name of 
Octavius, which could never have commanded any following, was 
abandoned entirely. Antony knew how to provoke his rival by 
reminding him (and others) of his real origin (Phil. Ill 6, 15). 
On the other hand, "Caesar" gave him an immediate advantage and 
cloaked his rise to power with a semblance of righteousness.
Philippus, who had occasion to knov/ him, distrusted him, 
and refused to call him "Gaesar" (see Att. XIV 12, 8, ad Brut.
I 17, 5. Att. XV 18, 8).
On reaching Italy, Octavian at first proceeded with caution. 
His first destination in Calabria was Lupiae (Nic. D#. 17).
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From there he made his way to Brimdisium for further neivs.
His arrival was rumoured as early as April 11th (Att. XIV 5,3). 
There was also some false report of the arrival of the 
Macedonian legions (Att. XIV 6, l). No doubt it was feared 
that Octavian would appeal to them.
He came, instead, to Naples, to his steÿ-father’s villa. 
During the Senate’s recess, most of the leading Caesarians
were to be found in the region of Naples. See Att. XIV 10, 3:
"Octavius Neapolim venit xiv Kal. Ibi eurn BalhLus mane postridie, 
eodemque die mecum in Cumano.” Att. XIV 11, 2 - "Hie mecum 
BaltLus, Hirtius, Pansa. Modo venit Octavius et quidem in 
proxiraam villam Philippi ..."
He was evidently busy contacting Caesar’s friends and 
preparing the ground for his appearance in the city (see Syme 
op. cit. p. 114 f.). Cicero, too, was skilfully placated. 
("Octavius ... mihi totus deditus" Att. XIV 11, S. "Nobis cum 
hie perhonorifice et peromice Octavius" Att. XIV IS, 2.)
He proceeded to Rome without haste, stopping at Tarracina 
on the way (App. Ill 12, 42). Appian (III 12, 40) and Velleius 
(II 59, 6) speak of popular demonstrations as he approached and
finally entered the city. There, he set himself to win the
favour of the people.
C.22, 3. Plutarch notes his payment of Caesar’s bequests to 
the people, as a step to this end. He contrived it with the 
assistance of Pedius and Pinarius and also Philippus, though
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he v/as unable to recover the part of Caesar’s fortune in 
Antony’s hands. Thus he soon gained much popularity, while 
Antony, by obstructing and slighting Caesar’s heir, did not 
assist his own cause. Plutarch here very briefly sketches 
their growing rivalry and differences. The clash was
inevitable, Cicero and Atticus foresaw it, when they knew
that Octavian had decided to accept his inheritance (Att.
XIV 10, 3), Antony would not consent to yield or share his 
primacy among Caesarians with a boy who ov/ed everything to
Caesar’s name (cf. Phil. Ill 11, 24-25). From the first
interview he expressed his contempt for Octavian and refused 
to co-operate with him,
(see App. Ill 14, 50 - 21, 77. Plut. Ant. 16. Dio 45, 5, 3-4. 
Veil. II 60, 3-5. Nic. Dam. 28)
Octavian had taken the first step towards his object by 
establishing himself in Rome before Antony’s return. Soon 
after his arrival, early in May 44, he took care to make 
himself knovm to the people, introduced officially by the 
tribune L. Antonius (see Att. XIV 20, 5 - 11th May. XIV 
21, 4), Some days later, news of the "Octavi contio” had 
reached Cicero (Att. XV 2, 3).
About the same time, he sought to win over the people by 
presenting some games, with material assistance from old 
friends of Caesar’s (see Att. XV 2, 3). On this occasion he 
made an attempt to produce Caesar’s chair and wreath in public
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(App. Ill 28, 105. cf. Mic. Dqm. 28). Antony thwarted it 
with the aid of tribunes and amid the applause of the équités 
(Att, XV 3, 2). It is thought that these Games may have been 
the Ludi Ceriales, postponed from April through the disorder 
in the city (see Rice-Holmes "Architect" p. 191, S^ mie p. 116, 
C.A.H. X p. 10).
In the months that followed, Antony lost no opportunity of 
hindering Octavian*s attempts to claim his inheritance. He 
retained the money in his possession, allowed a tribune to 
obstruct the proposed ’lex curiata’, and pursued his policy 
further in the litigation over Caesar’s estate (see App. Ill 
22, 80. Dio 45, 5, 3-4).
He is also said to have opposed Octavian in a design to 
obtain the tribunate, in place of Helvius Cinna (see App. Ill 
31, 120-123. Plut. Ant. 16. Dio 45, 6, 2-4. Suet. Aug.
10, 2). The effect of all this was merely to increase 
popular sympathy for Octavian.
After the Ludi Apollinares, from 20th to 30th July were 
celebrated the Ludi Caesaris Victorias. Their success, to 
v/hich Matius contributed and so earned Cicero’s reproaches 
(p. XI 27 & 28) was crovmed by the appearance of the comet 
hailed as Caesar’s star. Octavian was quick to take advantage 
of this fortunate coincidence and of the profound impression it 
made on the people (see Suet. lul. 88. Plut. Caes. 69. Dio 
45, 7, 1. Obsequens 68. Val. Max. Ill 2, 19).
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Perhaps to late July rather than September belongs 
Octavian’s candidature for the tribunate (see Frisch p. 113).
It was his first attempt to enter public life and would follow 
naturally on the success of his Games. Here, Antony violently 
opposed him (suet. Aug. 10, 8. App. Ill 31, 121-122), thus 
bringing their former differences to an open quarrel. 
Henceforward, their rivalry was not confined to semi-private 
affairs in connection with the will, but was continued more 
seriously in political manoayres.
Plutarch, therefore, rightly places his chapter on 
Octavian here, between Brutus’ Games and departure from Italy. 
He ignores Octavian’s earlier movements leading up th this 
point; but it was only in late July that Octavian began to 
emerge as a serious figure on the political scene.
22, 3. ?c crui/yyc TTc>Wou^
yj;#/ ufTo /fa/iV-yjc Krrj0<^Tcucr-«/^tt/L^iy.
The events of July - October 44 B.C. gradually led to the 
situation here described.
Relations between Antony and Octavian became more and more 
strained (see App. Ill 28, 105 - 29, 111. Dio 45, 5-8, Nic. 
D<#m. 28. Plut. Ant. 16, 2).
A public reconciliation,of short duration, was forced on 
them by the veterans with the tribunes acting as spokesmen 
(App. Ill 30, 115. Nic, Dqm. 29. Dio 45, 8, l). It was 
followed by fresh quarrels and mutual suspicion. Appian
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(ill 39, 156 speaks of a second reconciliation on the
Capitol, hut this too was ended by Antony’s accusation of an
attempt on his life, inspired by Octavian (Nic. Dqm. 30.
App. Ill 139, 157. Suet. Aug. 10, 3).
Cicero gives his account of the "Caesaris Octavian!
conatum", in which he was disposed to believe, see F. XII 83,
8 ”de quo multitudini fictum ab Antonio crimen videtur ... 
prudentes autem et boni viri et credunt factura et probant”.
The truth of the matter has never been ascertained. It 
may well have been only a device of Antony’s to bring discredit 
on Octavian. At all events, he did not press the charge - 
though, indeed, Cicero attributes this to his increasing 
unpopularity, see F. XII 83, 8 "tanto se odio esse intellegit 
ut ... rem proferre non audeat”.
Antony left Rome on October 9th to meet the Macedonian 
legions at Brundisium, before leading them north to take over 
Cisalpine Gaul from Decimus Brutus (F. XII 83, 8). Cicero 
alleges that he meant to march on Rome. But whatever his 
original intentions, his hand was forced by the sudden turn of 
events.
After his departure, Octavian began to act more openly. 
Bending agents to tamper with the legions at Brundisium, he
himself went to Campania, to enlist the veteran settlers there. 
He was especially successful at Calatia and Casilinum - see Nic. 
Dora. 31. App. Ill 40, 164-166. Dio 45, 18, 1-4. Suet. Aug.
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10, 3. Veil. II 61, 2, Plut. Imt, 16. Cic, 44. Tac. 
Ann. I 10. Cic. Phil. Ill 2, 3. IV 1, 2-3. V 3, 23. 16, 44.
It was at this point that he began to court Cicero more 
assiduously, in an attempt to win his support for the coup he 
was planning.
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28, 4-6. Cicero’s collaboration with Octavian.
The alliance of Cicero and Caesar’s heir was entered 
on at a time when each had need of the other and intended to 
use the other for his own purposes. Octavian, with no 
official position as yet, needed a responsible spokesman in 
the Senate, in particular someone of considerable influence 
and reputation. Byrne (p. 132-3') points out that his rela­
tives were not numerous or prominent and his friends and 
supporters were then obscure or disreputable. Cicero, on his 
side, conceived the plan of playing off Octavian against 
Antony, hoping that, once he was destroyed, the Senate would 
be strong enough to deal with Octavian.
28, 4, K T w  ^yxl<rct^ .
(cf. Plut. Cic. 45. Ant. 16, 3).
As early as June 44, Cicero had seen the possibility of 
using Octavian - see Att, XV 12, 2 "sed tamen alendus est; et 
ut nihil aliud ab Antonio seiungendus”. However, it was 
Octavian who took the first step, l-Vhile he v/as gathering his 
troops in early November 44 B.C., preparatory to marching on 
Rome, he wrote constantly to Cicero, asking his advice, trying 
to persuade him to commit himself openly to the coming struggle 
with the consul. Cicero was not yet ready. Pleased as he 
was to find a counterpoise to Antony, he did not trust Octavian, 
see Att. XVI 8, 1 & 2 (which Frisch, p. 146, takes to mark the
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first move towards collaboration): "Plane hoc spectat ut se 
duco helium geratur cum Antonio .. quern autem sequamur?
Vide nomen, vide aetatem. Atque a me postulat primum ut 
clam colloquatur mecum vel Gapuae ... Docui per litteras id 
nec opus esse nec fieri posse. Misit ad me Caecinam ... 
consultabat utrum Romam ... proficisceretur an Capuam teneret 
et Antonium venientem excluderet an iret ad tres legiones 
Macedonicas ..." From other letters, too, it can be seen 
that Cicero was besieged by urgent requests from Octavian, but 
still hung back: see Att. XVI 9 on the receipt of two more
letters from him "nunc quidem ut Romam statim veniam; velle 
se rem agere per senatum ... ille urget; ego autem 
Non confido aetati ..." "ab Octaviano cotidie litterae ut 
negotium susciperem" (Att. XVI 11, 6).
Plutarch (Cic. 44, 1) mentions the proposal of a definite 
compact between the two for their mutual advantage, made by 
Philippus and Marcellus,
Octavian’s attempted coup failed. He occupied the forum 
with armed men on 10th November, but his hopes of official 
backing from the Senate were not realised, as Cicero had fore­
seen; "Romam veniet cum manu magna ... Putat senatum statim. 
Quis veniet? Si venerit, quis incertis rebus offendet 
Antonium?" (Att. XVI 11, 6) Octavian was obliged to address 
the people in the assembly, introduced by the tribune Ti. 
Ci^niutius. Here, he made no secret of his intentions.
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Cicero saw a copy of his speech; "lurat ’ita sibi parentis 
honores consequi liceat' et simul dextram intendit ad statuam 
..." (Att. XVI, 15, 3), According to Appian (ill 41, 167) 
he also spoke against Antony - cf. Dio 45, 12, 4-6. The 
veterans, however, were not yet prepared to fight Antony, who 
now approached with the Macedonian legions. Many preferred 
to return home again. Octavian, with depleted forces, was 
obliged to withdraw from Rome. He march north into Etruria 
and made his headquarters at Arret lam (App. Ill 42, 174). cf. 
Dio 45, 12, 6.
At Brundisium, meanwhile, Antony had encountered mutinous 
troops and had ordered summary executions to restore order 
(Att. XVI 8, 8. Phil. Ill 2, 4. App. Ill 43, 175 - 45, 184.
Dio 45, 13, 2-3). On receiving news of Octavian’s activities, 
he returned to Rome and summoned the Senate to meet on 24th 
November, but failed to appear himself.
When the Senate met on the Capitol on 28th, he did not 
succeed in bringing forward a motion to declare Octavian "hostis" 
(Phil. Ill 8, 19-20). Antony’s position was further weakened 
by the desertion first of the Martian and then of the Fourth 
Legion (Phil. Ill 3, 6 & 9, 84. App. Ill 45, 185. Dio 45,
13, 3-5) to Octavian. He immediately left Rome to rejoin his 
remaining forces and proceed with them to Cisalpine Gaul (Dio 
45, 13, 5). On his arrival, Decimus Brutus, who had been 
established there since April, refused to surrender the
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province (App. Ill 49, 193. Dio 46, 35, 2). He would not 
risk an encounter with Antony, but by the end of the year was 
preparing to stand a siege in Mutlna (App. Ill 49, 800-2Ü1 .
Dio 46, 36, 1).
In Rome, Cicero, who had returned on 9th December (F. XI 
5, 1), had not intended to appear in the Senate before 1st 
January 43, when Hirtius and Pansa, the consuls-designate, 
would take office. ViTien, however, the Senate met on 20th 
December to provide for the presence of armed guards on 1st 
January (F. XI 6, 8. Phil. Ill 5, 13. Dio 45, 15, 3),
Cicero prepared to support Decimus and Octavian for their stand 
against the consul and to urge the Senate to action against 
Antony. No doubt both rebels were pressing Cicero to obtain 
official sanction for their actions (see F. XI 6, 1). With 
the Third Philippic, Cicero first came forv/ard publicly as the 
champion of Octavian, Earlier in December, he had been satis­
fied by Octavian’s attitude to the election to the tribunate of 
Casca, one of the murderers. He had previously decided to take 
this an an indication of Octavian’s future policy towards 
Caesar’s murderers - see Att. XVI 15, 3 "certissimum esse video 
discrimen Cascae nostri tribunatum, de quo quidem ipso di^ei 
Oppio cum me hortaretur ut adolescente# totamque causam .., 
complecterer, me nullo modo facere posse, ni mihi exploratum 
esset eum non modo non inimicum tyrannoctonis, verum etiam 
amicum fore." Octavian evidently offered no opposition to the
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election of Casca - for which,Antony later reproached him and 
Hirtius: "Cascam tribunatum gerere passi estis" (Phil.XIII
15, 31).
With the delivery of his Fifth Philippic on 1st January, 
Cicero committed himself still further. After condemning the 
suggestion of negotiating with Antony, roundly abusing Antony 
himself, and urging the passing of the senatus consulturn 
ultimum, he went on to propose honours for those who had 
opposed the consul. He extolled Octavian (Phil, V 16, 42 f.), 
proposed that he be given imperium with the title of propraetor, 
in spite of his youth - citing the precedent of the young 
Pompey (V 16, 43, 45, 17, 46). He went further, offering 
himself as sponsor for Octavian’s continued loyalty, see V 
18, 50-51; "Omnis habeo cognitos sensus adulescentis ... 
Promitto, recfipio, spondeo, patres conscripti, C, Caesarem 
talem semper fore civem qualis hodie sit ..."
Cicero was now fully embarked on his dangerous course 
and could not afford to look back. His new alliance at 
length brought alarmed protests from Brutus in Macedonia.
The extracts given by Plutarch correspond closely to passages 
in ad Brut, I 16 and 17 to Cicero and Atticus respectively.
(cf. Plut. Cic. 45, 2 - ^  cCVeC Kl~Cb iT
£,v J^f^ TTTtKoiy
22, 4. c>u .... etc.
cf. I 16, 7. "non dominum ^ gisse sed amiciorem dominum
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quaesisse videberis.”
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cf. I 17, 4. "dum habeat a quibus impetret quae velit et a
quibus colatur ac laudetur servitutem, honorificam modo, non 
aspernatur."
22, 5, o i %  'V^^cyo\/ox^ • rr^Te'^<£ ^e<rrroT^^ tA7r^£i/oK.
cf. I 17, 6. "sed dominum ne parentem quidem maiores nostri 
voluerunt esse."
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cf. I 16, 9. "... neque desistam abstrahere a servitio 
civitatem ..."
and I 17, 6. "... nulla erit tarn bona condicio serviendi qua 
deterrear."
22, 6. pofcyjLoc^ 6L(/ Se - - ~Tuy>^yt/o u-•
cf. I 17, 5 and 2 - "quid hoc mihi prodest, si merces Antoni
oppressi poscitur in Antoni locum successio?"
Of the whole collection of letters to Brutus, the 
authenticity of these two has been the most disputed, though 
they are now generally accepted.
see Mueller, Teubner text p. 521, cxlix. Tyrrell and Purser 
VI pp. cxi ff. Oelaer PW X 1008. Syme op. cit. pp. 147. 
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Plutarch here affords proof that such letters were known 
and accepted in his day; therefore, if they were forgeries, 
they would be of an early date. But the intimate knowledge
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of the characters and events of the time^ which they display, 
suggests, rather, that they are genuine; and the style and 
character of the letters themselves is not incompatible with 
that of Brutus.
For the date of the letters; Plutarch, who calls them
iwc^'To^oLÎs^ (c, 23, 1) seems to assign them to 
the time before Brutus? departure from Italy, which is clearly 
impossible from internal evidence. They undoubtedly refer to 
the situation after the Battle of Mutina in the early summer of 
43 B.C. (see I 17, 5 «quid enim nostra vieturn esse Antonium, 
si victus est ...«) and were probably were written within a 
short time of each other, from the identity of subject-matter.
I, 16. was evidently written when Brutus had heard of Octavian's 
aspirations to the consulship, i.e. in July 43. I, 17 is 
thought to be the earlier of the two (see Gel&er PW X 1008-9) 
and is, in fact, dated by Tyrrell and Purser to the middle of 
May (VI pp. 153 & 168).
Plutarch, in his Comparison of Cicero and Demosthenes 
(4, 4 /537)> corrects his dating here by quoting the letter to 
Cicero in connection with Octavian?s demand for the consulship.
The question of Cicero?s collaboration with Octavian 
developed into one of the serious differences which continaèd 
to trouble the relations of Brutus and Cicero. Fundamental 
differences of temperament and outlook made complete agreement 
on matters of policy impossible. In seeking to restore the
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Republic, though both desired the same end, they could rarely 
agree on the best means of attaining it (cf. ad Brut. II 5, 1). 
But this and other quarrels of the last year were more parti­
cularly accasioned by their different views of the situation. 
Cicero ?s policy was motivated chiefly by his feud with Antony, 
who, to him, was the most dangerous enemy of the Republic.
For personal considerations, too, he was bound to oppose any 
suggestion of peaceful negotiations with .Antony, In his
Philippics he had gone too far ever to retract. On the other
hand,, while he may never have trusted Octavian entirely, he was 
prepared to risk his advancement because he thought Antony more 
to be feared and persisted in believing that he could control 
Octavian (see ad Brut, I 3, 1 «... Est omnino illud difficilius, 
sed tamen non diffidimus*). He had returned to his old dream 
of acting as guide and mentor to the first statesman of the 
Republic (see Syme op, cit. p. 143). He tried to persuade 
himself - and succeeded in persuading others - that Octavian 
would be loyal; and he was, naturally, encouraged in this 
belief by Octavian himself, no mean dissembler.
Brutus refused to be charmed out of his natural mis­
givings, see ad Brut, I 17, 5 «licet ergo patrem appellet 
Octavius Ciceronem, referat omnia, laudet, gratias agat, tamen 
illud apparebit, verba rebus esse contraria".
His position was just the reverse of Cicero?s. For him,
there could be no accommodation with Caesar?s heir. Cicero
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had realised this at first, before he came under the spell 
of Octavian, see Att. XVI 14, 1 ''si rnultum pas sit Octavianus, 
multo firmius acta tyranni conprobatum iri quam in Telluris 
atque id contra Brutum fore". Similarly, Brutus' break with 
Antony v/as not irreparable. . Even as political opponents, they 
were still able to understand and appreciate eacb other (see 
below c. 29, 7 & lO). They had previously been bound by 
formal amicitia; no greater quarrel had interrupted it than 
the sharp exchange of letters in August 44 (see F. XI 3), Nor 
had Antony displayed a violent, unrelenting hostility towards 
Brutus and Cassius, though necessarily outwitting them in 
gaining power for himself. Had they been willing to acquiesce, 
they might have remained in high favour - "Atqui non solum bono 
domino potuimus Antonio tolerare nostrum fortunam sed etiam 
beneficiis atque honoribus ut participes Çui quantis vellemus"
(ad Brut. I 16, 4). Brutus continued to believe in the possi­
bility of reconciliation with Antony, but in Octavian he saw a 
greater menace to the Republic, and he was justified by events.
He perceived the dangers of too rashly applauding and advancing 
Octavian, and was alarmed by the lengths to which Cicero's policy 
was carried: "timeo de consulatu, ne Caesar tuus altius se
ascendisse putet decretis tuis quam inde si consul factus sit 
descensurumU Quodutinam inspectare possis tealorem de illo 
meum" (ad Brut. I 4^ Q, 2-3). He disapproved of the voting 
of extraordinary honours: "ego certe quin cum ipsa re bellura
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ger.am, hoc est cum regno et imperils extraordinariis et 
dominatione et potentia quae supra leges se esse velit 
(I, 17, 6 cf, I 16, 5), The advancement of Octavian called 
out a re-statement of his own Republican principles. Also, 
with his distrust of Octavian went a strong objection to 
Cicero's methods. The adulation of Octavian, "hunc divinum 
adulescentem" (Phil, V 16, 43), was repugnant to him, who had 
never fawned on Caesar himself. The terms of Cicero's letter 
to Octavian - the immediate cause of his general protest - 
angered and disgusted him: "Particulam lêtterarum tuarum quas
misisti Octavio legi .,, sic enim ill! gratias agis de re 
publica tarn suppliciter ac demisse . ut prorsus prae te feras 
non sublatarn dominationem sed dominura commutatum esse. Verba 
tua recognosce et aude negare servientis adversus regem istas 
esse preces." (I 16, 1)
Cicero's commendation of the "Liberatores orbis terrarum" 
to Octavian's mercy was a prime cause of vexation - he returns 
to it repeatedly throughout the letter; clearly, it had made 
a strong and painful impression. And the very sharpness of 
his disappointment in such a man as Cicero drove him to condemn 
his present attitude in stronger terms: cf. I 16, 10: "fatUr
enim duriorem esse condicionem spectatae virtutis quam 
incognitae. Bene facta pro debitis exigimus, quae aliter 
eveniunt ut decepti ab iis infesto animo reprehendimus."
Yet while he had a more vivid apprehension of the dangers
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involved, his position at a distance made him less able to 
appreciate the difficulties of Cicero at Rome. Cicero 
himself pleaded expediency in justification of his policy:
«Huic habiti a me honores nulli quidem. Brute, nisi debiti,
nulli nisi necesarii .,. Quamquam ego illi turn verborum 
laudem tribui eamque modicam, decrevi etiam imperium ... erat 
exercitum habenti necessarium ...« (ad Brut. T 15, 7 f.)
Cicero had no real choice of allies; Octavian and his army 
afforded the only check to the domination of Antony, for 
there was nothing to be done without military power. The 
state of the Republic was to blame, not Cicero. Boissier 
(op. cit. p. 376) points out that this last phase of Cicero's 
career was largely due to Brutus' encouraging him to return 
to Rome (in August 44); therefore, Brutus should have been 
the last to reproach him for the course he adopted after his 
return (cf. ad Brut,. I 15, 5). Nonetheless, Brutus was right 
in seeing the greatest danger in Octavian and in warning Cicero 
against him. He had been useful to the Senate in opposing 
Antony, but that did not make him a loyal servant of the Senate, 
since the limiting of Antony's power was in his own interests - 
see ad Brut. I 16, 7. "Quern quod laudas ob eq quae adhuc 
fecit, plane probo; sunt enim laudanda, si modo contra 
alienam potentiam, non pro sua suscepit eas actiones." By 
July 43, Cicero had begun to realise that it might not be 
possible to undo what he had done. He now regretted the
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pledge he had given to the Senate: "Maximo autem cum haec
scribeham officiebar dolore quod cura me pro adule scentulo 
ac paene puero res publica accepisset vadem, vlx videbar 
quod promiseram praestare posse." (ad Brut. I 18, 3)
Within a month of this, Octavian was to show beyond 
further doubt what his plans were and how much influence 
Cicero exercised over him.
With his march on Rome, to take by force what the 
Senate would not grant, the failure of Cicero's policy was 
complete, and his part in public life ended, 
cf. App. Ill 89, 369: -re %  'T'£c^s
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I & II. Fara. XII 4-8. Att
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Boissier; "Ciceron ..." pp. 370 ff.
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c. 23. The departure of Brutus and Cassius from Italy.
Plutarch makes the decision to abandon Italy follow the 
beginning of hostilities between Antony and Octavian and the 
corruption of the legions, i.e. October-November 44 B.C. (cf. 
Nie. Dom. 31). This is certainly a mistake. Brutus left 
Italy towards the end of August (Att. XVI 7, 5. Phil. X 4, 8). 
Already in July, while lingering near Naples for news of his 
Games, "non tergiVersantem sed exspectantem si qui forte 
casus" (Att. XVI 5, 3), he was making preparations for the 
voyage: "paratiorem enim offendi Brutum quam audiebam. Nan
et ipse (et) Domitius bona plane habet dicrota, suntque
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navigia praeterea luculenta Sestl, Bucilianl, ceterorurn"
(Att. XVI 4, 4). Cassius, too, was stationed at Naples, with 
a small fleet of his own (Att. XVI &, 4). From here, in the 
latter half of July, the two praetors published an edict, in 
which they re-asserted their desire for peace and gave that as 
their reason for abdicating their office and leaving the 
country. See F. XI 3, 3 "... non licere praetoribus concordiae 
ac libertatis causa per edictum de suo iure decedere ...?"
The general terms of the edict are found also in Velleius 
(II 62, 3) "M. Brutus et C. Cassius ... testati edictis 
libenter se vel in perpetuo exilic victuros dum^materiam 
Phil. X 4, 8 contains echoes of this: "At hunc (Brutum) iis
ipsis ludorum diebus ... nihil nisi de pace et concordia 
civium cogitantem. Eundem vidi postea Veliae cedentem Italia 
ne qua oreretur belli civilis causa propter se." In Phil. I 
3, 8, Cicero described the edict as "plenum qequitatis". He 
saw a copy ofjit on returning from his attempted voyage in 
August (Att. XVI 7, 1); that is, if Rice-Holmes' conjectural 
identification of the edict mentioned by Cicero here and in 
the First philippic with that quoted by Velleiue is accepted 
(see "Architect" pp. 22 & 267). Cicero has no reference to a 
later edict, which might correspond to Velleius, and indeed it 
seems more likely that only one edict was published, especially 
since that of July was evidmmtly on the same theme as Velleius'.
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Its publication provoked a sudden attack, by edict and 
private letter, from Antony. From the reply of Brutus and 
Cassius, in which they complained of the tone of his letter
("litteras ... conturneliosas, minaces, minime dignas quae 
a te nobis mitterentur" F. XI 3, 1), it only appears that 
Antony was irritated because they had made some demand - it 
has been suggested, the repeal of the corn commission - or 
because they had chosen to demand it publicly by edict.
Antony's attack immediately followed a conciliatory 
speech and rumours of a favourable change in his policy.
See Att. XVI 7, 1: "Suminam spem nuntiabant fore ut Antonius
cederet, res conveniret, nostri Romam redirent." and Phil. I 
3, 8 "... a quibus primum accipio M. Antoni contionem quae 
mihi ita placuit ut ea lecta de reversione primum coeperim 
cogitare ... Addebant praeterea ,.. rem conventuram, Kalendis 
(Sext.) senatum frequentem fore; Antonium repudiatis malis 
suasoribus remissis provinciis Galliis ad auctoritatem senatus 
esse rediturum",
Frisch (pp. 113-118) has pointed out the reasons for 
Antony's sudden change of attitude. It was just at this time 
that Octavian was becoming a serious rival for the favour of 
people and veterans. Antony's speech, which was soon followed 
by the publication of the Liberators' edict (Phil. I 3, 8) 
did not please his Caesarian supporters. Threatened by the 
increasing popularity of Octavian, Antony could not afford to
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offend them and was forced to adopt a more radical policy 
in order to compete with his rival. Under pressure from 
the veterans, he effected a temporary reconciliation with 
him, (see above on c.22) and about the same time abruptly 
terminated friendly rdations with Brutus and Cassius.
Their edict gave him his opportunity; his attack brought 
only a restrained and dignified reply, in which they stated 
their own case and their reluctance to be drawn into open 
hostilities, but concluded with a half-veiled warning:
(F XI 3, 4) "... vocemus te ad nullas inimicitias, sed tamen 
pluris nostrarn libertatem quam tuam amicitiam aestimemus.
Tu etiam atque etiam vide quid suscipias, quid sustinere 
possis, neque quam diu vixerit Caesar, sed quam non diu 
regnarit fac cogites It was their last communication
with Antony. They set out from Naples soon afterwards, 
having now no reason to linger in Italy. It is not at all 
likely that they were influenced in this by the intrigues of 
Octavian, as Nicolaus (c. 31) and Dio (47, 20, 3) state.
At that time he was still dissembling his real intentions 
regarding Caesar's murderers. Gelzer (PVif X 999) refers to 
Cicero's letter of June (Att. XV 12, 2): "In Octaviano ...
satis ingenii, satis animi, videbaturque erga nostros 
ita fore, ut nos vellemus,animatus".
Antony was responsible for their departure, not Octavian, 
For the remaining months of his consulship, there was no place
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for them in Italy. But they were not giving up all hope.
They had wished to he well-represented in the Senate on the 
1st August - see Att, XVI 7, 1 et fore frequentem
senatum Kalendis, a Bruto et Cassio litteras missas ad 
consulares et praetorios ut adessent rogare."
Piso's attack on Antony at this session, though a brief, 
unsupported attempt, yet as the first sign of a challenge to 
Antony's domination from the Senate, delighted Brutus. He 
was still more pleased by Cicero's decision to give up his 
journey to Greece; « quam valde ille reditu vel potius 
reversione mea laetatus effudit ilia omnia quae tacuerat .., 
Maxime autem dolebat me Kal. Sext. in senatu non fuisse. 
Pisonem ferebat in caelum ...” (Att. XVI 7, 5). They met at 
Velia on the Lucanian coast, on the 17th August, as Cicero v/as 
23, 1 returning; Brutus' fleet was then at the mouth of the river 
Heles (Att. XVI 7, 5. ad Brut. I 15, 5. Phil. X 4, 8).
Plutarch does not mention this last meeting. His account, 
drawn, as he says, from Bioulus' memoirs (23, 7) gives a more 
intimate picture of Brutus with his wife and friends before 
his departure, but barely sketches the political backgrounds. 
In this respect, Cicero's account is complementary to his.
24, 1. From Velia Brutus finally set sail for Athens, 
Cassius following later. It is difficult to say precisely 
what their plans were at that moment. They had certainly 
abandoned any intention of carrying out the corn commission;
159.
and they also ignored the praetorian provinces assigned to 
them by Antony (see above 19, 5) - provinces of no importance, 
where Antony need have no fear of them. But it may be 
doubted if any provocation v/as intended by this or if they set 
out with a definite hostile intent. They betrayed no haste 
in leaving, lingering in Italy from June to September and 
planning a leisurely voyage - see Att. XVI 4, 4 "Illud est 
mihi submolestum quod parum Brutus properare videtur ... 
deinde quantum intellego tarde est navigaturus consistons in 
locis pluribus," And at the end of September, Cicero did 
not know what they had in mind, whether they intended to make 
some attempt on behalf of the Republic, or whether they planned 
voluntary exile only for their personal safety (see F. XIII 2, 3 
quare spes est omnis in voüis; qui si idcirco abestis ut 
sitis in tuto, ne in Vobis quidem; sin aliquid dignum vestra 
gloria cogitatis, velim salvis nobis
Brutus, at least, was still anxious to reach some 
peaceful settlement and avoid civil war. Gelzer (PW X 997) 
thinks Cassius was not in agreement with him, and Syme (p. 184) 
inclines to the same opinion. Yet even if Cassius would have 
preferred a stronger policy from the beginning, he continued to 
act in concert with his brother-in-law; and any public 
pronouncements were made in the name of both (see F. XI 2 & 3). 
The two letters to Antony, in the nature of manifestoes, are 
sincere statements o$ principle (see F. XI 2, 2 "nos ab initio
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spectasse otiuni ..." etc.), expressive of the firm bpt 
negative attitude Brutus had tried to maintain.
Their edict had asserted that they were withdrawing in 
order to prevent war; in their last letter to Antony they 
made it clear that he would have to give the signal for it; 
they would not challenge him, unless driven 0?. XI 2). It 
was, most probably, a fair expresion of their intentions on 
leaving Italy; but that does not mean that they had not 
considered what steps they would take, if it became necessary 
No doubt they had the provinces of Macedonia dnd Syria in 
mind - there is no real proof that they had definitely 
planned to seize them, before they reached Athens. Schwartz 
(Hermes 33, 192) asserted that they were preparing for their 
campaign in the east during their stay in Campania. Gelzer 
(PW X 998) and Rice-Holmes (Architect p. 197) hefe corrected 
him. The fleets Brutus and Cassius collected in July were a 
necessary precaution against pirates - reports of whose acti­
vities had alarmed Cicero (Att. XVI 2, 4); and the passage 
inF. XI 3, 2 proves no more than that Antony, in his attack, 
had accused them of sending envoys abroad and tampering with 
legions in the provinces, and these charges he did not repeat 
in his edict ("quod te questum esse negas" "cum haec 
reticueris"). It is unlikely that he expected them to be 
taken seriously; they are comparable to the supposed attempt 
on his life by Octavian.
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Ferrero (Eng. trans. Ill pp. 77-78, 91, 107) conjectures 
from later events and from the construction he puts on Att.
XV 13, 4 that Cassius, on his own initiative, negotiated with 
the commanders in the East before leaving Italy and actually 
set out from there for Syria "with a well-defined plan for 
seizing the province", while Brutus, he believes, intended to 
go into voluntary exile in Greece and (apparently) abandon 
his colleague. The very slender evidence will scarcely 
support his intricate re-construction. From Att. XV 13, 4 
it only appears that by the end of October 44 certain rumours 
had reached Rome from the east concerning Cassius "Interea 
narrat eadem Bassi servum venisse qui nuntiaret legiones 
Alexandrinas in armis esse, Bassum arcessi, Cassium exspectari" ), 
Syria was the obvious point for Cassius to choose to rally 
his supporters, on account of his military reputation there 
(cf. Phil. XI 13, 35) - anyone might have thought of it.
That he was looked for there, once he was known to have left 
Italy, does not, by itself, prove that he had been in 
communication with the province since June or July. No doubt 
he received some good assurance of his reception before he 
finally arrived in Syria, but such negotiations might more 
easily have been conducted from Athens ; and if he had app­
roached the Pompeian adventurer Bassus, he must have been 
unsuccessful, for Bassus mas the only one to resist him when 
he appeared in the province (F. XII 12, 3). Moreover, his
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remaining in or near Italy even longer than Brutus does not 
suggest that he was pursuing a more determined course of 
action. How much longer he waited is not quite certain. 
Cicero says "Cassi classis paucis post diebus consequebatur" 
(Phil, X 4, 8), Yet Rice-Homes (op. cit. p. 44), following 
O.E. Schmidt, dates his departure to the first half of 
October, and Syme (p. 119) also thinks he did not leave 
Italian waters for some time, Rice-Holmes relies on the 
evidence of two letters to Cassius (F. XII 89%), written 
late September-early October, from which it is argued that 
Cassius was then still in the south of Italy. It appears 
from F. XII 2, 1 that by the end of September Cassius had 
read and congratulated Cicero on the First Philippic; and 
after these letters there occurs a gap in the correspondence 
with Cassius until February 43 (F. XII 4) when Cicero had no 
certain news of his movements. But Rice-Holmes argues (from 
F. XII 8, 3) that Cieero then wished Cassius to return to 
Rome. The paragraph is obvpiously addressed to both 
Liberators - Cicero changes here from the singular to the 
plural - and only expresses his uncertainty of their plans and, 
in guarded terms, his hope that they intend to take action.
The reference to their absence, and, in the following letter 
(F. XII 3, 2) to Antony's hostility towards Cassius' legate 
rather suggest that he was already on his way. And, in fact, 
Frisch (p. 118^ and Charlesworth (C.A.H, X p. 10) find no
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difficulty in accepting Cicero's statement in the ïentn 
Philippic and dating Cassius' departure to the end of August, 
S4, 1. The first destination of the Liberators was Athens, 
where they were received with enthusiasm: cf. Dio 47, 20, 4
Plutarch, unlike Dio, does not specifically mention Cassius 
here, but he evidently followed the same account, for later 
(28, 6), speaking of their meeting at Smyrna in 43, he says: 
i t/cT o'yyrii/o iy  lc<^'ou 2/ oc
^ykXf^(r<\/. It may reasonably be assumed, then, that Casâus 
followed Brutus to Athens, in accordance with his first plan 
(see Att. XV 11, 1: ille in Achaiam se iturura").
For some months, Rome had no certain news of them. Some 
information v;as privately brought by Brutus' agent Scaptius at 
the end of October - Att. XV 13, 4 "De Bruto te nihil scire 
dicis, sed (Servilia) venisse M, Scaptium ... ad se tamen 
clam venturum sciturumque me omnia
They took no open and decisive action at first. To all 
appearances, they were merely distinguished visitors to Athens; 
Brutus fpent much of his time attending the lectures of the 
philosophers. But, according to Plutarch, while indulging in 
his favourite pursuit, he was also secretly preparing for war. 
He was, at least, looking for allies and opening negotiations 
with the neighbouring provinces. The Greek Herostratus was 
:4, 2 sent to Quintus Hortenâws, the governor of Macedonia. He had
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not, hitherto, belonged to the same political groun, but he 
v/as related oy marriage to Brutus' adopted family, the 
Bervilii Caepiones, and in this case, family ties prevailed. 
From Dio (47, 21, % & 26, l) it may be inferred that Trebonius 
was also approached, as was natural enough. The first open 
34, 4 movement on Brutus' part was the acceptance of the Asian
tribute from the quaestor Apuleius, at Carystos, see App. Ill 
63, 259. Dio 47, 21, 3. By his own account, it was this 
which (by furnishing him with the means) led to his raising 
forces in Greece. Bee Phil. X 11, 24 "nam de M. Apuleio ... 
cui testis est per litteras M. Brutus, eum principem fuisse 
ad conatum exercitus comparandi".
Ferrero (B.T. Ill p. 135 f ,; cf. Boissier p. 370) believes 
that Brutus was prepared to live in retirement at Athens and 
had no thought of vigorous action, until the enthusiasm of 
various elements in Greece and Macedonia, focusing on him and 
crystallizing in the material assistance brought by Apuleius, 
forced him to place himself at the head of a new movement.
Plutarch is probably nearer the truth in showing Brutus 
engaged at first in private negotiations only, not committing 
himself to any revolutionary course until his meeting with 
Apuleius placed him in possession of public funds, diverted 
from the government at Rome. The decisive step was taken 
following news of events in Italy, the raising of armies there 
by November (see Syme p. 184) which proved once again that
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nothing could be done without military aid. Gelzer fPW X 
lOOO) believes that Brutus was influenced by Antony's 
redistribution of provinces on November 28th (Phil. Ill 
10, 25), in which, he says, Brutus, Cassius and Trebonius 
were no longer recognised. It might be objected that 
Brutus and Cassius had shown no disposition to accept the 
provinces previously assigned them and that Trebonius' 
command would end in 43. However, if Antony had not yet 
plainly declared war on them, with the rise of Octavian he 
was forced to appear less accommodating than formerly: see
F, XII 3 for evidence of his attitude in October 44; a more 
violent speech against the Liberators, and obstacles put in 
the way of Cassius' legate: "Auget tuus amicus furorem in 
dies ... ante diem vi Non, Oct. productus in contionem ... ea 
dixit de conservatoribus patriae, quae dici deberent de 
proditoribus ... cetera cuius modi sint, ex hoc iudica, quod 
legato tuo viaticum eripuerunt". In December, Republican 
opposition to Antony gathered head all at once in the 
provinces. Gelzer (PW X lOOO) notes the simultaneous 
resistance of Decimus in Cisalpine Gaul and Brutus and Cassius 
in the East. It may be supposed that Brutus and Cassius acted 
together,
28, 6. Plutarch later suggests that they set out about the 
same time for the provinces they meant to occupy:
i^jjy>L<rO€\/T€Si é €(s  ^o cfs
166.
cf. Velleius (II 62, 3) "intente ac pari animo sua auctoritate 
... provincias exercitusque occupaverant". In this design 
they were supported by Trebonius in Asia. According to Dio 
(47, 3) it was he who had sent the Asian tribute to
Brutus, and he also allowed Cassius to pass through his 
province to Syria and gave him assistance (47, 26, 1).
24, 6. This incident at the banquet is related also by 
Valerius Maximus (I 5, 7) and Appian (IV 134, 564). From 
Plutarch's account, which refers it to the arrival of 
Apuleius, it would appear that Brutus' birthday fell in 
winter, (see PW X 973). Appian, however, gives this story 
with other supposed portents of disaster and refers it to a 
different occasion.
25, 1. Before the end of the year Brutus was provided with 
additional funds by the quaestor of Syria (Dio 47, 27, 2-4) 
Antistius Vetus - see ad Brut. II 3, 5 "Vetus Antistius me 
tamen pecunia sublevavit" and ad Brut. I 11.
Velleius admits that the two quaestors were willing 
parties to the interception of the tribute, see II 62, 3 
"... pecunias etiam quae ex transmarinis provinciis Romam ab 
quaestoribus deportabantur a volentibus acceperant".
85, 2. With this money, Brutus proceeded to levy forces in
Greece. He was joined by veterans of Pharsalia and young 
84, 2-3 Romans studying at Athens (including Cicero's son and Horace); 
he also intercepted two cohorts of cavalry intended for
1
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Dolabella - see Phil, X 6, 13 - and appropriated the arsenal 
at Demetrias, which Caesar had established for his Parthian 
campaign (cf. App. Ill 63, 259).
85, 3. At the beginning of 43 B.C., Hortensius surrendered 
Macedonia to Brutus, recognising him as his successor and 
holding a levy to provide him with fresh troops (Phil. X 6, 13 
and 11, 24). Brutus' occupation of the province coincided 
with the arrival of G, Antonius, appointed governor of 
Macedonia on 28th November by his brother (see Dio 47, 21, 4).
25, 4 Brutus hastened to intercept him before he could gain a secure 
footing in the province,
26, 1-3. Plutarch uses this story of Brutus' illness on the 
march to meet Antonius for the purpose of showing the dis­
position even of enemies towards his hero; he then continues 
his narrative of the brief struggle with C, Antonius to the 
defection of his army and his capture near Apollonia. See App. 
Ill 79, 281-4. Dio 47, 21, 1-J. Veil. II 69. Livy Per 118.
Brutus had also occupied Illyricum, which was then 
governed by Vatinius. Cicero (Phil. X 6, 14) says Vatinius 
opened the gates of Dyrrhachium to Brutus and surrendered his 
army. Dio (47, 21, 6) has a different account; he declares 
that Vatinius was hostile (not unnaturally, since he was a 
Caesarian) but that his soldiers took the decision upon them­
selves during his illness. At all events, Brutus won over his 
legion without a struggle (cf. Veil. II 69).
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While still besieging Apollonia, since he was now, in 
effect, master of Greece, Macedonia dnd Illyricum, Brutus sett 
a despatch to Rome to inform the Senate of his actions and of 
the new state of affairs across the Adriatic. It arrived early 
in February; Pansa, acting consul in the absence of Hirtius, 
who was engaged in the campaign at Mutina, immediately convoked 
the Senate to hear it (Phil. X 1, 1). At this session, Cicero 
delivered his Tenth Philippic, opposing the motion of Calenus, 
ibbia-b Ekriitajus sli()ULLd be (iep]riv\B(i cxf iiljs commancl (iNbjL].. )[ :a-.8; 
ad Brut. II 3, 4) and successfully pleading Brutus' case. He 
urged that Brutus had acted in the Senate's interests, if 
without waiting for its authority, in holding Macedonia against 
Antony's brother and had at last provided a Republican army. 
Moreover, the Senate could scarcely refuse to legalize Brutus' 
position, since both Octavian and Decimus had received its 
sanction on 20th December (X 7, 15). The news of this had 
probably reached Brutus before he entered Macedonia (cf. Frisch 
p. 215). The proposal which was carried approved Brutus' 
actions and gave him, officially, command of the provinces and 
legions he possessed, with permission to raise funds for his 
operations; adding a clause "ut cum suis copiis quam proxime 
Italiam sit" (X 11, 85-26). cf. App. Ill 63, 258. Dio 
(47, 22, 2) explains the acceptance of this proposal by the 
Senate's growing suspicion of Octavian and its desire for the 
support of a more reliable army. The position of the Senate
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at the beginning of 43 v/as undoubtedly improved. Under 
Qicero's leadership, it had at last begun to challenge 
Antony; and at the same time it received support from the 
provinces where the Liberators were finally rousing themselves 
to action. Decimus in Gaul and Brutus in Macedonia were more 
likely to prove loyal defenders than Octavian. Following on 
the despatch from Brutus, there were persistent rumours of 
Cassius' movements. It seems to have been generally believed 
or expected that he had established himself in Syria and 
gathered an army, anticipating Dolabella, who had set out for 
his province without delay (see F. XII 4 & 5). It was, 
indeed, reasonable to suppose that Cassius would not be 
slower or less successful than Brutus in taking action (Phil,
XI 12, 27-28), but no news of him had yet reached Rome.
Meanwhile, the Senate's new hopes received an unexpected check. 
Dolabella, on his way through Asia to Syria, had murdered 
Trebonius at Smyrna and seized his province#. Reports of it 
arrived in Rome at the beginning of March (see F, XII 7); 
Dolabella was immediately outlawed, and the question arose, 
who was to conduct the war against him? Cicero, in the 
Eleventh Philippic, advocated the appointment of Cassius, but 
his proposal was vehemently opposed by Pansa and failed.
Cicero did not stop there, but made a speech in favour of
Cassius to the people. His course in this affair did not meet
with the approval of Cassius' family and Servilia (see F. XII
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7, 1 "id velim mihi ignoscas quod invita sooru tua fecerim 
... in contione quidem Pansa dixit matrera quoque tuam et 
fratrem illam a me sententiam noluisse dici"). It appears 
that they did not want to offend Pansa, and, since they did 
not yet know of Cassius' successes, they may have thought 
that Cicero had gone too far in his assertions: see Phil. XI
IS, 28 "C. Cassius ... nonne eo ex Italia consilio profectus 
est, ut prohiberet Syria Dolabellam?”
Cassius, however, was already in a position to challenge 
Dolabella's title to Syria. On his arrival, probably early 
in February, he had won over the three armies engaged there. 
Caesar's general, L. Staius Mureus, with three legions and the 
governor of Bithynia, Q. Marcius Crispus, who had come with 
his three legions to assist Murcus, both joined Cassius; their 
opponent, the Pompeian adventurer (f, Caecilius Bassus, was 
compelled by his troops to surrender; finally Aulua Allienus, 
who was taking four legions from Egypt to join Dolabella, 
handed them over to Cassius instead (see F. XII 11 & IS). By 
7th March 4S (the date of F XII 11), Cassius was master of 
Syria, with twelve legions (App. IV 59, S51). Brutus had 
news of it when he v/rote to Cicero on 1st April (ad Brut. II 
3, 3) and before 12th April it was common knowledge in Rome 
(ad Brut. II 4, 5), though Dolabella's occupation of Asia seems 
to have hindered communications with Cassius (F. XII 12, 1).
As soon as he was well established, Cassius wrote to inform
171.
Cicero, to reassure him of his intentions and to enlist his 
aid in the Senate; which Cicero had actually given ivhile he 
was v/riting (see F. XII 11, 2 "Nunc te cohortatione non puto 
indigene, ut nos apsentis remque p., quantum est in te, 
defendas. Scire te volo firma praesidia vobis senatuique 
non deesse
For the Senate, then, the first months of the year 43 saw 
a more hopeful prospect opening. The Optimates could now 
depend on the support of the eastern provinces: "Magnis
subsidiis fulta res p. est; a prima enim ora Graeciae usque 
ad Aegyptum optim^orum civium imperiis mttniti erimus et coniis." 
(F. XII 5, l) In the West, Cicero was in communication with 
Plancus in Transalpine Gaul, Lepidus in Narbonensis and Hither 
Spain and Pollio in Farther Spain, whose loyalty to the 
Senate he hoped to preserve (ad Brut, II 2, 1). The Senate's 
eventual recovery of complete control v/as held to depend on 
the outcome of the campaign at Mutina (F. XII 5, 2) where 
Decimus Brutus still held out, while Antony was now 
threatened by the armies of Octavian at Forum Cornelium and 
the consul Hirtius at Claterna. Reinforcements from Italian 
levies were being prepared by Pansa, v/ho, with the spring, was 
to join his colleague. In a comparatively short time, the 
situation had changed completely.
For Brutus, however, the occupation of Macedonia marked a 
serious retreat from his original stand on peaceful and
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constitutional methods. He had maintained it as long as 
he could, but his slow realisation of its futility, of the 
impossibility of attempting anything without military power 
to back it, was further assisted by the turn of events in 
Italy. His own. withdrawal had not prevented an appeal to 
arras there, as he had hoped. That ffinally decided him to 
adopt a more resolute policy. Cicero, in the Tenth 
Philippic, urges his long reliance on his former policy in 
justification of his final gathering of troops: "Teraptavit 
quid patientia perficere posset; nihil cum proficeret, Vi 
contra vim experiundum putavit" (11, 23). He related the 
change in Brutus (4, 9. 7, 14) to the new opposition of the 
Senate to Antony's domination. He laid strong emphasis on 
Brutus' moderation and forbearance but, allowing for 
rhetorical exaggeration, he represented Brutus' actions and 
motives accurately enough, with only a hint of his own 
privately expressed criticism: "itaque illi ipsi - qui 
tarditatem Bruti reprehendant, tamen idem modérâtionem 
patientiamque mirantur" (X 7, 14). Nonetheless, Brutus had 
been forced to retreat to a new standpoint. Henceforward, 
he was prepared to "be his o^m Senate" (cf. Phil. XI 11, 87), 
to act independently in the interests of the Republic, without 
waiting for the Senate's mandate. Already, the Liberators 
were beginning to see themselves as the embodiment of the 
Republic - see Veil. II 68, 3 "praetexentes esse rem publicam..".
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Livy Per. 118 "sub praetextu reipublicae ...n. It ^as, had 
Brutus realised it, an admission of the hopelessness of his 
attempt to restore the old Republic. He had achieved nothing 
by adhering to his principles; to have any hope of success he 
was obliged to use the weapons of his opponents, and thus 
prove again that the old form of government could no longer 
hope to work efficiently. Brutus could not, or would not, see 
it. A determined and ruthless course from the beginning might 
have given him the advantage over his political opponents, 
though it would not have recreated the Republic. But even now, 
he would not completely abandon his hopes of a peaceful agree- 
ment. This last attempt to cling to his old policy directed 
his attitude to G. Antonius and led to another clash with 
Cicero.
26, 6. Plutarch notes that C. Antonius, after capture, was 
treated honourably and Allowed to retain the insignia of his 
office, though this brought protests from Rome, especially 
from Cicero (see ad Brut. I 2a, 3, 4. II ^  5. App. Ill 79, 
321-4. Dio 47, 21, 7).
On 1st April 43 Brutus wrote to Cicero, asking his advice - 
among other matters - on C. Antonius: see ad. Brut, II 3, 2
"Antonius adhuc est nobiscum, sed medius fidius et moveor 
hominis precibus et timeo ne ilium aliquorum furor excipiat. 
Plane aestuo. Quodsi scirem quid tibi placeret, sine 
sollicitudine essem ...* Cicero, at first, was of the opinion
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that he should wait for the outcome of the war at Mutina:
"Quod me de Antonio consults, quoad Brut! exitum cognorimus. 
custodiendum puto." (ad Brut. II 4, 3) But on 13th April 
a letter from Brutus has read in the Senate and with it one 
from G. Antonius, in which Brutus had allowed him to style 
himself ^proconsul’. This caused a sensation and even 
confounded Gicero: "Vohementer admiratus senatus. Mihi
autem non erat explicatum quid agerem. Falsas dicerem? 
Confirmarem? non erat dignitatis tuae ..." (ad Brut. II 5, 3% 
Such recognition of C. Antonius? title to Macedonia was most 
unwelcome to the Senate; and the possible danger in this to 
those who had taken up arms against him was not overlooked: 
"Sestuls causae non defuit post me, cum quanto suum filiumj 
quanto meum in periculo futurum diceret, si contra proconsulem 
arma tulissent" (ad Brut, II 5, 4).
To Cicero and the Senate Brutus*clemency to Antony*s 
brother, just when events at Mutina were reaching a crisis, was 
untimely, and even alarming, if it suggested that he might not 
be ready to lend them his wholehearted support against Antony. 
They may have begun to fear, as Boissier says (op. cit. pp. 
372-3), having seen Brutus so slow to take the lead in any open 
and decisive action, that this lenient attitude indicated fresh 
hesitation and withdrawal on his part. At that point, they had 
no patience with his scruples and did not appreciate his policy. 
Cicero, in particular, was anxious to impress on him the
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desperate nature of the struggle in which they were engaged:
" ... nec quicquam aliud decernitur hoc hello, nisi utrum 
simus necne" (ad Brut. II 5, 5).
86, 6. In this last phase of his career, Cicero exhibited 
a vehemence and fanaticism at variance with his former 
political conduct. He saw that they were entering on the 
final contest for the Republic and abandoning his old hesi­
tancy concentrated all his energies on prosecuting the war 
with -Antony, Seeing no hope in peaceful measure* he pressed 
for more determined action, for the restoration of the Republic 
by force of arms if necessary, for a ruthlessness to match that 
of their enemies - see ad Brut. II 5, 1& 5 "Pacem ipsam bello 
atque armis effici posse arbitrabar ... His ergo consulimus, 
quibus victoribus vestigium nostrum nullum relinquetnr?"
He denounced all attempts to come to terms with their 
opponents or to use moderation in dealing with them, realising 
that their ovm existence was at stake (see ad Brut. II 15, 10). 
He reminded Brutus (II 5, 1) that peace could not be won by 
fine words alone: an admission which reveals the great change
in his outlook. Commenting on this, Boissier explains this 
apparently uncharacteristic phase in Cicero*s life: - "II n*y a 
rien de violent comme les colères des gens modérés quand on les 
pousse a bout*(op. oit. p. 378). For him it was *une lutte à 
outrance", and so with Antony*s brothers as with Antony (see 
ad Brut. I 3, 3 "trium fratrum unam et eandem esse causam").
In this frame of mind, he was exasperated by Brutus’
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refusal to wage war relentlessly on the Antonii or to share 
his ovm sense of urgency,
Brutus, for his part, still shrank from the prospect of 
civil war. He vms not prepared to conduct a ruthless 
campaign against his opponents: see ad Brut. I 8a "scribis
enim acrius prohibenda bella civilia esse quam in sQperatos 
iracundiam exercendam."
He had not yet abandoned all hope of compromise. 8yme 
(p. 184) suggests that this was the reason for his reluctance 
in April to have Cassius’ successes published at Rome (see ad 
Brut. II 3, 3). To him, the possession of the eastern 
provinces and legions provided a basis for negotiation. If 
the Republicans held the East, evenly matched against the 
combined Caesarian forces in the West, some compromise might 
even yet be effected and the ultimate and fatal trial of 
strength between them averted (see Syme p. 183-4. 803. Gel%er 
PW X 1003-5). This belief dictated his policy towards C. 
Antonius, whom he hoped to use as a hostage.
Ferrero’s Interpretation (Fng. tr. Ill p. 146 f.) is too 
strained and derives entirely from his view of Brutus as a 
singularly weak and impressionable character. It is 
incredible that Brutus was completely dominated by Antonius, 
adapting his policy to suit his prisoner even to the extent 
of a quarrel with Cicero.
On the contrary, Brutus and Cicero had alv/ays held
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opposite views on Antony and Brutus' actions at this time 
are quite consistent with his general policy. It was his 
last attempt to secure a peaceful settlement.
The dispute is closely connected with the quarrel over 
Octavian and stems from the same difference of opinion.
Cicero protested against the use of mild, law-abiding methods 
in dealing with the Antonian faction - see ad Brut. I 2%, 1 
"Vehementer a te. Brute, dissentio nec clementiae tuae 
concede, sed salutaris severitas vincit inanem speciem 
clementiae."
Brutus, however, again insisted that it was more 
dangerous to load Octavian with honours than to fail to crush 
the Antonii completely (cf. ad Brut. I 4, 2). He persisted, 
even though C. Antonius repaid his indulgence with repeated 
attempts to stir up mutiny among his troops (c. 26, 7-8. of. 
ad Brut. 12, 3), until at length Brutus was obliged to place 
him under guard.
On the mutiny described by Plutarch, Dio (47, 23, 1 - 24,
2) who gives a similar account, shows Brutus using greater 
severity in dealing with it.
C, Antonius is said to have been left at Apollonia, with 
a certain Gaius Clodius, by Dio. Plutarch, however, evidently 
believed that he was left in the charge of Hortensias (see below 
c. 28, 1).
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c. 27. Events in Italy and the West, 43 B.C.
ÇT'
Cicero: Philippics V - IX* F. x 5-35 XI 8-26.
XII 5, 9, 10, 25, ad Brut. I 10. 12-15. 18.
Appian; III 50, 202 - 77, 312. 80, 325 _ IV 52, 224. 
Dio: 46, 29-56. 4%7, 1-19.
Velleius: II 63-67. Livy: Per. 119. 120.
Plutarch: Ant, 17-21. Cic. 45-49.
Mon. Anc. 1 - 2 .
Suetonius: Aug. 10 - 12.
Eutrop.: VII 1 - 3.
Oros.: VI 18, 3-13.
At the beginning of the year, while Antony was blockading 
Deciraus Brutus in Mutina, the Senate decided, against Cicero’s 
advice, to send an embassy to negotiate with him. Yet at the 
same time Decimus and Octavian were commended and honoured.
The embassy, having lost its most influential member, Servius 
Sulpicius, who died on the journey (see Phil. IX), failed, and 
the two remaining envoys, Philippus and Fisc, returned on the 
1st or 2nd February. Antony not only refused to capitulate 
or to allow the envoys to approach Decimus, but sent counter- 
demands to the Sen&te (see F. XII 4, 1 " ... intolerabilia
postulate He, however, was not declared ^hostis". His
supporters
ywggmfttmNa in the Senate carried the proposal to declare a 
state of emergency ("tumultum") rather than war ("bellum")
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which would have involved the outlawing of Antony (see Phil.
VIII 1, 1-4). A second embassy, to include Cicero, was 
proposed in March but soon abandoned. On 19th March, Pansa 
with forces levied in Italy started for the north to join his 
colleague, v.ho was conducting the campaign in conjunction with 
Octavian. Towards the end of the winter, operations against 
Antony had begun; he had been driven from Claterna (Phil. VIII 
2, 6) and held only the towns of Bononia, Regium Lepidi and 
Parma (F. XII 5, 2). Dio (46, 37, 1) says that Antony, seeing 
Decimus was unlikely to surrender with relief in sight, left 
the continuance of the siege to his brother Lucius and himself 
moved to encounter Hirtius and Octavian.
On the 14th April the battle of Forum Gallorum was preci­
pitated by Antony (see F. X 30). He encountered and defeated 
Pansa's troops as they came up; Pansa himself being fatally 
wounded. But Hirtius, renewing the battle late in the day 
with fresh forces, routed Antony and retrieved the situation. 
News of this, following premature reports of a defeat, was 
received in Rome with great rejoicing. At a meeting of the 
Senate, Cicero delivered his last extant speech, the Fourteenth 
Philippic, and carried the proposal of a fifty-days thanksgiving 
and the erection of a monument to the fallen. About a week 
later, probably 21st April, a battle was forced on Antony 
before Mutina, in which he was again defeated. The senatorial 
victory was not complete, even then, for the loss of both
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consuls created serious difficulties. Hirtius had fallen 
in the battle and a day or two later Pansa died of the wounds 
received at ForuaGallorun. When, on 22nd April, Antony
finally raised the seige of Mutina and retreated west, the 
surviving generals on the senatorial side were Octavian and 
Decimus Brutus. The latter was unable to pursue Antony 
effectively (F. XI 13) and Octavian refused to co-operate with 
him (e.g. F. XI 20, 4). At Rome, ivhen news of the victory 
arrived on 27th, Antony and his followers ivere ]hist 
declared "hostes". The Senate, believing the threat to its 
existence removed, was extravagantly optimistic and now began 
its policy of discarding Octavian, who was no longer needed.
In the award of honours Decimus was granted a triumph, Octavian 
an ovation only; and further, the supreme command was trans­
ferred to Decimus - Octavian was to be subordinate to him. 
Octavian and his soldiers alike refused to be relegated to an 
inferior position and treated with contempt by the Senate (cf.
F XI 10, 11 "sed neque Caesari iraperari potest nec Caesar 
exercitui suo ..."). He showed no disposition to follow up 
the victory at Mutina; and indeed the destruction of Antony 
was not in his own interests, for it would leave him no 
check to the Senate. Meanwhile Antony was joined at Vada 
by Ventidius Bassus, who had been recruiting forces in 
Picenum, and continued his march westward towards Lepidus in 
Harbonensis. The Senate, after the first elation, was filled
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with disappointment and renewed anxiety. Its reliance now 
was on Decimus, who was virtually helpless, and on the 
doubtful loyalty of the Caesarian commanders in the west. 
Lepidus was the least reliable. Plancus, coming up to join 
him in opposing Antony, received no encouragement. Antony, 
now camping close by, secretly intrigued with Lepidus and his 
army; the final conjunction of the two occurred on 29th May, 
Lepidus pretending to act under compulsion from the soldiers. 
Plancus withdrew again beyond the river Isère and waited for 
Decimus (F. X 23). But their combined forces continued 
inactive, and in Rome optimism had given way to profound 
depression. On 30th June, Lepidus v/as declared "hostis". 
Brutus wrote from Macedonia on behalf of his nephews, the 
sons of Lepidus, and at home his mother and sister Junia had 
also applied to Cicero (see ad Brut. I 18; 13; 14; 15, 13;
18, 6). His concern for Lepidus' children, though natural 
enough, was not well received at Rome. The situation was too 
desperate to admit of half-measures or gestures of clemency; 
and the Senate expected Brutus' support against declared 
enemies. Cicero was annoyed by his attitude, but nonetheless 
did what he could (I 15, 13). Brutus, characteristically, was 
unwilling to believe the first reports of Lepidus' treachery - 
I, 13, 1 «Qui si eripuerit se nobis - quod velim temsre atque 
iniuriose de illo suspicati sint ...«. It is not likely that 
there was any political significance in Brutus' appeal - as has
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been suggested. He did not attempt to defend Lepidus, once 
assured of his defection, but he was,naturally, concerned for 
the,fate of his nephews and hoped to use his ovm influence on 
their behalf. He cannot be seriously reproached for failing 
to adhere strictly to Republican principles in this clash of 
political sympathies and family loyalty.
I'Vhile Lepidus was befriending Antony, the attitude of 
Octavian gave further cause for alarm (27, 1-4 see ad Brut. I 
10, 3. F X 24, 6). Assured of the loyalty of his army, he 
sent officers to Rome early in July to demand the consulship 
for him. when it was refused, he promptly marched on Rome.
On August 19th he was elected, together with his cousin 0, 
Fedius. Plutarch refers (27, 3) to Augustus' memoirs, 
recording his extreme youth. cf. Mon. .Anc. 1, 1-4 "Annos 
undeviginti natus .... populus autem eodem anno me consulem - 
creavit".
His first measures showed which way he was intending.
His adoption was speedily ratified, the sentence of outlawry 
on Dolabella was abrogated, and finally a Lex Pedia provided 
for the prosecution of all those concerned in the murder of 
Caesar. 0.27, 4-6; see also App. Ill 95, 392-894. Dio 46,
48-49, Suet. Aug. 10, 1. Livy Per 120. Veil. II 69, 5. 
Mon, Anc, 2.
A trial was staged, L. Cornificius acting as prosecutor of 
Brutus, Agrippa of Cassius. All the accused were condemned by
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default.
27, 5. Publius Silicius mentioned here appears in Appian
(ill 95, 393) as the sole juror who ventured to vote for 
acquittal.
According to Dio (46, 48, 4) Sextus Pompeius was also 
condemned under this law. The legal position of Brutus and 
Cassius was thus completely altered. From holding proconsular 
authority over the east by senatorial decree, they had become 
outlaws. But the provinces were still theirs in fact if not 
in law and would have to be wrested from them by force.
Octavian soon left Rome and marched north, ostensibly to 
encounter Antony. Yet before long the Senate was induced to 
repeal the sentences on Antony and Lepidus - sufficient indi­
cation of what was to come. The last step was not long 
delayed. Pollio, ?/ho had been waiting on events, came up to 
join Antony and brought Plancus over with him, thus completing 
the union of the Caesarian generals. Decimus Brutus, isolated, 
tried to escape overland to Macedonia; but his troops 
deserted, and finally, falling in with a Celtic tribe, he was 
murdered by their chief at Antony's instigation (App. Ill 98, 
§05-9. Veil. II 64, 1. Oros. VI 18, 7). About the same 
time died also Minucius Basilus, another conspirator (App. III?* 
409).
27, 6. Meanwhile, the conference of Antony, Octavian and
Lenidus near Bononia in November had resulted in the formation
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of the 2nd Triumvirate. They agreed to share supreme 
power in Rome, to divide the Western provinces, to prosecute 
the war with the Liberators, and to raise funds and crush 
opposition by proscription. Towards the end of the month 
they entered Rome separately w'^ .th their armies and on November 
27th the agreement received formal ratification by a Lex Titia: 
they became "triumvir^XreipHhlicae constituendae" for five 
years. Octavian then laid down the consulship (see App. IV 
2, 4 - 4, 14. Dio 46, 55-56. Livy Per, 120).
27, 6, In the first announcement to the armies, all mention
of proscription had been suppressed. But before the triumvirs 
came to Rome, the first names had been dispatched to fedius 
(whose heart failed after the first night) and the pro­
scriptions set on foot. Cicero, abandoned by his protege 
to Antony's vengeance, was among these. The proscriptions 
did not take him completely unawares. Since the Senate's 
collapse in August, he had had time to escape from the new 
regime. But with the fall of the Republic in Italy, his 
courage had failed. He no longer had the will or strength 
to continue the struggle abroad: "Omnia illi displicuisse
praeter mortem" (Seneca Suas. VI 19), And after the failure 
of his policy, and all that had passed between them, he could 
not have been eager to meet Brutus again. Indeed, none of 
the three camps in which others were taking refuge attracted 
him (Sen. Suas. VI 14). Unable to face a doubtful future in
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uncongenial company and in the midst of wars, he hesitated 
and delayed, even after the posting of the proscription lists, 
until it was too late. He was overtaken and murdered on 
December 7th 4% B.C. by Laenas, whom he had once defended (see 
Plut. Cic. 47 f. App. IV 19, 73 - 81, 84. Dio 47, 8, 3-4. 
Seneca Rhetor. Suas. VI 17. de vir. ill. 81, 6).
27, 1, Plutarch passes over the activities of Brutus 
during the months when these events were taking place in Italy.
From Cicero, we know that he remained in the region of 
DyrrhachiJirtand Apollonia until he heard of the victory of 
Mutina in early May 43, when he began his eastward march.
His intention was to repulse the cohorts of Dolabella, 
invading the Chersonese from Asia (ad Brut. 12, 1). Cicero 
at first approved. While he still hoped for a successful 
issue to the 'war in the north and for the support of the 
Caesarian generals in the defence of Italy, he was of opinion 
that Brutus should assist in crushing Dolabella, whose hold on 
Asia constituted a serious threat to the Republican position 
in the east (ad Brut. I 2, 2; 4, 3. I 5, 1. Phil. XI 11, 26). 
When Brutus left Dyrrhachium, the danger from Antony was 
believed to have been averted. He therefore continued east­
ward, even when Dolabella's cohorts withdrew from Europe and he 
received news of the activities of Cimber and Deiotarus against 
Dolabella (ad Brut. I 6, 3). Dio (47, 24, 2 - 25) says he 
then crossed to Asia, but presently returned to Thrace.
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Gelzer (PW X 1007) accepts this account and describes the 
brief incursion as a demonstration to impress the Asian 
communities. It is more probably an error on Dio's part.
Ho other source records two crossings witnin the year, and it 
seems in itself a dubious account. It seems more likely that 
Brutus' campaign in Thrace was undertaken on his way to Asia 
and that he did not make the crossing before the end of the 
year 43. In Thrace, he won the support of some of the native 
princes, in particular of Rhascyporis (Dio 47, 25, 2) and of 
Polemocratia, who placed in his care both her son and the 
considerable royal treasure (App, IV 75, 319-320). After a 
successful campaign against the Bessi, completing the subju- 
gation of Thrace, he assumed the title of Imperator (Dio 47,
25, 2. Sydenham p. 202-203).
Meanwhile, Cicero's opinion had changed with the 
changing situation in Italy. Before the end of May, when 
the rejoicing over the victory of Mutina had proved premature, 
he began to advocate the recall of Brutus and his army (ad 
Brut. I 9. 10. 12). Decimus held the same opinion (F. XI 14, 
2). Cicero's appeals to Brutus became more urgent as the 
Senate's position grew worse with the defection of Lepidus and 
the new menace from Octavian (ad Brut, I 14. 15, 12). It also 
appears from ad Brut. I 10, 1 that in June a senatus ^ptoritas 
had recommended Brutus' return. The original proposal had 
evidently met with opposition, perhaps from the Antonian or
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other Caesarian groups, for the Senate as a whole did not 
share Cicero's enthusiasm for the Liberators, In February, 
though Calenus' motion to deprive Brutus of his command was 
defeated, it was not unsupported (see Phil. X 7, 14 - 9, 19). 
Again, Cicero's proposal to give Cassius the eastern command 
was vetoed and raised some criticism of his championing of 
the Liberators - see Phil. XI 14, 35 "exaudivi etiam nimium a 
me Bruturn, nimium Cassium ornari, Cassio vero sententia mea 
dominatum et principatum dari". Many of the senators may not 
have wished to recall the Liberators while there was hope of 
saving the situation without their aid. Appian (ill 85, 350 
says that the Senate sent secretly to Brutus and Cassius for 
aid. The tradition may have some connection with Cicero's 
last extant letter to Brutus, dated 27th July (ad Brut. I 18). 
He describes an interview with Servilia, at which Casca, Labeo 
and Scaptius were also present; he was asked his opinion on 
the question of recalling Brutus : ''respond! ... et dignitati
et existinationi tuae maxime conducere te primo quoque tempore 
ferre praesidium labenti et inclinatae paene reipublicae" (ad 
Brut. I 18, 2). The question was evidently being discussed in 
Republican circles already in June: see F. XI 25 & 26, 1
"Délibérant utrum ... Bruturn accersant necne But again
the policy of the Republicans abroad failed to correspond with 
that of the government at Rome.
Cicero now, when he saw the coalition against Antony for
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which he had worked, beginning to break up and a new com­
bination of Caesarians forming, naturally turned for help to 
the Liberators. He had made every effort to keep the good­
will and loyalty of all the array commanders, but his perse­
cution of Antony had pleased neither Republicans nor Caesarians 
The new alliance was foreshadowed long before it became a 
reality. The adherence to the Senate of Plancus and, more 
especially, of Lepidus had always been questionable. Their 
despatches of 20th March,(f . X 8j advocating peace, and 
probably sent in agreement with Antony, showed the direction 
of their thoughts, -Antony, on his side, affirmed his con­
tinued association with them in his letter to Hirtius and 
Octavian (see Phil, XIII 19, 42-44 "Mihi quidem constat 
nec Lepidi societatero violare... nec Plancum prodere, 
participera consiliorum"). In the same letter, he dwelt on 
the folly of Caesarians uniting against him with former 
Pompeians, and reminded them that their destruction would be 
as welcome to the Senate as his : "utrum sit aequias concurrere
nos, quo facilius revivèscat Pompeianorura causa ... an 
consentira, ne ludibrio simus inimicis" (Phil. XIII 18, 36)
"... quibus, utri nostrum ceciderint, lucro futurum est" (19, 
40). Antony knew the real worth of the uneasy and unnatural 
association of old enemies who had no new reason to trust each 
other. l#en, inevitably, the Caesarians began to fall away, 
Cicero relied absolutely on the Liberators, in whom he had
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always had far more confidence (see F. XII 6, 1. 9, 2, 10, 4). 
He did not doubt their willingness or their ability to return 
and successfully defend the Senate at the crucial moment.
And, in his opinion, the saving of the Republic depended on 
their return: if the Senate and Italy were lost, all was lost
- a belief shared by Marsh ("Founding of Roman Empire" pp. 188- 
189). In this, Cicero would, naturally, be influenced by 
personal considerations; for him, the loss of Italy was fatal. 
He had no longer the energy or will to undertake the journey 
and begin the fight again in the provinces (see above). But 
the Liberators saw the situation in a different light. To 
Brutus, concerned with the pursuit of abstract ideas, the 
Republic and Rome were not inseparable; about this time he 
wrote to Cicero: "an tu Romae habitare, id putas incolumem 
esse? Res, non locus, oportet praestet istuc mihi" (ad Brut,
I 16, 6) "mihi esse iudicabo Romam ubicurnque liberum esse 
licebit" (16, 8). In view of this distinction, Brutus vfas 
prepared, like Pompey in 49, to abandon Italy at first and 
concentrate on the rich provinces of the east, drawing the war 
abroad, in the hope of winning back the peninsular later. His 
policy - and Cassius' too - was to consolidate his power in 
the east and secure a strong base for the Republic there.
If the Caesarians overwhelmed Italy, Republicans could still 
find the Republic in his camp - many had already sought it 
(see ad Brut, II 4, 4). He was not prepared to risk
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everything in a premature attempt to encounter his opponents 
on Italian soil, leaving the èast but half-pacified, liable to 
revolt and thus cut off his resources. Moreover, his return 
in the summer of 43 was not practicable. Cassius was too far 
away and too fully occupied with Dolabella and his adherents 
to be able to join in an invasion of Italy; and without 
Cassius, such an expedition could not hope to succeed. Cicero 
assured him of the support of all right-minded citiaens: "si 
Italiaffi attigerit (exercitum tuum), erit civis nemo quern 
quidem civem appellari fas sit, qui se non in tua castra 
conférât" (ad Brut, I 14, 2). Assertions of this kind, however, 
were not enough to inspire Brutus with confidence in his 
reception. He had formerly been disappointed in popular 
reaction to his cause; and of the other commanders in the 
west he could only rely on the co-operation of Decimus and his 
weakened forces("raeas copiolas ..." F. XI 13, 2). His arrival 
would merely have precipitated the combination of the 
Caesarians against him (see Sjnne p. 185) and made certain his 
own destruction.
Dio (47, 24, 1-2) asserts that Brutus withdrew further 
from Italy for fear of the effect on his soldiers of events 
there, for the loyalty of some, corrupted by C, Antonius, had 
already wavered. He may with reason have entertained such 
fears. His army was partly composed of Caesar's veterans.
That of Cassius contained an even greater number. They were
191,
always the weak point in the Republican defence.
Brutus' decision is justified by the behaviour of the 
tv.’'o African legions which Q. Cornificius brought to Italy in 
response to the summons. Instead of defending the Republic, 
they joined Caesar's heir (see App. Ill 91, 373, 92, 381.
Dio 46, 45, 2).
To suggest that he might have made the attempt but for a 
petty disagreement with the Senate is unjustified. The 
question of Octavian was not a minor issue and it could not 
affect the practical difficulties in the way of Brutus' 
return; although it might be said that Brutus was less dis­
posed to abandon Cassius and their joint policy in a rash 
attempt to save the Senate from the consequences of its ovm 
folly, after his repeated warnings.
- on this question see Syme pp. 185. 203. Geiger PW X 1008. 
Ferrero Eng, tr. Ill 180. Rice-Holmes: "Architect" p. 65. 
Meyer p. 544. Tyrrell and Purser VI Ivii.
VJhat is apparent in Brutus' refusal is his increasing 
independence. The terms of the decree authorising his 
command had included the proviso, that he remain within reach 
of Italy (Phil. X 11, 26. XI 11, 25). The decree of April 
27th, conferring imperium maius in the east on the two 
Liberators left Brutus considerable liberty of action (see ad 
Brut, I 5, 1); but there was also the senatus auctoritas of 
June (I 10, 1), to which a strict constitutionalist might have.
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expected, to pay attention. Brutus preferred to use his own 
judgment. He was beginning to lay aside his former scruples 
of legality and in that respect overstepping the bounds 
originally set for the role of Liberator. He had come to 
consider himself the representative of the Republic and,as 
such not indistinguishable from the government at Rome.
This new attitude is strikingly illustrated by an action 
of Brutus at the end of his Thracian campaign. On the coins 
issued by his legates to the army appear some coin-portraits 
of Brutus himself. The use of portraits of living men ?/as 
an innovation in Roman coinage. The privilege was first 
granted to Caesar, but in the wars after his death it was used 
by almost all the rival commanders as a form of propaganda 
(see Taylor: Divinity of the Roman Emperor pp. 107-8). Antony 
first made use of it in Gaul in 43 B.C., and Brutus later 
followed his example, Geiger (PW X 1007-8) refuted those who 
sa'V in this step a monarchical tendency. In Brutus' case, it 
was not an usurpation of the royal prerogative, but a pro- 
clamation of his belief in himself as "liberator orbis 
terrarum". The portrait appears with other symbols of 
liberty, including a portrait of his supposed ancestor L. 
Brutus (Grueber CRRBM III plate cxi no. 18) and with the cap 
of freedom and two daggers, commemorating the Ides of March 
(ib. no. 17. cf. Dio 47, 85, 3). Geiger notes that on
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these coins he uses his birth-name not, as on others, his 
official title since adoption. Clearly, he intended the 
parallel with the founder of the Republic to be closely dravm, 
vJiether he was at all influenced by the precedent set by 
Flamininus (Gelzer loc. cit. Grueber I Ivi), the meaning of 
his coins is plain enough. They repeat in varying forms the 
slogan of "Libertas" under which the Republicans fought. (of 
Dio (47, 43, 3.)) By this time Brutus v/as becoming, even to 
himself, the personification of his cause, "the living symbol 
of the constitution" (Radin p. 205); therefore his own 
portrait sometimes replaces the head of Liberty on his coins. 
It indicates a considerable development in his conception of 
the champion of Liberty since the Ides of March and, in that, 
a probably unconscious departure from the true spirit of 
Republicanism. Cato's influence had waned. Circumstances 
were largely responsible. He had been driven to adopt his 
opponents' methods and so deviate from his own principles, 
from the very cause for which he was fighting. Seneca (Suas, 
VI 11) quotes a remark of Cassius Severus on Brutus, Cassius 
and Sextus Pompeius: "et respublica suos triumviros habet".
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Cicero: P. XII 4 - 15. ad Brut. II 3, 3. I 5. 1.
Appian: III 79, 323. IV 60, 258 - 65, 278.
Dio: 47, 24. 28 - 32.
Livy: Per. 121. 122. Veil: II 62. 69.
Josephus: Bell. Ind. 1, 218 ff. Ant. XIV 271 - 301.
Syme: p. 203 Oelzer PW X 1010-1011
Boissier; pp. 378 ff. Froehlich PW III 1732.
28, 1. On learning the fate of Cicero and of Decimus,
Brutus wrote to Hortensius ordering the execution of C.
Antonius as a reprisal ( S s — ryx . The accounts of
Appian and Dio differ slightly: Appian (ill 79, 323) says the
execution followed Antonius* repeated attempts to stir up 
mutiny among Brutus* soldiers: Dio (47, 24, 4) that C. Clodius,
in whose custody Antonius was left, after a number of attempts 
by Antony's agents to rescue the prisoner, had him put to 
death; but whether on his own responsibility or following 
instructions from Brutus, Dio is uncertain. Plutarch's version 
seems the most reasonable, and is further supported by 
Antony's treatment of Hortensius after Philippi (cf. Livy Per 
124). cf. also Livy Per 121 "... M. Bruti ... iussu ... 
occiQUs est",
28, 2. The execution of C. Antonius was Brutus' answer to
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the proscriptions. As a reprisal, it was a mere gesture, 
unlikely to affect the triumvirs, who were quite prepared to 
sacrifice their own relatives (see App. IV 5, 16). However, 
it also advertised Brutus* final abandonment of his more con­
ciliatory policy - C. Antonius could no longer be useful to 
him as a hostage. The formation of the triumvirate had 
destroyed his persistent hopes of an accommodation; once 
Antony had allied himself with Octavian, there could be no 
compromise. The opposition was now united and open. The Lex 
Pedia and the edict of proscription (App. IV 8, 31 - 12, 95) 
declared war on the Liberators and left them no alternative but 
to fight; the proscriptions gave notice of the character of 
the struggle,
Brutus was, therefore, finally freed of his old hesi- 
tations and scruples. He had given ground reluctantly, piece 
by piece; now, since there could be no more doubts, he was 
ready to adopt a resolute and more tuthless policy. He had 
resisted Cicero's advice while he lived: his death persuaded
him that it had been sound; "aliis rebus, aliis temporibus 
locus esse solet debetque clementiae ... nec quicquam aliud 
decernitur hoc bello, nisi utrum simus necne" (ad Brut. II 5, 5).
If Plutarch is here quoting genuine comments of Brutus 
on Cicero's death Soo^£.Ô£.<-^ w«/ occTl<=l
) they reveal a new understanding on his 
part of the true state of the Republic, a realisation that
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"tyranny" was the product of the times and that the removal 
of one autocrat would only bring forth successors, since the 
condition of Rome had made autocracy inevitable. For Brutus, 
it must have been a bitter admission. But the course of 
events since the assassination, culminating in the triumvirate 
and proscrintions, eventually forced him to recognise realities. 
86, 3. Brutus' first objects on entering Asia; to equip 
a fleet, for which he demanded aid of the Bithynians and 
Cygiceni, and to secure the allegiance of the native rulers.
The Greek letters to these communities, attributed to Brutus 
(Ep, Graec. p. 183-4, 189-90) are of little assistance here. 
Those to the people of Cyzicus simply demand the convoy of 
arms from Bithynia and admonish them for a request to withdraw 
from the alliance; those to the Bithynians demand warships 
and complain of their tardiness in providing them. From the 
final letter (no. 67 p. 190) it appears that Brutus equipped 
himself with a fleet drawn from other allies before the 
Bithynians responded to his demand; for which he imposed a 
fine in lieu of ships. The authenticity of these letters 
being suspect (see below c. 30-38), there is no good reason 
to dispute Plutarch's statement on this point.
Apart from his allies in the provinces, Brutus was by 
this time accompanied by many of the proscribed who had 
escaped from Italy - others joined Cassius or Sextus Pompeius 
(App. IV 70, 898). Before the proscriptions, many had
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voluntarily abandoned Italy to seek his camp (ad. Brut, II 
4, 4). He had the support of the younger generation of 
Optimates, sons of those who had. followed .Pompey and Cato, 
many of them his kinsmen - see ad Brut. I IS, I^ 15, 1-2.
II 3, 6, Syme p. 198.
At this point, Brutus recalled Cassius from his proposed 
invasion of Egypt, intended as a punitive expedition against 
Cleopatra who had. sent evasive replies to his demands for 
assistance and had been giving aid to Dolabella (App. IV 
63, 269, Dio 47, 30, 4) and favoured the triumvirs.
Cassius, durjng the year 43, had been occupied in 
securing his position in Syria and excluding Dolabella. At 
the beginning of May, he heard of his rival's invasion of 
Cilicia, the neighbouring province, and prepared to march 
against him (F, XII 12, 5). Dolabella actually entered Syria, 
but did not succeed in storming iuitioch and was forced to fall 
back on the coastal town of Laodicea (F, XII 14, 4, end of 
May). This news was sent to Cicero by Lentulus Spinl^ er, 
Trebonius' quaestor in Asia, vho after the murder of 
Trebonius had gone to Brutus in Macedonia dnd subsequently took 
part in the campaign against Dolabella, in command of a flAet. 
He claimed to have given material assistance to both 
Liberators in the east, and in fact to have made possible 
Cassius' entry into Syria (F. XII 14, 1 & 6), which, even if 
somewhat exaggerated, throws further light on the part played
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by '^^bonius and his officers in the Republican occupation of 
the east..
The postscript to Lentulus* despatch of the Senate (F.
XII 15), written on the 8hd June, announced Cassius' advance
on Laodicea, The situation on l%th June is described in a 
letter of Cassius Parmensis to Cicero (F. XII 15): Dolabella
was then closely invested in Laodicea by Cassius, the sea v/as 
closed to him also by Cassius' fleet under the command of 
Sextilius Rufus, his situation was already desperate. No 
certain news had reached Rome by 50th June (F. XII 10) but 
Cassius' letter of 7th May had arrived, and it was confidently 
expected that he would quickly bring the war to a successful 
conclusion. Already on 27th April, after the Battle of Mutina 
and the death of the consuls, who were to have undertaken the 
campaign against Dolabella, Cassius' position had been 
legalised, and the supreme command in the eastern provinces 
conferred on Brutus and Cassius jointly (see ad Brut, I 5, 1 
"ad. V K. Maias ... dixit Servilius ... et ut Cassius 
persequeretur Dolabellam. Cui cum essem adsensus, decrevi 
hoc amplius, ut tu, si afcitrarere utile exque re publica esse, 
persequerere bello Dolabellam". cf. Veil. II 62, "Bruto 
Cassioque ... omnia transmarina imperia eorurn commis sa 
arbitrioM and Livy Per 121. App. IV 58, 248. 69, 294. 70, 297- 
8. Dio 47, 28, 5%. 29, 5-6).
Laodicea was finally taken through the treachery of the
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sentries. Dolabella committed suicide to avoid capture 
(App. IV 62, 267. Dio 47, 50, 5). Cassius then turned his 
attention to Tarsus, which had also favoured his opponent and 
which continued to hold out after the fall of Laodicea. It 
was soon taken, and a heavy contribution levied as the price 
of its resistance (App. IV 64, 272-276. Dio 47, 20-22). 
preparations for the Egyptian campaign were beginning when 
Brutus recalled him.
28, 3-6. Plutarch gives, as Brutus' reasons for this 
summons, a general statement of his aims - in chief, to 
liberate Pome, not merely to establish personal authority and, 
with this in view, to remain within reach of Italy and bring 
relief as soon as possible. These views appear to be incon­
sistent with Brutus' attitude to the question of returning to 
Italy only a fevr months previously - unless his sole reason, 
then, was that the time was not ripe. Yet, after the trium­
virate was well established, the attempt would have been even 
more hazardous. Brutus may have wished to confront the 
triumvirs and reach a decision at the earliest opportunity, 
without proposing an invasion of Italy, Dio (47, 32, 3) 
certainly mentions it among the plans discussed, at Smyrna, but 
as a future possibility on which both were agreed. There 
were other reasons for recalling Cassius. Brutus no doubt 
felt that Egypt was too far afield and the danger from 
Cleopatra not so pressing; but, especially in view of the
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great change in the political scene at home, a personal 
interview between the two Republican leaders was essential, in 
order to discuss the situation and decide their course of  
action (see Dio 47, 32, l).
28, 5-8. The conference at Smyrna, early 42 B.C.: see App.
IV 65, 276-279. Dio 47, 52, 1-4. Livy per 122.
This was the first meeting of Brutus and Cassius since they 
parted at Athens, towards the end of 44 B.C. Plutarch dwells 
on the confidence inspired by the sight of their joint forces 
and the advance of their cause since they left Italy, almost 
alone and powerless. with their combined armies and the 
resources of the east, they were now in a position to challenge 
the triumvirate. That, according to Appian (IV 65, 276), was 
what Brutus proposed to do. In this account, he had recalled 
Cassius because Antony and Octavian were already sending their 
troops across the Adriatic (IV 65, 270); Brutus therefore 
suggested that they advance at once into Macedonia dnd confront 
the eight legions arriving there (IV 65, 276). Cassius, 
however, thought that the enemy might safely be disregarded 
for the moment, while they turned their attention to the dis- 
affected communities of Asia, which might otherwise cut off 
their retreat when they returned to Europe. At the same time 
they would also strengthen their armies and increase their 
resources. Brutus agreed to adopt his plan. Dio (47, 52,
3-4) adds their reasons for believing that the triumvirs
presented no immediate danger: they were still occupied in
Italy, and it was thought that Sextus Pompeius would further 
delay their departure (as, in fact, he did - see App. IV 85, 
555-36%).
50, 1-3. On the assistance given to Brutus by Cassius at 
Smyrna - against the advice of his friends; Cassius seems, 
throughout the campaign, to have been in a better position 
financially, though he had some difficulties at first in 
paying his soldiers (F. XII 12, 2). Brutus, in spite of the 
money brought to him by the quaestors and Atticus* generous 
aid (Wepos 8, 6), wrote to Cicero of his need of men and money, 
soon after his occupation of Macedonia (ad Brut, II 3, 5), 
Cicero was unable to secure any promises from the Senate (II 
4, 4); it was not in a position to help Brutus further than 
authorising him to raise money in the provinces. But Cassius 
did not need to rely on Rome (see ad Brut. I 18, 5): wMaximus 
autem ... in republics nodus est inopia rei pecuniariae ... 
Impendent autem infiniti sumptus cum in hos exercitus ... turn 
vero in tuum. Mam Cassius noster videtur posse satis ornatus 
venire".
In addition to crushing incipient opposition, the campaign 
in Asia was also to provide them with sufficient funds for the 
final campaign against the triumvirs.
To the Smyrna conference also probably belongs the attempt 
of Gellius Publicola on the lives of Brutus and Cassi®: see
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Livy Per 122. Dio 47, 24, 4-6 appears to separate the two 
attempts but does not date them clearly.
Gelzer (PJ// X 1011) cites this incident as an example of 
the influence of 'amicitia'. No action was taken against 
Gellius because he was half-brother to Messalla Gorvinus, 
who was intimate with both Liberators (Dio loc, cit. cf. 
Gic. ad Brut. I 12, 1, 15, 1).
203.
c. 29.
This chapter - a digression from the main course of the 
narrative - is chiefly concerned with the development of the 
contrast between Brntns and Cassius, which Plutarch first drew 
in c, 1, 4 and to which he frequently returns. In order to 
throw his portrait of Brutus into stronger relief, hm heightens 
the natural contrast of character and thereby misrepresents 
both men.
His brief character-sketch of Cassius (c. 29, 2) on the 
whole agrees with other reports (cf. App. IV 132, 553 f. - but 
a more generous estimate) and is not inconsistent with the 
tone of Cassius' extant letters to Cicero (F. XII 11 & 12.
XV 19). But the distinction he makes, especially in dis­
cussing the ultimate aims of Brutus and Cassius, is largely 
unjust. Both Liberators had the same object in view - namely, 
the restoration of the Republic, There is no convincing 
evidence that Cassius occupied the East with the intention of 
establishing his own supremacy. Two incidents, in particular, 
in the year 42 illustrate his views - his rejection of the 
royal title at Rhodes and his adherence to Republican tradition 
in the issue of coins; there is no coin-portrait of Cassius.
Certainly, he was no doctrinaire. His opposition to auto­
cracy vas the natural reaction of the Roman nobilis. He 
remained in closer touch with reality than Brutus and was less
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hampered by scruples. But that is no proof of insincerity. 
Plutarch's comparison with Pompey and the violent Popular 
leaders is not justified.
89, 5 f. The character of Brutus, idealised throughout, is 
presented here rather as a model philosopher-statesman than a 
real human figure. A comparison with Cicero's evidence 
reveals the discrepancy between ideal and reality.
Brutus was distinguished from most of his contemporaries 
by his studious habits and his more austere mode of life (yet 
see de vir. ill. 88, 3 for his connection with the notorious 
Cytheris); but that he was not (for instance) indifferent to 
gain is clearly shown by his business dealings in the East 
(see above on c. 3). Plutarch was unwilling to see that his 
mild philosopher, like a true Roman, could also be a hard man 
of business. In the same way,_ he treats Brutus' conduct in 
war, selecting for his narrative and embellishing such inci­
dents as could serve his purpose, e.g. Brutus' grief at the 
destruction of Xanthus (c. 31), his dealings with the mutineers 
at Apollonia (c. 86, 8), his reluctance to kill his prisoners 
at Philippi (c. 45, 4-5). In one instance only, he has no 
palliation of the truth, see c. 46, 1-3 on Brutus' promise to 
his soldiers at Philippi. It is the only fault he finds in 
his hero. It was, ho^ rrever, not an isolated lapse, but is 
related to his exactions in Asia in 42 and his dealings with 
Cyprus - evidences of a flaw in his moral judgment.
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The general confidence in his honesty of purpose in the 
war (29, 7), if true, was not wholly misplaced. There was a 
change in him, traceable in his actions from the Ides of 
March to the final campaign, as he began to see that war was 
inevitable and could not be waged with clean hands (cf. Tac, 
Ann. I, 9 "arma civilia ... quee neque parari possent neque 
haberl per bonas artis"). The effort to emerge victorious 
from the struggle in the conditions of the times led to 
deviations from strict principle. But it cannot definitely 
be inferred from that that he was no longer truly Republican - 
as far as was possible. An uncompromising Republican of 
Cato's type it was not possible to be, by that time, without 
abandoning politics or taking refuge in suicide (cf. Meyer on. 
cit. p. 558 "wollte man das Leben unter der Monarchie nicht 
ertragen, so musste man wie Cato freiwillig in den Tod gehn 
29, 9 f , Plutarch says Antony was heard by many to express 
his belief in Brutus' integrity; and with this belongs 
Brutus' comment on Antony's folly in throwing in his lot with 
Octavian, when he might have been numbered among the 
Republicans (29, 10. cf. App. IV 130, 547 - a similar 
tradition). In Brutus' opinion Antony, a man of the same 
class and tradition as the Liberators, had formed an unnatural 
alliance with Octavian, when his place was naturally with them.
This was his final expression of the belief revealed in 
his former policy: the belief that he and Antony could find a
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basis for co-existence. He had shown it in sparing Antony's
life, in treating with him after Caesar's death, in honourable 
treatment of his brother. And this in spite of his disapproval 
of Antony's political conduct (see ad Brut. I 17, G "quamvis 
sit vir bonus ... Antonins; quod ego nunquam existimavi"), 
Differences with Antony were reconcilable. His antagonism 
towards Octavian was not of the same character. While Antony 
and Brutus might meet on common ground, there could, be no 
agreement between Brutus and Caesar's heir. They represented 
apposing forces, and were conscious of it. Each, to the other, 
was "1'ennemi par excellence" (cf, Carcopino, "Correspondance
p. 106)r
Brutus, who had been slow and hesitant in resisting 
Antony, refused to countenance any alliance with Octavian.
He counselled peace and moderation when Antony was the chief 
opponent: but with the rise of Octavian, in whom he recog-
nised the real enemy of his Republic, he abandoned his hopes 
of averting war.
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C. 30-53. The subjugation of Rhodes and Lycia (first half 
of 42 B.C.)
Sources; for Rhodes - App. IV 65, 278 - 75, 31G.
Dio 47, 33, 1-f. Val. Max. I, 5, 8.
for Lvcia - Ann. IV 75, 319 - 85, 348.
Dio 47, 34, 1-G.
Veil. II 69. Oros. VI 18, 13 (Bpistolographi Graeci
pp. 177-191)
Sydenham: Roman Republican Coinage pp. 201 - 205.
Grueber: CRRRM II pp. 470 ff. Ill Plates cxi ü exit
Macdonald: Coin Types pp. 198 - 200
Smith: The Greek Letters of M. Junius B r u t u s X X X .
1936 pp. 194 ff.)
30, 3-4. A very brief account is first given of Cassius' 
capture of Rhodes, stressing the harshness of his dealings with 
the Rhodians (see below 32, 4), Appian treats the campaign 
more fully. Leaving Smyrna, Cassius prepared his fleet at
M^mdus. The Rhodian nobles were alarmed by these preparation.^
but the people, excited by two demagogues, were eager to 
fight. However, two separate embassies were sent to Cassius, 
the second headed by his former teacher, Archelaus, in the 
hope of conciliating him. But Rhodes had supported Dolabella 
In the recent war (cf. F, XII 14, 2-3, 15, 2-3) and Cassius 
now disregarded excuses and evasions. A naval battle in the 
territorial waters of Cos ended in the defeat of the Rhodian
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fleet; the city itself was then attacked by land and sea 
and quicKly tauen, partly through the treachery of some of 
the citizens. Once captured, it was put under contribution 
and stripped of all money and valuables; not even the temples 
were spared. To those who had betrayed the city and now 
tried to save at least some of their temples and gods, Cassius, 
the Epicurean, returned a contemptuous answer (Val. Max. I 
5, 8). In addition, a number of Rhodians who had led the 
opposition were executed; and from the whole of Asia, ten 
years’ tribute was exacted.
According to Dio (47, 23, 3-4) Cassius, after twice 
defeating the Rhodian fleet, met with no resistance when he 
landed on the island, on account of his former association with 
Rhodes as a young man.
This victory was comrMoiated on coins struck at Sardis in 
Cassius' name by his legates, Servilius and Lentulus. One of 
these, in the symbols on the reverse, gives a pictorial summary 
of events: it shows a crab, the device of Cos, holding in its
claws the aplustre, symbolising victory at sea; below is a 
rose, the usual device of Rhodes, and a loosened royal diadem; 
evidently a reference to the title Cassius rejected on his 
30, 3 entry into the city, confirming Plutarch's anecdote.
(see Grueber II p. 483 III plate cxii no. 8)
The subjugation of Rhodes by Cassius seems to have been 
completed before that of Lycia. It was evidently a fairly
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short campaign and is described by the historians, as by 
Plutarch, before the account of the Lycian campaign.
Moreover, Cassius’ legate Lentulus is said to have assisted 
Brutus in the later stages of the Lycian campaign, which 
suggests that the capture of Rhodes had then been effected. 
From the coins, another legate, M. Servilius, appears to 
have served both Brutus and Cassius at this time. And Appian 
(IV, 81, 341) seems to imply that Rhodes fell before Patara, 
the second Lycian city attacked by Brutus. If this is so, it 
throws suspicion on Brutus’ supposed letter to the Rhodians 
(Sp. Graec. p. 179-180); while receiving some support from 
other letters in the collection - see no. 23 p. 181 to the 
Lyclans (-^crlc t-o/ ^ ^ and no. 13
p. 180 uJTj/coos, Ty/ î^cjort*^) ,
30, 4 - 32, 4. Plutarch’s account of the Lycian campaign 
deals only with the siege and destruction of Xanthus, in 
detail, and briefly with the taking of Patara, the two chief 
cities that held out against Brutus.
Appian, who appears to be using a different source here, 
describes the storming of Xanthus and the desperate resistance 
of its inhabitants, without mentioning any particular anxiety 
on Brutus’ part to stop their self-destruction. Those who 
were saved - mostly slaves, very few free Xanthians - were 
held as captives and used in an attempt to induce the surrender 
of Patara. According to Appian, the people of Patara
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capitulated on seeing preparations for a siege going 
forward; none of them was executed or banished but a heavy 
contribution was levied. About the same time, Lentulus, 
now acting as Brutus’ legate, was sent against the sea-port 
of Myra, whereupon the Lycian confederation decided to come 
to terms with Brutus and promised military aid. Taxes were 
Imposed on the whole community, and the Lycian fleet was 
despatched to Abydos, to await the gathering of the 
Republican forces. After this, the free Xanthians were 
restored to their city. Dio (47, 34) alone speaks of a 
battle in which Brutus overcame the combined Lycian forces 
and which persuaded most of the cities to surrender. His 
account of the taking of Xanthus and Patara is substantially 
the same as Appian^’s, and is followed by the surrender of 
Myra and the subjugation of the rest of Lycia. Dio also 
mentions the end of Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia (43, 33, 4) who 
was seized and put to death by Cassius after refusing to 
assist the Liberators.
32, 4. Plutarch’s attempts to distinguish between the 
exactions of Brutus and those of Cassius in Asia are not 
supported by other sources, though Appian and Dio do not give 
an unfavourable account of Brutus. It is unlikely that there 
was much difference between the two leaders in their dealings 
with subject nations, considering their pressing need for 
more funds and reinforcements. Apart from Plutarch, only
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Velleius (in describing their return to Macedonia) makes any 
such distinction, and that in favour of Cassius: "cum per 
omnia repugnans naturae suae Cassius etiam Bruti clementiam 
vinceret" (ll 69, 6).
In connection with this campaign must be considered the 
collection of Greek letters, supposedly written by Brutus to 
the various Asian communities (Sp, Graec. pp. 177-191), In 
general, the information contained in them adds little to 
other accounts, but in one particular - the fates of Xanthus 
and Patara - they present a different picture. Several 
letters (nos. 11, p. 179. 85 & 87 p. 182. 43 p. 165 in Hercher) 
deal with this topic-holding the contrasted fates of the two 
cities before other recalcitrants. Xanthus is said to have been 
harshly treated for its obstinate resistance; its plea for 
mercy was refused, its youth killed, the city itself 
destroyed - no word of self-destruction. Patara, on the 
other hand, was not only allowed to retain its freedom and 
granted a remittance of the fine, but even received a gift 
of fifty talents from Brutus. (This, in itself, sounds 
highly improbable.)
Those who accept th^ letters (e.g. Gelzer PW X 1011-12 
following Ruehl) reject Plutarch and the historians on the 
Lycian campaign. But the existing collection is full of 
difficulties. The letters are arranged in no sort of order, 
many are merely repetitious and supply little information of
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events. The rest generally contradict the historians and 
are difficult, sometimes impossible, to arrange in chrono- 
logical sequence. Letters dealing with the Lycians are 
mixed indiscriminately with those belonging to the early 
months of 43 B.C. when Dolabella was ir Asia. This second 
group, consisting of letters to Tralles (p. 186-189) and 
Bith^/nia (p. 189-190) is very questionable; for instance, 
the accusation that the Bithynians had aided Dolabella over- 
looks the fact that Tillius Cimber had been governor of the 
province at that time and had, by Brutus’ own account, resisted 
Dolabella (ad Brut, I 6, 3). The letter to the Rhodians 
(no. 11 p. 179), one of the most jmportant for Xanthus and 
Patara, is suspect, since Brutus had no occasion to ^rite to 
Rhodes when Cassius v/as conducting that campaign - quite apart 
from the chronological confusion mentioned above on c. 30, 3-4. 
This applies also to the two letters to the Lycians (nos. 81 & 
83 p. 181), ordering them to supply Cassius with engines of war 
Bee R.E. Smith (CQ. XXX pp. 194 ff.) who refuted arguments in 
favour of the letters, with a full discussion of Brutus’ 
movements 43 - 48 B.C. from other sources.
If these letters are later compositions, inspired by 
genuine letters of Brutus, there remains the question, how 
far their version of the Lycian campaign may be trusted.
They presumably drew on their source, but their material may 
have suffered distortion in the process: the contrast between
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Xanthus and Patara is rhetorically exaggerated. In view 
of the other confusions or absurdities in the collection, it 
may be that the original account of the two cities was not 
unlike Appian's (who js in general the most reliable source 
on these campaigns), and that a rhetorician, finding it so 
presented, improved on it in order to produce a dramatic 
contrast between extreme harshness and incredible leniency.
It is evident, in any case, that Plutarch’s narrative 
cannot be accepted without question* but it remains doubtful 
if the Greek letters alone can be used to challenge him. 
c. 33. A digression: Theodotus, tutor of the young
Ptolemy, who had counselled the murder of Pompey and haei 
since been in exile in Asia, fell into Brutus’ hands and was 
put to death by him in 42 B.C. (cf. Plut, Pompey 77.) 
c. 34 - 35. The meeting at Sardis, summer of 42 B.C.
After the settlement of Asia, Brutus and Cassius joined 
forces at Sardis before crossing together to Europe and pro­
ceeding against the triumvirs. Here, in a private interview, 
they composed various misunderstandings that had arisen since 
their last meeting (cf. Dio 47, 35, 1), On their arrival, 
they were saluted as Imperators by their armies. Brutus, at 
least, had already assumed the title (see above on c. 27, 1). 
35. The affair of Lucius Pella (or Ocella) illustrates the 
kind of difference which caused friction between the
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Republican leaders. Cassius was lr±itated by Brutus' rigid
adherence to legality on minor points when, in his opinion, 
the necessities of war demanded toleration of such lapses in 
subordinates. In this case, too, Brutus' condemnation of 
Pella was a reflection on Cassius' dealings with a similar 
offence (35, 2 ) . But in his insistence that the Republicans 
should not countenance abuses for which they had condemned 
Caesar, Brutus forgot that he had himself in this 'mar be<%i 
compelled to override strict legal forms. His reluctance 
to admit the necessity for this is seen in his words and 
actions here (35, 4-5). Having given v/ay v/here he was hard 
pressed, he then attempted to hold his ground at other points, 
failing to see hov/ such inconsistency must exasperate his 
colleague. After the resources of the east had been drained 
to provide war materials, a single case of extortion might be 
overlooked.
The same failure to reach an effective compromise between
his idealistic conception of the "liberation" and the reality 
had hindered his cause from the beginning. Yet it was 
reasonable to insist that they would have done oetter to 
submit to Caesar than adopt his methods in the name of the 
Republic.
34, 4 f. Favonius, the follower of Cato, who reappears 
here had followed Brutus since the assassination (App. 11^
119. 500) in spite of his original disapproval (c. 12, 3 above).
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After Philippi he -as taken prisoner and executed 
(suet. Aug, 13, 2, Dio 47, 49, 4), He evidently shared 
Brutus' opinion of the triumvirs - Suetonius says he 
saluted Antony with respect, but reviled Octavian.
3G-37, 7. The story of the ghost, said to have appeared 
to Brutus at the Hellespont, treated here at soipe length, is 
probably part of the later tradition which surrounded the 
fall of the Republic with innumerable portents of inevitable 
disaster (see Florus II 17, 8. App. IV 134, 565).
Some attempts have been made to rationalize the 
traditional story by assuming that Brutus was subject to 
hallucinations. Ferrero (Eng. tr. Ill pp. 201-202. 206) 
takes thâ view and believes that Brutus, being unfitted for 
the work he had undertaken, was now on the verge of a com­
plete mental and nervous collapse. Syme (p. 204) on the 
contrary dismisses the "ghost" as part of the embellishments 
of later writers, wise after the event, foreseeing the fate 
of the Liberators. His explanation is far more credible, 
especially since there are no other serious indications of 
mental instability in accounts of Brutus. Plutarch himself 
describes him as calm and hopeful at Philippi (see below 39, 
8. 40, 1 and above 29, 9).
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oc. 37 ff. The campaign of Philippi flate 42 B.C.)
App. IV 86, 362 - 132, 553. Velleius II 70-72.
Dio 47, 35-40. Livy Per. 123-124.
Plutarch: Antony 22 de vir. ill. 82, 6. 83, 6,
Suetonius: Aug. 13, Oros. VI 18, 14-17.
Florus II 17. Kutrop. VII 3.
Val. Max. V 1, 11 I 7, 1. 8, 8.
VI 4, 5. 8, 4.
IX 2.
Syme: pp. 204 - 206.
Rice-Holmes: "Architect" 1 pp. 80-88. 
Ferrero: Eng. tr. Ill pp. 199 - 207,
37, 7 - 38, The Republicans advance to Philippi, throwing 
hack the advance-guard of the triumvirs under Norbanus;
Antony makes haste to assist him, while Octavian is delayed 
by sickness.
Appian's account more closely follows the movements of 
the army from the crossing of the Hellespont to the encamp­
ment at Philippi. He describes first the lustration of the 
army at the Gulf of Melas (88, 371 - 102, 426), where it was 
held necessary to confirm the loyalty of the soldiers, 
especially the large number of Caesar’s veterans, with lavish 
gifts and personal exhortations (89, 374-5).
Meanwhile Norbanus and Dtcidius Saxa with the triumvirs
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advance-guard had pushed forward into Thrace and blocked the 
Via Egnatia from Asia by occupying the passes of the Corpili 
and Bapaei through the mountains. As the Republican army 
advanced, they were outflanked by Tillius Cimber, following 
the coastline with his fbet; Rorbanus therefore, at the 
western pass, recalled Decidius, thus leaving the Corpili 
open to the Republicans, Together they prepared to hold the 
second pass, and so effectively held up the advancing army 
that the men became discouraged. A circuitous route through 
the mountains was finally pioneered by Bibulus, under the 
guidance of Rhascyporis (IV 87, 369 f, cf. Dio 47, 25, 2) 
and by this the army advanced, again flanking Morbanus and 
Decidius, who were obliged to fall back on Amphipolis (104, 
434-438), at the same time withdrawing their garrison from 
Symbolon, between Philippi and Neapolis (c. 38, 2. cf. Dio 
47, 36, 1).
38, 3. Plutarch asserts that Norbanus and Decidius were 
only saved from a Republican attack bi^  the arrival of Antony 
and his army.
Appian (IV 106, 443-4) has a different explanation:
Brutus and Cassius, finding an excellent situation for their 
purpose near Philippi and hearing of Antony’s imminent approach, 
set about fortifying a strong camp there. Dio (47, 36, 2) 
states definitely that Morbanus took care not to encounter the 
Republican forces and sent a summons to Antony and Octavian,
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who had been delayed; Octavian at Rhegium by Sextus Poriroeius 
v/ho held Sicily, Antony at Brundisium by the operations of 
Stains Murcus and the Republican flèet (Dio 47, 36. 3-4.
App. IV 85, 365-361). When Octavian at last joined Antony 
at Brundisium, Murcus v/as unable to prevent the transporting 
of their legions across the Adriatic. When this was known, 
Domitius Ahenobarbus was sent to reinforce him and the com­
bined fleets succeeded in hindering the triumvirs' convoys 
from Italy.
38, 4. The encampment at Philippi: cf. App. IV 105, 439 -
106, 446. Dio 47, 35, 5-6. Brutus and Cassius pitched 
camp on high ground west of Philippi, astride the Via Egnatia; 
their armies encamped separately, but a single fortification 
enclosed and strengthened both. The flanks rested to the 
north against the wooded mountains they had just traversed, to 
the south against the marshes stretching to the sea. The 
island of Tnasos, just off the coast, provided a base for their 
supplies, and the fleet anchored off Neapolis. Their 
situation left nothing to be desired, while Antony and Octavian 
when they arrived were obliged to camp on the plains near the 
marsh.
38, 3-4. Octavian, who had fallen sick, was left behind
at Dyrrhachium while Antony hurried on to join up with the 
advance-guard (App. IV 10, 444' Dio 47, 37, 1-4). Octavian, 
however, though not fully recovered, soon followed. He could
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not allow Antony to carry off all the honours of the
campaign.
39. While the tv/o armies confronted each other, a lus­
tration was carried out on both sides, the Republicans again 
seeding to hold their troops by distributing generous 
donations, in contrast to the poverty or parsimony of their 
opponents,
39, 3-6. Similar stories of 111-omens besetting Cassius 
at this time are told by Dio (47, 40, 7-8), Florus (II 17, 1) 
and Obsequens (7o). If the actual incidents are authentic, 
it is possible that they alarmed the more superstitious 
soldiers, but that Cassius' Epicurean philosophy was shaken by 
them is difficult to believe. This is no doubt comparable to 
and of the same value as the stories of Brutus' "ghost" and 
Valerius Maximus' tale of Caesar's ghost haunting Cassius on 
the battlefield of Philippi (I 8, 8).
39, 7. Cassius' plan - to protract the war and avoid a 
pitched battle, since they held the superior position and were 
well-supplied, while being inferior in numbers to their 
enemies - is said to have been opposed by Brutus, who was 
anxious to reach an early decision. Plutarch describes a 
council of war at which, in spite of Cassius' advice, the 
majority voted with Brutus and decided to offer battle withoit 
further delay.
C.40 - 45. The first battle of Philippi: Plutarch's
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account of tne beginning of the battle is contradicted by 
Appian's more convincing description of military manoevres 
leading to a sudden engagement. Moreover, both Appian 
(108, 453-456) and Dio (47, 38, 1-4) represent Brutus and 
Cassius in complete agreement on the policy of waiting and 
starving out the enemy, which seems the more likely In view 
of Brutus' continuance of it after the first battle and his 
reluctance to begin a second. These facts are not consistent 
with Plutarch's account of his anxiety to finish the war.
Further, since he had the advantage and good hopes of ultimate 
victory, he had no reason to force the pace.
The opposing army, cut off from Italy by his fleets in 
the Adriatic, was dependent on the resources of an 
impoverished Greece and Macedonia, which could not long support 
it. If the Republicans could succeed in avoiding battle until 
the approaching winter, the situation of the triumvirs would 
then be desperate. Brutus might well be I v
- as Plutarch himself says - and not impatiently eager to tempt 
fortune. On the other hand, Antony was anxious to force an 
engagement as soon as possible, and proceeded with characteristic 
energy and boldness. From this, Appian's narrative follows 
naturally (IV 109, 457 - 113, 472). Antony began building 
a way through the marsh, in order to cut off Cassius' camp 
from the sea; the work continued secretly for ten days, when 
Antony was able to build and garrison redoubts along his line.
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Cassius thereupon began counter-works southwards across the 
marsh, cutting off from the maiji body Antony's men at the 
redoubts. Antony, perceiving this, immediately launched an 
attack on the counter-works and drew out his whole army to 
engage that of Cassius. At this point, Brutus' troops, 
without waiting for orders, charged and drove straight into 
the camp of Octavian, which was without its general, Antony, 
meanwhile, delighted at the success of his plan to bring on a 
battle, broke through Cassius' lines and stormed his camp.
Against this, Plutarch's account of a formal battle, 
beginning in the usual way, is suspect. Most cf the. narrative 
here - of the council, the contrast between the two leaders 
the night before battle, their last conversation, the pre­
paration and disposition of the army - probably consists of 
later additions, dramatizing or inventing, to fill out the 
plain account of events. From other sources, it appears 
unlikely that Brutus and Cassius made the mistake of offering 
battle; Brutus' views on suicide may be authentic, but were 
probably not delivered at length before a waiting army; the 
story that Cassius yielded the post of honour on the right wing 
to Brutus souÈds like an attempt to explain an arrangement 
which needs none: for as they were encamped Brutus already
commanded the right. Only the account of the night before 
the battle cannot be dismissed at once, since it came, according 
to Plutarch, from Messalla. It might have seemed, otherwise.
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that the description of the two - Brutus hopeful, Cassius 
uneasy and depressed - was only retrospective colouring.
Gelzer (PW X 1018) does not find it incompatible with 
Appian; but Cassius' protestations of his unwillingness to risk 
everything in one battle are difficult to reconcile with the 
surprise attack by Antony. Cassius' words here bear a 
suspicious likeness to those of Brutus, in Appian (IV 124, 520) 
before the second battle, even to the comparison with Pompey at 
Pharsalia. Gelzer (x 1015) supposes that the Republicans, 
though refusing to attack, were prepared and waiting for the 
decisive battle, and therefore accepts the account attributed 
to Messalla. This would explain also how Messalla came to be 
40, 11 assigned to the right wing, but it does not solve all the
difficulties in the conflicting accounts of Plutarch and Appian. 
Dio, who also speaks of a set battle (47, 42-43), says that 
Brutus and Cassius were forced into it against their will by the 
men, who threatened to desert (47, 38, 4-5). But this too 
closely resembles the situation before the second battle, and 
in any case, Dio's description of the beginning is vague and 
unsatisfactory.
c. 41 - 44. Accounts of the battle, once joined, follow
the same general pattern of events: the spontaneous charge of
Brutus' troops, the defeat of the Triumvirs' left wing and the 
plundering of Octavian's camp; Antony's success on the other 
wing, leading to the death of Cassius (see also App. IV 110,
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461 - 114, 476. Dio 47, 4(k47).
This mention of .Antonyms tranches through the marsh 
confirms Appian's account on that point (though Plutarch says 
that Antonyms men were surprised by a Republican attack).
41, 7-8. On Octavian's absence from the battle, Plutarch 
quotes his own explanation; that he quitted his camp, after a 
warning dream visited his physician Artorius - an explanation 
that leaves much to be desired; though he seems not to have 
been fully recovered from his illness at that time. For 
variations of the same story see App. IV 110. 46%. Dio 47, 41, 
3-4. Suet. Aug. 13, 1. VelLII 70, 1. Val.Max. I 7, 1. 
Florus II 17, 9.
4.2y 5. The chief weakness on the Republican side, which 
really cost them the victory, was the lack of unity in their 
command. The two generals seem to have lost contact with each 
other and. to have acted alone; Brutus then failed to send help 
to his colleague in time and Cassius, knowing nothing of the 
43, 1-3 other wing, feared the worst. Plutarch attributes Cassius’ 
defeat to his hesitation and delay in the beginning, which 
resulted in his being surrounded by Antony: whereupon his
troops quickly broke and fled. His failure to control the 
situation, in this account, began with his preoccupation with 
the activities of Brutus’ wing and his annoyance at their 
disorderly advance and the pillaging of the camp before the 
enemy was completely destroyed. If that were so, Cassius
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must have been able to see what was happening on the right 
i, 4-5 wing and must have known of Brutus’ victory. Yet Plutarch
definitely states that there vras no communication between them 
and, that Cassius believed Brutus had been defeated too, 
because he could see nothing of that part of the battlefield, 
nor even his ovm camp. In Appian’s version, this confusion 
is a little more explicable; Antony’s attack, while Cassius’ 
men were engaged on the counter-works, took him by surprise 
and the consequent disorder was not improved by the behaviour 
of Brutus* array. Indeed, of the four armies only Antony’s 
seems to have been properly organised and controlled. Under 
those circumstances, mistakes arising from confusion and panic 
would more easily occur than if the Republicans had offered 
battle, as Plutarch says, and had the ability to plan an 
attack and make their arrangements. Appian’s account will 
also explain why Brutus and Cassius lost contact.
Cassius, driven from his camp (App. IV 113, 472), retired 
to a hill v/hence he could view the whole scene and learn the 
situation of both Republican armies. But clouds of dust 
obscured the battlefield (Dio 47, 46, 5); or, as Plutarch says, 
fô, 4 Cassius was short-sighted and unable to distinguish friend from
enemy. Assuming that the approaching detachment of cavalry 
was the enemy in pursuit and fearing capture, he committed
&, 5f. suicide, without waiting for the return of his scout Titinius,
whom he believed to have been taken prisoner.
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âupian (IV 113, 472-475) gives two versions of this 
scene, one corresponding exactly to Plutarch's, the other - 
which he relates first - that Titinius actually returned in 
time with news of Brutus’ success, but that Cassius refused 
to survive his own defeat. Froehlich (PW III 1735) considers 
this an attempt on Appian’s part to give Cassius a noble and 
dramatic end, comparable to that of Brutus. Dio (47, 46, 1-5) 
has the same account as Plutarch, slightly condensed. On 
Cassius’ death also, see Veil. II 70, 1-3. Plut. Ant, 22, 2. 
Livy Per. 124. Florus II 17, 10. 13. de vir ill. 83, 6,
Val. Max. VI 8, 4. IX 9, 2.
All these accounts leave two questions still unanswered: 
why did Cassius, the more experienced general of the two, fail 
so completely and despair so soon? Or was he, in fact, 
murdered? As to the first, Appian’s account shows that 
Cassius’ troops were divided, one section being engaged on the 
counter-works, away from the camp, when the attack was launched 
on them; but Cassius obviously failed to gain control of the 
situation or rally his men. Dio (47, 45, 2) explains that 
Antony’s generalship was superior to that of Cassius; in this 
first encounter, Cassius was immediately worsted,
Froehlich (PW III 1735) ascribes Cassius’ failure to the 
deterioration of his ability since the spectacular beginning 
of his military career at Carrhae. This explanation is 
scarcely satisfactory, since such a falling-off had not
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appeared in his activities of the past two years - his seizure 
oi Syria, the defeat of Dolabella, the campaign against Rhodes 
and his conduct of the Philippi campaign hitherto. Froehlich 
further suggests, however, that Cassius was hampered by his 
partnership with Brutus and, possibly, too much dominated by 
him. There is probably much truth in this - and in any case 
the sharing of the supreme command of any army was bound to 
create difficulties and encourage mistakes. But it does not 
fully explain why Cassius found it so completely paralysing 
just at that crisis.
The explanation may be contained largely in Cassius^ 
character. He seems to have been a good organizer, capable 
and energetic in planning, but in the execution of his plans 
easily discouraged and liable to panic. Although he seemed 
cool and resourceful enough in forming the conspiracy, on the 
Ides of March itself, at the mere suspicion of betrayal he was 
prepared to abandon the attempt and thought instantly of 
suicide (see above c.l6, 3-4). So, again, his conduct of the 
war showed that he had considerable military ability, but in 
the crisis at Philippi, he lost his presence of mind and was 
too ready to fear the worst (cf. Veil. II 70, 2: ’turn Cassius 
ex sua fortuna eventum collegae aestimans ...”). No doubt, 
since he knew himself to be the better soldier in general, he 
found it easier to believe that Brutus, too, had suffered 
defeat.
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43, 8, On the second, question, suspicion of foul play 
is mentioned by Appian (IV 113, 4 74) as well as Plutarch, 
since no-one but pindarus actually witnessed Cassius’ death 
and the freedman promptly disappeared. (Valerius Maximus 
- IV, 3, 4. - says Pindarus killed himself afterwards, but it 
is merely conjecture - he admits that the body was never found.)
Ferrero (S.T, III p. 204) inclines to this alternative 
explanation, since he finds Cassius’ suicide incomprehensible.
He believes that one of Cassius’ attendants (presumably 
Pindarus) had been suborned by the triumvirs, and took 
advantage of the general confusion and flight to murder his 
master. This is certainly not impossible - the behaviour of 
the slave Demetrius, who took the cloak and sword from the 
45, 2 body and carried them to Antony the same night is an indication 
that Cassius’ attendants were not above suspicion. But there 
is no strong case against the traditional vieW; a view 
generally accepted in antiquity in spite of the possibility of 
a different explanation. Plutarch and Appian alone mention 
in passing that some people queried the suicide and cast 
suspicion on Pindarus. If Plutarch’s story of the Parthian 
campaign is true and Cassius was known to have kept Pindarus 
by him for such a purpose ever since the disaster at Carrhae, 
it sufficiently explains the acceptance of the suicide. As 
to Pindarus’ disappearance - Radin reasonably suggests (p. 220) 
that if he saw Titinius returning among friends and realised
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Cassius’ error, he would not be anxious to be found there, 
even without consciousness of guilt.
44, 2. Brutus’ verdict on Cass lus : if f iw*/.
He was, indeed, one of the last of the old nobiles, a class 
rapidly disappearing and finally defeated at Philippi. Cassius 
was typical of the class for which he fought, more than Brutus, 
the doctrinaire, A sincere Republican, a capable soldier and 
administrator, he was no statesman; his view was bounded by 
the interests of his ovm class. But he was far from being one 
of the worst of his kind. However narrow and outmoded the 
tradition for which he stood, he at least was active and 
earnest in its defence (cf. Eutrop. VII 3, 2 ”dux nobilitatis 
Cassius").
His reputation in gntiquity naturally suffered since he 
had fought for the wrong, that is, the vanquished party. But 
under the early Empire, at least, he evidently had his sup- 
porters - see Tac. Ann. IV 34 on the trial of the historian 
Gremutius Cordus, accused "quod editiûs annalibus laudatoque M. 
Bruto, C. Cassium Romanorurn ultimum dixisset" - repeating 
Brutus’ expression. In his defence, he cited others who had 
praised the Liberators or at least given them honourable 
mention - Livy, Asinius Pollio, and Messalla Corvinus, who 
"imperatorem suura Cassium praedicabat" (IV 34-35). cf. Appian 
IV 132, 553 - 135, 568. But though he had some admirers, he 
was always to be overshadowed by Brutus. Momigliano (J.R.S.
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XXXI 1941 pp, 151 ff.) attributes this to the greater interest 
under the Empire in Stoicism - therefore in Cato and Brutus 
rather than the Epicurean Cassius,
44, 2, On Brutus’ orders, the body of Cassius was taken, 
privately, to Thasos, that the men might not be disheartened 
by a public funeral (see App. IV 114, 477. Dio 47, 47, 1),
The consequences of his death for the Republicans were 
.fatal. After the first battle, the situation v/as still more 
favourable to them; they continued to hold their strong 
position and were well supplied with provisions while their 
opponents, in addition to the former scarcity of food, had 
45, 1 suffered considerable losses in men (according to Messalla) and 
had had their camp pillaged. Their distress became more acute 
through the early approach of winter, which rendered their 
47, 1 low-lying camp scarcely habitable. The Republicans certainly 
appeared to hold the advantage, but the loss of Cassius counter- 
balanced it: Livy Per 124 "in aequalem fortunam partium mors
Cassi fecit". Of the two leaders, he had been the better 
general and better disciplinarian (see App. IV 123, 518. 
Frontinus, 8tratage*s IV 2, 1). Moreover, his array, being now 
damaged and sullen, did not lighten Brutus’ task as sole 
commander. There was bad feeling between the two Republican 
5, 3-9 armies, one victorious, the other beaten in the battle, and a 
discordant atmosphere throughout the camp.
45, 1-2. The triumvirs’ appreciation of the weakening of
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the Republican position by the death of Cassius is shown in
their revival of optimism (when the news reached them) after 
their despondency over the result of the battle. This is 
heightened and dramatised in the account in de vir. ill. 83, 7 
"Cuius morte audita, Antonius exclarnare dicitur: Vici." (cf.
App. IV 119, 501.)
44 - 49. Brutus’ position between battles.
44, 5f. Republican chances of victory still appeared high,
though their successes in the first battle night have been much 
greater had the men thought more of fighting and less of 
plunder. Plutarch (below 46, l) says Brutus reproached them
with this ) - Appian (IV 117, 489 - 118, 498)
provides him with a speech for the occasion.
45. The day following the battle, Brutus refused Antony’s 
challenge to renew it (see App. IV 114, 4%8) and remained 
passive. According to Dio (47, 47, 2f.) he now took up a new 
position in Cassius’ old entrenchments and transferred his 
headquarters.
45, 4f. Brutus’ treatment of the prisoners is also discussed
by Dio (47, 48, 3) who does not mention any attempt on Brutus’
part to save them, but grants that circumstances forced him 
against his will to order their execution. His account is the 
more likely to be true since he is less inclined to favour 
45, 8 Brutus. Plutarch’s narrative of the affair provides evidence of 
P. Servilius Casca’s presence at Philippi. He had fled from
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Rome on the passing of the Lex Pedia.
46, 1, -Appian (IV 118, 498) also records, as a current 
rumour, Brutus’ promise to the soldiers of the plunder of 
Thessalonica and Lacedaemon, in the event of victory. For 
this, Plutarch has no excuse. He sees it as a single,
incomprehensible lapse on the part of the mild, humane
philosopher. It is, however, a part of his character, 
contradictory and recurring, stemming from his acceptance of 
the narrow Roman code (see c, 29).
46, 3. Plutarch again attempts to exonerate Brutus by
referring any appearance of cruelty and injustice in his 
actions to the influence of Cassius - an unjust evasion. 
Moreover, the promise to the soldiers, on which he touched 
above, was made after Cassius’ death.
46, 4f, Brutus’ enforced reliance on his officers, now 
that he lacked the support of Cassius in military councils, 
was soon to have serious consequences, when they failed to 
support his policy (see App. IV 123, 518).
47. Situation of the triumvirs: now rendered almost
desperate by shortage of food and the heavy rains and cold. 
Appian (IV 122, 512-514) further explains that the resources 
of Thessaly were exhausted, they could hope for nothing from 
Italy since Republican fleets patrolled the seas and their 
army was already beginning to feel the pinch of hunger. A 
detachment was sent to forage in Achaia. Dio (47, 47, 4)
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adds that Antony and Octavian were impoverished and unable to
repair the losses their men had sustained in the plunder of 
the camp. News of the victory of the Republican fleet in the 
Adriatic alarmed them still more.
The naval battle was said to have taken place on the same
day as the first battle of Philippi. Domitius Calvinus was 
defeated by Ahenobarbus and Mureus, and the reinforcements and 
supplies intended for the triumvirs were destroyed (App. IV 
115, 479 - 117, 489. Dio 47, 47, 4).
47, 4-6. Plutarch asserts that Brutus did not know of the 
naval victory until twenty days later, and that if he had, he 
would never have been drawn into another battle. Ho?; and when 
he learned of it, if not before the battle, is not made clear.
His officers are said to have known on the eve of the second
battle, but, not crediting their authority, failed to inform 
Brutus. Appian, on the other hand, states, without qualifi­
cation, that Brutus heard the news - that being one of his 
reasons for adhering to his policy of passive resistance (App.
IV 123, 515). Dio (47, 47, 5) implies that Antony and 
Octavian endeavoured to keep the news from their ovm men, as 
well as from Brutus. Plutarch believes they were successful 
in the last, though it is not easy to see how, if the news 
reached them, it could be withiield from Brutus, who had control 
of the sea. Appian’s version seems to be more reliable on this 
point, too.
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4.8. On the second appearance of the ghost, and other 
renorts of unlucky omens, see Dio 47, 48, 4. App. IV 128, 532. 
Obsequens 70.
Plutarch’s narrative of this period is largely composed of 
anecdotes and unconnected incidents, since his chief object is 
not to give a history of the campaign. For that, Appian 
provides a clearer picture of the state and the actions of both 
sides (see IV 121, 503 - 125, 522). He describes the desperate 
anxiety of the triumvirs to force another engagement before 
their array was hopelessly weakened; their attempts by daily 
challenges and abuse to rouse Brutus’ soldiers and provoke him 
to retaliate. Brutus, however, observing the state of their 
array, refused to be drav/n. He did not wish to forsake the 
advantage of his present position and hazard another encounter 
v/ith troops driven desperate by v/ant. His plan was to wait in 
safety behind his fortifications until winter and the want of 
food had broken down the opposing army, and then to send out his 
troops to complete their destruction. But the men, unwilling 
to endure a winter in camp when they thought the victory already 
theirs, were.eager to taste its fruits, and influenced, too, by 
their opponents’ propaganda, insistently clamoured for battle. 
The officers, while appreciating Brutus’ reasons for delay, 
nevertheless thought that, in the present temper of the men, 
the war might be brought to a close more speedily - and more 
spectacularly. None of them doubted the result, in any case.
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Brutus, alone and unable to enforce his will^ like 
Cassius, seeing the army grow more restive, eventually allowed 
his better judgment to be overruled and agreed to offer battle.
Dio (47, 47, 1-4 & 48, 1-4) gives a similar account, with an 
additional reason for Brutus’ decision; the beginning of 
disaffection and desertion among the detachments of eastern 
allies, and his fear of its spreading.
Appian (IV 121, 508-512) describes the manoevres of the 
two armies between the battles - the triumvirs' object being 
to get through to the sea and cut off Brutus’ line of supply. 
They had succeeded in occupying a hill close to his camp and 
garrisoning two more outposts along the same line to the south, 
Antony’s courage and resourcefulness in such a vehture were 
much to be feared and the danger that he might succeed would 
not have escaped Brutus - who had been countering the movement 
with outposts of his ovm and harrassing his opponents with night 
skirmishes and other devices (App. IV 121, 511. Dio 47, 47, 3) 
Indeed, Rice-Holmes thinks Brutus’ change of plan was due more 
to Antony’s manoevres than to compulsion from his own men 
(Architect p. 87, following Kromayer). But it is equally 
possible that he was driven to hazard a decisive engagement 
by internal discord. From the sources it appears that there 
?;as a want of unity among the officers as well as the men, and 
Heitland (Roman Republic III p. 424) has pointed out that 
Brutus’ Republican principles hindered him in asserting an
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arbitrary power when the general opinion was against him.
But the root of the trouble lay in the difference of aim 
between Brutus and his army. It was no true Republican army 
with which he hoped to restore the Republic, but a band of 
mercenaries, united by no common purpose, whose chief object 
in the war was personal gain, who followed individual leaders. 
Hence the need of the Republicans for unlimited resources with 
which to persuade their troops that it was more profitable to 
fight for the Republic than for its enemies; hence, too, the 
impatience of the army at Philippi: the men were more con­
cerned to end the war quickly and plunder the possessions of 
their opponents than to take the surest way for the sake of 
the Republic.
It was yet another indication of the futility of Brutus’ 
undertaking; the material vfith which to rebuild the Republic 
no longer existed.
49 - 51. The Second Battle of Philippi.
The date of this battle is fixed by Suetonius (Tiberius 
5): "natus est Romae in Palatio xvi Kal. Dec. ... per bellum 
phiJ.ippens€. Sic enim in fastos actaque in publica relatum 
est." i.e. it took place about 16th November 42 B.C. or a 
few days later. A difficulty arose with the discovery of a 
fragment of the Fasti Praenestiii., which, Huelsen found, 
covered five consecutive days, 20th - 24th October (Year’s 
Work in Classical Studies - 1922-3 p. 108, 1923-4, p. 33 ff.).
83G.
From this, the decisive battle of Philippi should be dated 
Sord October /Augustus vicit Philippis posterlore proelio,
Bruto occlso.2/. Wissowa (Hermes 58, 192% pp. 372 ff,) saw 
no way of reconciling these two pieces of evidence. Others 
have since accepted 23rd October as the date of the first 
battle and 16th November for the second, which leaves about 
the right interval between them - twenty-four day^, compared 
with Plutarch’s twenty (47, 5). This seems to be the only 
possible solution, unless further evidence were obtained, and 
has been accepted by Byrne (op. cit. 205), Rice-Holmes (op,cit. 
p. 85) and Others.
49. It was already late in the day when the battle was
joined (£cs ). Brutus’ underlying mistrust of
his soldiers is betrayed here - Appian, however, says the men 
fought all the more desperately in order to shovr Brutus that 
they had been right (IV 128, 5%%),
50. The anecdote of Lucilius - told also by Appian (IV 129,
542-545): It is significant that Lucilius, to convince his
captors that he was Brutus, asked to be taken to Antony, 
pretending to have more confidence in him than in Octavian. 
Brutus’ viev;s on the tv;o opposing commanders must have been 
widely known.
Appian’s account of the progress of the battle (IV 125,
522 - 130, 546) is similar to Plutarch’s. He notes particularly
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the desperate character of the fighting on both sides and, 
after the rout of the Republican army, Antony’s determined 
pursuit, to prevent a sufficient force escaping and re-forming 
Dio (47, 48, 4-5) makes the same points, and adds that in 
oursuing the fugitive army, Antony and Octavian regained ale^t 
all night to prevent the juncture of scattered detachments. 
This time there could be no doubt of the result of the battle.
C. 51 - 5%„ The end of Brutus.
Appian: IV 13Ç, 546 - 131, 552. Livy Per. 124.
Dio; 4?, 40, 1-3. Florus: II 17, 14.
Plut. Ant. 22, 4. Oros. VI 18, 16.
Veil. II 70, 4. de vir. ill, 82, 6.
Futrop. VII 3, 2.
Byrne: p. 206. Bolssier: p. 379.
In the general rout, Brutus escaped to the surrounding hills 
during the night, Plutarch says he was accompanied only by a 
few officers and friends. Appian, on the contrary, states that 
he fled crû*/ ^IV 130, 546) which he later
defines as less than four legions (131, 549). At first, Brutus 
seems to have entertained some hone that the defeat was not 
complete (51, 5. cf. App. IV 130, 546. Dio 47, 49, 1). All 
agree that he intended to try to break through to his camp again, 
which was still garrisoned with his troops, according to Appian 
(IV 131, 549). In Plutarch, Btatyllius evidently found the 
camp nearly intact, though he failed to return thmrrh the 
enemy lines which now lay between Brutus and his former position. 
The soldiers remained under arms throughout the night (App. IV 
130, 548. Dio 47, 48, 5). Appian (IV 131, 549) says Brutus 
waited till morning, intending to offer further resistance, but 
finding then that his remaining officers were unwilling to
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continue the struggle and nlanned to make terms tith the 
triumvirs, he finally abandoned hone. Dio (47, 49, l) agrees 
that news of the surrender of his men nroven to him that his 
cause was lost, but, like Plutarch, he seems to imnly that 
Brutus’ death took place during the night after the battle.
51 - 52. The intimate details of the last night recorded 
by Plutarch seem t^ have come from an account hy Brutus’ 
friend Volumnius, who was with him, and are probably authentb 
though the same Volumnius also included in his accorut of the 
campaign supnosed omens and miraculous occurences (see above 
c. 46, 2-5).
52, 4f. Plutarch describes Brutus as still calm and even 
cheerful in taking leave of the friends who were with him.
His final comments on the triumvirs and his assertion that his 
reputation for "virtus" would outlive him and condemn his 
conquerors presumably come from Volumnius also. But Dio (47, 
49, 2) very briefly gives a different picture in recording the 
verse Brutus is said to have quoted before his death, It is 
sometimes identified with the second verse, mentioned by 
51, 2 Plutarch, which Volumnius forgot. See Dio 47, 49, 2: 
w , A^yos fj (Tct' ^ eyu> oe crc
^I^TKOOi/' era 3 ^  ' c2o(^Co£.^ .
These lines reflect a final despair, a collapse not only of 
hope but of belief also. They suggest that his pursuit of 
"virtus", his life-long devotion to philosophy, failed him at
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the supreme moment. Seeing the triumviri victorious and 
the Republic finally lost, he doubted of his old beliefs and 
princinles. Possibly - contrary to Plutarch’s account - he 
understood then that "virtus" would be annronriated by the 
vectors, that it was an empty expression, a catchword, to be 
claimed and used by the party in power and denied to their 
vanquished onponents (see Dio 46, 34, 4-5).
It was his last disillusionment. In leaving his studies 
to become a political leader he met with continual disappoint- 
ment. The people, the Senate, the army all failed him ulti­
mately, for they were no longer what he believed them to be.
His theories, formed by an isolated, bookish mind, were 
shattered by contact with reality. Finding at last how he 
had deceived Bmself, he lost faith even in his philosophy.
53, 4. Antony’s treatment of Brutus’ body (cf. App. IV 135, 
568. Dio 49, 2. Plut. Ant. 22, 6-8. Val. Max. V 1,11) 
again recalls their one-time friendship. Anton7^ was capable of 
generosity to his fallen opponent. In contrast, the story was 
told that Octavian ordered the head of Brutus to be sent to 
Rome and cast at the foot of Caesar’s statue (Suet, Aug. 13.
Dio 47, 49, 2). The story has been doubted, but it serves as 
a last illustration of the difference between Antony and 
Octavian in their attitude to Brutus (see c.29 above).
53, 5. The account of Porcia’s suicide is found also in 
Appian IV 136, 574, Dio 47, 49, 3, Plut. Cato Min, 73, 6,
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Polyasnus 8, 32, Martial I 42, Val, Max. IV 6, 5 (whom
Plutarch quotes'. From Cicero’s letters, however, it arrears
that she died in the summer of 43 B.C. (see ad Prut. I 17, 7 
and I 9). Even if these letters are not authentic, the^  ^
prove the existence of an alternative tradition, which is 
more likely to he true, since it is more prosaic. There 
vfould be no reason to invent it, if the dramatic suicide werA 
true (see Gelzer PM X 1009. Tyrrell and Purser VI note p. 
237). It was kno'^ n, though less popular, in Plutarch’s day 
(53, 6).
Philinpi savf the end of many who had f oi.lowed Brutus ; it 
thinned the ranks of the aristocracy still more (see Veil. II 
71, 2. Futrop. VII 3, 2 - "infinitam nobilitatem’) . Among 
the dead were Cato’s son, the younger Lucullus, hivius Drusus, 
the father of Livia, Hortensuis, Quintilius Varus and a nephew 
of Cassius (Apu, IV 135, 571-572. Plut. Ant. 22, Veil II 71, 
2-3). Of the remaining consnirators, Cimber and the Cascas 
are not heard of again. 8yme (p. 205) notes the lack of 
consulars in this list. The old Optimales of 49 (Cato, 
Bibulus, Domitius, Marcellus) had already disappeared. The 
younger generation of nobiles fell with Brutus and Cassius at 
uhilippi.
Of those 77ho escaped to Thasos, some with Messalla and 
Bibulus made terms with Antony, others (including Cicero’s son) 
fled to Cassius Parmensis (App. V 2, 4) and later joined
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Dorait:.i;s’ fleet in the Adriatic or went over to Sextus 
Poraneius (V 2, 9).
Pnilinpi, then, did not see the end of all resistance to 
the triumvirate but it marked, nonetheless, the *nd of the 
Republic. Porapeius was not Brutus’ successor. While Brutus 
lived, the Republic existed in some sort, for it had a 
defender and a party. But the restoration for which Brutus 
hoped was impossible. Had he then victorious, his disilluslon- 
rnent would have been even greater. He could have done no more 
than restore the merest semblance of the Republic, maintained 
in existence by force of arms alone. "Hoc bello victores. 
quam rem uublicam simus habituri, non facile adfirmarim" (ad 
Brut. I 15, 10).
His attempt, doomed to fail from the beginning, played its 
part in the dissolution of the Republic. Rome had not been 
ready for Caesar. His assassination and the wars that 
followed in 44 - 42 B.C. swept away still more of the old order, 
preparing the way for the new, v/hen the revolution should be 
completed.
Brutus himself had no qualifications for the task of re­
construction. Plutarch was drawn to him chiefly by the 
qualities which made him unfit for it: the idealism, the set
principles, the love of intellectual pursuits. The character 
he depicts, is,on the whole, similar to that of the historians, 
but with its harsher lines smoothed away. The result has a
little too much of the Greek in it; though Brutus was 
influenced by Greek thought and had a circle of Greek friends 
(e.g. Erapylos, Strato, Aristus). he was always a Roman, ano a 
Roman of his age. This is apnarent from Cicero, whose 
impressions of him provide invaluable evidence; yet cannot 
always be taken too literally. On the one hand, complimentary 
reference in literary works paint an idealised picture, not 
unlike Plutarch’s; on the other, the vivid accounts of the 
letters are sometimes subject to the distortion of misunder- 
standing or particular mood. Apart from the general historical 
background, Plutarch drew much of his material from memoirs and 
■monographs by Brutus’ friends (e,g, Volumnius, Bibulus,
Messalla) which probably provide the basis for his character 
study and may be responsible for much of the idealising apparent 
in it. To reach any estimate of the real man is difficult in 
the contradictions of the sources. But the strongest impression 
is of a man "who in any ordinary age would have developed into 
nothing more than an aristocratic dilettante" (Ferrero II p. 304), 
a student by nature, thrust by his position at Rome and the 
regard of contemporaries into a part for which he was not fitted 
and which magnified his importance. The burden was too much 
for him and ended by destroying the world of ideas in which he 
had lived and v/ith which he had attempted to oppose the real 
world of men and affairs.
